concurring specially.
While I agree the judgment in this case must be affirmed, I cannot agree with all that is said in the majority’s opinion. A review of the trust agreement created by James Richards reveals that the beneficiaries have a vested interest because there is no uncertainty as to their right of future enjoyment, see generally Henderson v. Collins, 245 Ga. 776 (1) (267 SE2d 202) (1980), and that it is a non-discretionary trust because the trustee has no discretion in regard to the “annual or more frequent” disbursement to the beneficiaries of the income that accrues on the multi-million dollar principal1 or to the ultimate distribution of the principal to the beneficiaries. See generally id. (“discretionary trust is a trust under the terms of which the trustee has absolute discretion as to the payment of principal and interest to beneficiaries”). The law is well established that a creditor can obtain satisfaction of a judgment by proceeding against the interest of a beneficiary in a non-discretionary trust, see id., and that even in the case of minors, a creditor can recover for the provision of necessaries, see OCGA § 13-3-20 (a), and other items under certain circumstances. See, e.g., OCGA § 13-3-21; Ullmer v. Fitzgerald, 106 Ga. 815 (32 SE 869) (1899) (minor allowed by guardian to practice profession is bound by contracts minor executed in relation to that profession). Thus, because the law allows persons to obtain reimbursement from a vested, non-discretionary trust for sums contributed to the welfare of its beneficiaries, whether or not the trust so provides, I would recognize, contrary to the majority’s position, that a person may be an “interested person” for the purpose *289of removing the trustee of a vested, non-discretionary trust for “simply . . . expending sums for the support of a trust beneficiary,” Majority Opinion, p. 287, and would reject the majority’s language intimating, without any supporting authority, that a person’s status as an “interested person” may be determined solely based on the presence or absence of language in the trust agreement. See Majority Opinion, p. 286 (“the trust agreement neither guaranteed that the trust would contribute a specific amount towards the children’s support nor provided that the trust would assume the obligation to reimburse . . . any other third party for such sums as might be contributed to their welfare”).2
I further diverge from the majority on the interpretation it gives to the definition of “interested person” in OCGA § 53-12-2 (4). The Legislature, in defining this term, expressly recognized that its “meaning, as it relates to particular persons, may vary from time to time and must be determined according to the particular purposes of and matter involved in any proceeding.” (Emphasis supplied.) Given this expansive directive from the Legislature, I disagree with the majority’s restrictive application of this definition because it ignores the guiding principles in the plain language of OCGA § 53-12-2 (4) in favor of language out of a foreign case construing a statute that lacks the guiding principles found in our statute. See In the Matter of Horton, 668 NW2d 208, 212 (I) (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing that its code provisions on trusts do “not define ‘interested person’ ”); Lemke v. Lemke, 929 SW2d 662, 664 (Tex. App. 1996) (relying upon Texas statutory definition of “interested person” as merely a “ ‘trustee, beneficiary, or any other person having an interest in or a claim against the trust or any person who is affected by the administration of the trust’ ”).
Following the directive of OCGA § 53-12-2 (4) and looking to the particular circumstances in this case, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that appellant could not be an interested person based on a claim against the trust for expenses paid on behalf of the beneficiaries. My conclusion is not based merely upon the fact that the trust agreement in this case, while not guaranteeing a “specific” amount to the beneficiaries’ support, did guarantee that any income generated on the principal was to be distributed at least annually, if not more frequently, and then further provided that this income, once generated, was to be disbursed during the beneficiaries’ minority to *290their duly appointed legal guardian, thereby authorizing disbursement of these amounts to appellant. My conclusion is also based on the fact that the trial court in this case has already expressly found that the parties have “admit [ted] . . . that [appellant] should be reimbursed for expenses she has paid on behalf of the children in the amount of $80,284.03” and ordered the immediate payment of this sum. That amount represents over half of the $150,000 claim appellant has made against the trust for reimbursement of expenses on behalf of the beneficiaries. Appellees have not challenged that ruling. See generally Chester v. Georgia Mut. Ins. Co., 165 Ga. App. 783 (1) (302 SE2d 594) (1983) (cross-appeal required for appellees to challenge rulings adverse to them). The majority’s holding as to appellant’s right to reimbursement is thus contrary to the law of the case. See generally OCGA§ 9-11-60 (h).
The record fails to reflect any reimbursement to appellant for the remaining expenses she claims she expended on behalf of the beneficiaries. Because of these outstanding sums, appellant argues that she is an interested person under OCGA§ 53-12-2 (4). I agree with the majority that appellant is not an interested person, but I can do so only because the record in this case reveals that appellant herself has chosen to define her interest in this litigation in a manner that excludes her from the definition of “interested person” under OCGA § 53-12-2 (4). Appellant has directed this Court’s attention to language in the pretrial order, submitted by the parties and signed by the trial court, in which appellant contended that appellees had failed to pay her for the unreimbursed advances, asserting that the amounts were due to her “under the Settlement Agreement” and that, “[a]s a result, [appellees] are obligated for the full amount of the unfunded distributions for support and maintenance” of the beneficiaries. It thus appears that appellant seeks reimbursement of the remaining expenses not based on the terms of the April 1994 trust agreement and her interest in receiving the annual or more frequent income disbursements on behalf of the beneficiaries, but rather upon the obligations appellee James Richards assumed under the December 2000 settlement agreement and the manner in which the parties thought those obligations would be supplemented by the trust.3 However, the provisions in the settlement agreement could have no effect on the trust agreement, which expressly provides that it is irrevocable and subject to amendment solely for certain designated tax purposes wholly unrelated to this litigation.
*291Decided November 20, 2006. Morris, Manning & Martin, Joseph R. Manning, Robert C. Threlkeld, Leslie A. Allen, for appellant. Caldwell & Watson, Floyd E. PropstHI, Warner, Mayoue, Bates & Nolen, John C. Mayoue, Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore, H. Lamar Mixson, Lisa R. Strauss, Susan A. Chiapetta, for appellees.The record contains no modification to the pretrial order between the time it was executed and entry of the order granting summary judgment to appellees. Accordingly, appellant is bound by her statement that her claim for reimbursement is premised solely upon the settlement agreement. No other basis appearing in the record that would support appellant’s claim to be an “interested person” under OCGA § 53-12-2 (4), I therefore concur only in the majority’s final disposition.
The non-discretionary nature of the trust is not changed by the fact that the original principal of the trust, which produced income, has apparently been replaced with property that does not produce any income.
For the reasons that follow, I do not find it necessary to reach the question whether appellant, in her status as the mother of the beneficiaries, could qualify as a “creditor” for purposes of standing under OCGA § 53-12-2 (4).
Appellant does not reference, nor does review of the record reveal, any pleading in which appellant asserted she was entitled to reimbursement under the trust agreement.