dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion, as I believe the constitutionality of this statute is controlled by the principles enunciated in Jamison v. City of Atlanta, 225 Ga. 51 (165 SE2d 647). In my opinion, the majority decision cannot be reconciled with the reasoning used by this court in Jamison.
It is true that we are dealing here with the dissolution of municipal corporations rather than with annexation. Both, however, lie within the exclusive power of the legislature and cannot be delegated without constitutional authorization.
I know of no constitutional provision which authorized the Georgia General Assembly to delegate its power to dissolve municipal charters in 1947 when this statute was enacted.
*355Clearly the present statute delegates legislative power. Under the express terms of the statute, no charter is ever dissolved unless and until a petition is filed with the superior court by a majority of the voters involved. The decision to dissolve or not dissolve the municipality is made first by the voters and finally by the courts. The superior court is given discretion, without any standards which must be followed, to dissolve the municipality or not to dissolve the municipality. The statute provides the court "may [not shall] receive the surrendered corporate charter and by order ... declare [the] incorporated city or town to be dissolved.”
Therefore, under the statute, both the voters and the superior courts are given aspects of legislative power which the Constitution vested in the General Assembly. Despite my reluctance to overturn any Act of the General Assembly, it is our duty to do so if the Act is violative of the Constitution. I believe the present statute must fall under the law as previously interpreted by this court if stare decisis is still a valid doctrine.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hill concurs in this dissent.