OPINION
LOPEZ, Judge.Plaintiffs claim that they were falsely imprisoned by their employer, Lockheed Electronics Corporation, and two of its agents (hereafter referred to collectively as Lockheed) at the time they went through the clearance procedures associated with their discharge from the NASA Johnson Space Craft Center, at the White Sands Test Facility. The court below, believing that, as a matter of law, Lockheed had reasonable grounds to detain the plaintiffs, granted summary judgment for the defendants. We reverse.
Around 10:00 A.M. on June 28, 1977, the six plaintiffs were called from their work and informed that their employment with Lockheed was terminated. After being informed of their discharge, the plaintiffs dispersed to eat their lunches. Some returned to their work area for lunch, and some ate at the cafeteria. They were told to reassemble at 12:30 to meet the van which would transport them around the facility during the clearance process. Arriving at the van, the plaintiffs found not only the driver, but also L. C. Stokes, a management official, and Walter Raypon, a security guard, uniformed and armed with a gun. Raypon indicated that his gun was loaded. The plaintiffs could not exit the van by themselves, since the handle to the sliding door, having broken, had been removed and was kept by the driver. During the clearance, which took about two and half hours, the plaintiffs were not allowed to leave their group. They were not allowed to use restroom facilities, drink water, or use the telephone, except at one area. They claimed they were marched through work areas in front of other workers, which caused them humiliation and embarrassment.
Plaintiffs had been discharged for involvement in a scheme of falsifying their time cards, a plan which they thought had been approved by the management. Later, as the result of arbitration between their union and Lockheed, the plaintiffs were reinstated in their former positions.
False imprisonment involves the unlawful interference with the personal liberty or freedom of locomotion of another. There is no need that the plaintiffs have been held in jail or custody. Martinez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 81 N.M. 371, 467 P.2d 37 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 81 N.M. 425, 467 P.2d 997 (1970).
The restraint constituting false imprisonment may arise out of words, acts, gestures or similar means which induce reasonable apprehension that force will be used if the plaintiff does not submit and it is sufficient if they operate upon the will of the person threatened and result in a reasonable fear of personal difficulty or personal injuries.
Id. at 373, 467 P.2d at 39. In deciding whether summary judgment is proper, an appellate court must view the matters presented in the light most favorable to support the right to trial on the issues. C & H Construction & Paving Co. v. Citizens Bank, 93 N.M. 150, 597 P.2d 1190 (Ct.App. 1979). The plaintiffs, through their pleadings and depositions, have established that defendants unlawfully interfered with their personal liberty. If, however, the defendants had reasonable cause to restrain plaintiffs, then plaintiffs’ suit for false imprisonment fails. See, Stienbaugh v. Payless Drug Store, Inc., 75 N.M. 118, 401 P.2d 104 (1965). The issue presented to us is whether, as a matter of law, the defendants have established that they had reasonable cause to restrain the plaintiffs in the manner described above.
In Stienbaugh, a shop owner detained a customer whom he believed had been shoplifting. The customer sued him for false imprisonment and won a judgment because the court found the shop owner did not have reasonable cause to detain that customer. By analogizing to the situation in the case before us, we believe that if Lockheed can prove that it had reasonable grounds for employing these security measures in these circumstances, it will have established a defense to plaintiff’s suit. Because this is an appeal from a summary judgment, we must determine whether reasonable cause to detain is a question of law or of fact, or mixed. In Stienbaugh the New Mexico Supreme Court wrote:
[I]f the question of reasonable or probable cause for the detention ... is undisputed, it is one of law for the court, but if the evidence is conflicting, it is a mixed question of law and fact. . . .
Id. at 122, 401 P.2d at 106. The court in that case found that the question of reasonable cause was disputed because, although the manager of the store had reason to believe the plaintiffs were shoplifting, having been so informed by a clerk, the plaintiffs testified to the contrary; and the merchandise was not in their possession.
In the instant case there is conflicting evidence of the existence of reasonable cause to detain the plaintiffs in this fashion. Lockheed stated that it feared the plaintiffs might sabotage the system or disrupt the work activities because they had just been fired. In support of this, it claimed the plaintiffs, or some of them, had been involved in disruptive activities that very morning before their discharge. The plaintiffs denied this. They also denied that Lockheed had reasonable cause to believe that they posed any danger to the facilities. The plaintiffs had never threatened sabotage; they were not charged with a criminal offense; many of them held, at one time or another, various degrees of military clearance; and one of them had worked at the site for over eleven years. Plaintiffs asserted that the defendants did not seriously consider them a security threat, since they allowed plaintiffs to go off by themselves at lunch for approximately two hours, after they had been informed that they, had been fired and before they were to meet the van.
A reasonable doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in dispute precludes summary judgment. Goodman v. Brock, 83 N.M. 789, 498 P.2d 676 (1972). The party opposing the motion is to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts in determining whether a genuine issue exists. Pharmaseal Laboratories, Inc. v. Goffe, 90 N.M. 753, 568 P.2d 589 (1977). An issue is raised when there is some evidence in dispute. Id. There is disputed evidence in the case before us of whether Lockheed had reasonable cause to detain plaintiffs. This issue is sufficient to preclude summary judgment.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
SUTIN, J., specially concurs. WOOD, C. J., dissents.