More than a year ago I joined in Justice Mosk’s Frierson opinion. (25 Cal.3d 142, 188-196.) Yet in the case now before us I am persuaded by neither parts II to IV nor part V of his dissent. Instead I concur with my colleagues who hold that the statute is constitutional and that the judgment of death therefore must be affirmed.
Very briefly I will explain why I do not subscribe fully to any colleague’s views. The lead opinion, I believe, answers credibly (1) the questions on adequacy of counsel that have been specified by the Chief Justice and Justice Mosk, and (2) the Chief Justice’s objections concerning constitutionality and proportionality. As to the death penalty in general, I still share views expressed by Justice Mosk in Frierson. I do not, however, agree with his conclusion that four defects require us to hold the statute unconstitutional.
How much should we demand of the individuals who draft death-penalty statutes? A reasonable and conscientious response to the United States Supreme Court rulings is enough, I think. Since I am persuaded that the California Legislature did. so respond, I vote to uphold the statute. There may well be revision of those rulings (see Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 190-195), but “a state court would be rash indeed to pre*319diet how and when the United States Supreme Court will ultimately solve the problem it created in Furman.” {Id., at p. 195.)
If the Supreme Court does decide to prescribe certain procedures, how might our approach to cases like this be affected? Should we pronounce that legislative acknowledgment of the new prescriptions is essential and (as Justice Mosk seems to suggest) that all “elementary requirements” must be articulated in a rewritten statute? As recently as last month we stated: “If feasible within bounds set by their words and purpose, statutes should be construed to preserve their constitutionality. [Citations.]” (Conservatorship of Hofferber (1980) ante, p. 161 at p. 175 [167 Cal.Rptr. 854, 616 P.2d 836].)
California courts and federal courts are not timid in reading into legislation various procedural and other rules deemed constitutionally required that the draftsmen may have overlooked or rejected. That is demonstrably true as to countless requirements on matters such as unanimous verdict, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and jury or judge findings. Whether there be four such matters or forty (cf. Hofferber, supra, at pp. 178-179; Frierson, supra, at p. 193, fn. 8) we should not insist, even in death penalty cases, that each requirement be first written out and then enacted by the Legislature.