dissenting.
“The law is clear that the basis for an owner’s liability for injury occurring to another while on the owner’s property is the owner’s superior knowledge of the danger or defect which was the proximate cause of the injury . . . [I]f his invitee knows of the condition or hazard, there is no duty on the part of the proprietor to warn the invitee and there is no liability for resulting injury because the invitee has as much knowledge as the proprietor does.” Purvis v. Holiday Hills Property Owners Assn., 163 Ga. App. 387, 388-389 (294 SE2d 592) (1982). See also Jones v. Interstate North Assoc., 145 Ga. App. 366 (243 SE2d 737) (1978).
Even where the injury is death, this court must be firm in the application of this rule. “The hardship of the particular case is no reason for melting down the law. For the sake of fixedness and uniformity, law must be treated as a solid, not as a fluid. It must have, and always retain, a certain degree of hardness, to keep its outlines firm and constant. Water changes shape with every vessel into which it is poured; and a liquid law would vary the mental conformation of judges, and become a synonym for vagueness and instability.” Southern Star Lightning Rod Co. v. Duvall, 64 Ga. 263, 269 (1879).
By adding a test of absolute, subjective awareness of the injured person, the majority opinion has proceeded to melt down the meaning of the term “superior knowledge.” Carrying that analysis to its logical *213conclusion, a jury question will always exist in cases of this nature; although certain dangers present on a defendant’s premises may be as obvious as daylight, that analysis will allow an injured person to court the sympathy of a jury simply by protesting that “Yes, I couldn’t help but notice the radish on the floor, but I didn’t realize that by placing my foot on the blighted orb I would slip and fall.” The point is that, in perhaps a rare display of common sense, the law has always attributed to people the appreciation of certain dangers presented by a known condition, regardless of a particular injured party’s individual, subjective awareness. For example, this court has always held, as a matter of law (and perhaps at the risk of denying reality in specific cases), that even a small child appreciates the dangers of natural bodies of water; surely some child has ventured into a natural body of water completely unaware of the risks, and drowned, but this court’s adherence to the above principle has been steadfast. This “certain degree of hardness” may be frustrating to those who seek solace in the collection of damages, but it is vital and necessary to maintain a workable uniformity in the law. Although by human measure the circumstances presented by the instant case are less compelling than those of a small child drowning in a lake, the majority opinion unwittingly has abandoned the above fundamental judicial philosophy.
The facts of this case are uncomplicated. Javis Coates, a seventeen-year-old student athlete of normal intelligence, drowned in a motel swimming pool while swimming with his teammates. All of the circumstances at the time, i.e., the lack of lighting, the absence of a safety rope, the degree of water clarity, and the lack of any lifeguard, alleged by the appellants as negligence on the appellee’s part, were readily apparent to Javis Coates and the other members of the tennis team. Under these circumstances, the law must attribute to Javis Coates the actual appreciation of the risk. Consequently, the uncontroverted lack of superior knowledge on the part of the appellee proprietor, and the voluntary act of Javis Coates in proceeding to swim despite his knowledge, should absolve the appellee of any liability for the drowning death of Javis Coates. It could be argued that the sage expression of Justice Bleckley is appropriate here: “Any one who seriously doubts the correctness of this ruling may readily solve his doubts by studying law.” Dutton v. State, 92 Ga. 14, 15 (18 SE 545) (1893).
I believe that the trial court properly granted judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict. The majority opinion errs in holding otherwise, and I must respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong joins in this dissent, and that Judge Sognier concurs in the judgment of the dissent.
*214Decided February 18, 1986 Rehearing denied March 11, 1986 William J. McKenney, for appellants. Morris S. Robertson, W. G. Scrantom, Jr., Mark R. Youmans, for appellees.