dissenting
In my opinion the trial court did not err in concluding that the Notice of Appeal from the decision of the State Technical Review Board was not timely filed. Therefore, I dissent from the majority’s decision.
In this case the County was required to file a Notice of Appeal within thirty days after entry of the Board’s final order. Rule 2A:2. The certified mail receipt contained in the record shows that a document which the parties agree was a Notice of Appeal was filed on August 22, 1985. Thus, the Notice of Appeal was timely only if the Board’s order was entered on or after July 23, 1985.
The Board’s order has three different dates. The last sentence recites that it was “entered this 28th day of June, 1984 A.D.” Appearing below the chairman’s signature, without explanation, is the date “July 20, 1985.” Finally, the date “July 23, 1985” appears below the secretary’s attestation.
An examination of the three dates reveals a rational basis supporting the trial court’s decision that the order was entered on July 20, 1985. The date of July 23, 1985, appearing below the secretary’s attestation, established at most that the secretary attested to the order on that date. From the date of attestation, we can only determine that the order was entered on or before that date. Since the earliest of the three dates on the order, June 28, 1984, is facially incorrect, this date must be discarded as the date upon which the order was entered. Rejecting these two dates leaves only July 20, 1985 (the date written below the chairman’s signature). In my opinion the trial court’s selection of this date was reasonable and supported by the record; using this date, the Notice of Appeal was not timely. Therefore, I cannot join in the majority’s conclusion that there is no rational basis to support the trial court’s determination that the Board’s order was entered on July 20.
Also, I cannot agree that the requirement contained in Code § 9-6.14:14, requiring the Board to serve its decisions upon the “private parties by mail,” alters the requirements of Rule 2A:2. First, the provisions of Code § 9-6.14:14 apply expressly to “private parties” which Fairfax County is not. More importantly, neither Code § 9-6.14:14 nor Rule 2A:2 ties the thirty day time *11period required for filing the Notice of Appeal to the date of the mailing of the final order. Only the Supreme Court can change a rule of court and only the legislature can amend statutes. Therefore, 1 cannot join the majority in expanding the scope of Code § 9-6.14:14 to rectify the County’s failure to file its Notice of Appeal within the time required by the Rules of the Virginia Supreme Court.
For these reasons I would affirm the judgment of the trial court and must dissent from the decision of the majority.