dissenting.
I voted to decline to accept jurisdiction in this special action for a number of reasons. First, in my opinion, the courts of this state lack the power to issue writs of habeas corpus to secure the reton of persons outside of Arizona. Furthermore, the courts of this state also- lack the authority to advise the courts of Florida on issues of its own jurisdiction particularly before Florida has finally resolved such matters.9
In examining the adequacy of available remedies, this court should also be cognizant of the potential for delay occasioned by accepting special action jurisdiction. See Ft. Lowell-NSS Ltd. Partnership v. Kelly, 166 Ariz. 96, 100, 800 P.2d 962, 966 (1990). The majority’s desire to afford immediate relief to the father may actually delay any favorable outcome in this case. The mandate in this case must be domesticated, and hence “relitigated,” in the state of Florida where the child is now located. The special action relief granted by this court could postpone the ultimate outcome in Florida.
The procedural context of this dispute has not been fully considered. It is well settled that writs for habeas corpus in state proceedings cannot extend beyond state lines. Specifically, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in an adoption case seeking return of a child being adopted should be filed in the state in which adoption proceedings are pending. Application of Peterson on Behalf of Peterson, 203 Mont. 305, 661 P.2d 40 (1983). In Peterson, a case analogous to the one at bar, the Montana court held that a Montana mother who had executed consent forms in Montana and placed the child with a couple in Wyoming, where adoption proceedings were commenced, must properly contest her consent in the Wyoming courts. Interpreting the same UCCJA the majority construes above, the Montana court concluded that it was for the Wyoming court in which the proceedings were pending to determine that Wyoming was an inconvenient forum; the issue of Wyoming’s jurisdiction was not properly before the courts of Montana. Id. 661 P.2d at 43. See also Palm v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 97 Cal.App.3d 456, 158 Cal.Rptr. 786, 791 (1979) (UCCJA does not give a court authority to determine it has a superior right to proceed where another court is also asserting jurisdiction). Although the petitioner father in the present dispute makes a persuasive case for forum non conveniens, his arguments are better addressed to the Florida courts because prior adoption proceedings have been brought in that state.10
*108For similar reasons, I believe the UCCJA has been misconstrued by the majority. The majority is correct that Arizona is the child’s home state, because the child was bom in Arizona and lived here for the first four months of her life. However, A.R.S. section 8-406 provides that the Arizona courts shall not exercise jurisdiction if, at the time a petition is filed in Arizona, a proceeding concerning the child’s custody is pending before the court of another state asserting jurisdiction in conformity with the UCCJA unless the foreign proceeding has been stayed. Lofts v. Superior Court, 140 Ariz. 407, 682 P.2d 412 (1984). The majority states, ante at page 756, that Florida did not exercise its jurisdiction in conformity with the UCCJA and that Arizona may therefore assert jurisdiction merely because it is the child’s home state. This statement overlooks the fact that the petitioner is collaterally attacking the jurisdiction of Florida courts in an Arizona forum. A decision in a collateral attack is limited only to a finding that the matter of jurisdiction in the other State was “fully and fairly litigated and finally decided in the court which rendered the original judgment.” Lofts, 140 Ariz. at 410, 682 P.2d at 415 (citing Underwriters National Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life and Accident and Health Insurance Guaranty Assoc’n, 455 U.S. 691, 102 S.Ct. 1357, 71 L.Ed.2d 558 (1982)). Clearly, in the present proceedings, the Florida court has not fully and fairly litigated this issue. From the present record it appears that no objection to Florida’s jurisdiction has been raised in that court. It also appears that no motion pleading forum non conveniens has been presented to that court. Furthermore, no request for a stay has been directed to that court. See In re Custody of Rector, 39 Colo.App. 111, 565 P.2d 950, 952 (1977) (Under UCCJA proper course of action is to request stay from court in which case is pending.). In short, the Florida court has not been afforded the opportunity to consider, let alone determine, its own jurisdiction. In my opinion, it is improper for this court to entertain a collateral attack on that non-existent determination.
Predictability and consistency are the cornerstones of the jurisdictional law of this country. The monetary ability of litigants to travel to a distant courthouse is not, and should not be, the dispositive factor in jurisdictional disputes which implicate the longstanding doctrines of inter-jurisdictional deference and respect. In its desire to afford immediate relief to an aggrieved party in an emotionally charged situation, the majority has seemingly ignored the comity afforded to the court of our sister state and has released an anomaly into a highly volatile area of the law.
For the foregoing reasons, I would decline to accept jurisdiction in this special action.
. Although I decline to accept jurisdiction in this proceeding, I candidly admit that the limited record before this court presents a strong position in favor of the father.
. Requiring the petitioner to argue his cause in Florida courts will not deprive him of a substantial right because the statutes controlling the natural father's parental rights are essentially the same, and the ultimate outcome is unlikely to vary. Compare A.R.S. § 8-106; Matter of Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JA-33794, 171 Ariz. 90, 93, 828 P.2d 1231, 1234 (App.1991) with F.S.A. §§ 63.062 and 63.072; Collins v. Cottrill, 388 So.2d 302 (Fla.App.1980); Durden v. Henry, 343 So.2d 1361 (Fla.App.1977).