concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur fully except with regard to Divisions 3 and 8, involving Michael Johnson’s appeal, case no. 76958, and Division 13, involving Johnson Realty, Inc.’s appeal, case no. 76956.
These divisions relate to court charges in connection with the Georgia Real Estate Manual and testimony about it. Michael Johnson enumerates as error the giving of four charges, three regarding the Georgia Real Estate Manual and one regarding the Georgia Real Estate licensing law. He also enumerates the admission of the manual into evidence. Johnson Realty joins Michael Johnson in enumerating as error the admission of the manual and the giving of the charge in *717connection with the Georgia Real Estate licensing law. It further enumerates as error the admission of testimony regarding the licensing law.
As to the admission of the document, objections were withdrawn and consequently the issue dissolved and the manual was admitted into evidence. About this appellants cannot complain, having acceded.. The majority addresses the court charges in Division 3, and both the charges and the testimony in Division 13. In order to properly consider the charges and testimony, we must understand what the manual is and the limited purpose for which it was offered and, in obedience to the court’s charge, used.
The manual was published by the Georgia Association of Realtors, Inc., under authorization of the Georgia Real Estate Commission, a statutory agency which regulates the profession. OCGA § 43-40-2. The foreword, by the Commission, states that “[t]he Commis- ’ sion is responsible for preparing the contents of the manual.” It also states that, in addition to its being a preparatory aid for license examination, “[t]he Commission also intends that current licensees may utilize the contents of this manual as an aid to legal and ethical brokerage activity.” A caveat is added to warn that it is not intended as a substitute for legal advice or service. The manual contains Title 43 Chapter 40 of OCGA (the licensing law), the Rules and Regulations (Chapters 520-1 through 520-5), and procedures and explanatory notes regarding various aspects of the real estate practice.
The court charge about which both Michael Johnson and Johnson Realty complain, and which is controlling here, states:
“I charge that a person holding a Georgia real estate license may not be sued for his failure to comply with statutes governing real estate brokers, but those statutes set out the relevant standards and may be referred to in determining whether the broker has violated or fulfilled his fiduciary duties.” Thus the court limited the use to which the jury could put the manual. Plaintiff had introduced this docu-" mentary evidence and the testimony in connection with it for the limited purpose of serving as a guideline of the minimum standards in the real estate profession.
While of course a great portion of the manual is not relevant to the standard of behavior required of Michael Johnson and Johnson Realty in dealing with Hand, the objections go to the heart of the relevancy of any of it to this issue. Since the court expressly circumscribed the use of it to what was relevant, there was no harm in admitting the whole thing so as to provide the context.
“Where evidence is offered and objected to, if it is competent for any purpose, it is not erroneous to admit it. [Cits.]” Gordon v. Gordon, 133 Ga. App. 520, 522 (1) (211 SE2d 374) (1974). As in that case, the evidence here “was admissible for the purpose stated.”
*718“ ‘Evidence which, in connection with other evidence, tends, however slightly, to prove, explain, or illustrate a fact, even though it is not sufficient, standing alone, to sustain a finding of such fact, is relevant, has probative value and is admissible as against objection as to its relevancy and probative value; doubt as to the latter should be resolved in favor of admission and against exclusion, sufficiency not being a test or condition of admissibility [Cits.]’ [Cits.]” Dept. of Transp. v. Whitehead, 169 Ga. App. 226, 231 (4) (312 SE2d 344) (1983). Evidence of doubtful relevancy should be admitted, and even if irrelevant evidence is admitted, it does not require a new trial unless the objector’s rights are prejudiced. Wages v. Sibran, Inc., 171 Ga. App. 14, 15 (1) (318 SE2d 679) (1984).
Much of the dispute here involved the fiduciary relationship between plaintiff and defendants and the duties of each of the latter to him in their professional capacity. At issue was whether each had lived up to the standards of the profession in dealing with plaintiff, or whether they had violated their professional standards and in addition committed fraud. In aiding the jury to determine what the professional standards were, the minimum standards required by the agency which regulates the profession would be relevant albeit not determinative.
Just as expert testimony on the subject would aid in giving the jury a measuring stick, so would the law, rules and regulations, and practices outlined in the manual for the proper practice of the profession. It would be akin to evidence of custom in the trade. See City of Macon v. Yaughn, 83 Ga. App. 610, 614 (2) (64 SE2d 369) (1951). The court in Coffeen v. Doster, 161 Ga. App. 529, 530 (1) (288 SE2d 327) (1982) stated the rule: “evidence of custom and practice of persons in a similar trade is admissible to show whether one so engaged can be faulted for negligence by failing to exercise that degree of care customarily followed in the trade, . . .” Relevance to the breaches of duty alleged in this action for fraud and deceit would be no less than in a negligence action.
The minimum standards set by the law and the agency are not recognized in law “solely for the regulatory purpose of licensing,” as ruled by the majority. As quoted from Campagna v. Sara Hudson Realty Co., 137 Ga. App. 451, 452 (224 SE2d 102) (1976): “Some of the conduct condemned may also serve as the basis for judicial action for recovery of monetary damages under other statutes.” The court in Kimball Bridge Rd. v. Everest Realty, 141 Ga. App. 835, 837 (2) (234 SE2d 673) (1977) quoted this and stated: “[h]ence, this Act recognizes certain minimum standards for persons engaged in the real estate business.” Fraud is a statutory cause of action. OCGA § 51-6-1.
The agency is empowered to “do such acts and things as may seem advisable to the commission in the advancement of the profes*719sion and the standards of the real estate business.” OCGA § 43-40-2 (b).
Decided November 30, 1988 — Rehearing denied December 20, 1988 Oliver, Duckworth, Sparger & Winkle, G. Robert Oliver, Warren A. Sellers, for Johnson Realty & W. R. Johnson. Remar & Graettinger, John S. Graettinger, Jr., Marcia E. Fishman, Megan E. Gideon, for Hand. Brown & Foster, Larry A. Foster, for Michael Johnson.“ ‘Questions of relevancy of evidence ... are for the court, and in the absence of an abuse of judicial discretion, this court will not interfere. [Cit.]’ ” Wages, supra at 15. There was no abuse of discretion in applying OCGA § 24-2-1 as it relates to the testimony concerning the manual, which document was in evidence, particularly in light of the limiting instruction. The charge on the subject was proper and did not supplant but rather supplemented the court’s extensive charges on the principles of agency.
Since I find no error in the matter ruled upon in Division 13, I dissent to the reversal of the judgment against Johnson Realty, Inc., Case No. 76956.
I am authorized to state that Judge Pope joins in this opinion.