dissenting.
Construing the evidence in favor of upholding the jury’s verdict, Ackerman/Adair Realty Co. v. Coopedge, 155 Ga. App. 903, 907 (3) (273 SE2d 645) (1980), and bearing in mind the well established rule that a judgment will not be disturbed where there is any Evidence in the record to sustain the verdict, in the absence of some material error of law, Bullock v. Bullock, 178 Ga. App. 336, 337 (343. SE2d 121) (1986), I must dissent from the majority’s reversal of the verdict in Case No. 76525 since evidence supporting the verdict is present in the record and I find no material errors mandating reversal.
1. The trial court refused to admit approximately 50 photographs depicting the subject property which were shot by a DOT employee shortly after the date of taking. The issue on appeal is not whether the photographs should have been admitted, since both I and the trial court agree with the majority that it would have been better to have admitted the photographs. The issue for determination is whether the improper exclusion of this evidence constituted a material error mandating reversal. “It is incumbent upon the reviewing court to determine if the mistake was of sufficient magnitude to require a new trial. [Cit.]” Dual S. Enterprises v. Webb, 138 Ga. App. 810, 812 (3) (227 SE2d 418) (1976).
*642The record reveals that while no photographs depicting the property during that time frame were admitted, there was extensive testimony describing the condition of the property: the DOT employee who photographed the scene testified in depth detailing the view he had witnessed while shooting the photographs and other witnesses also testified at length about the delapidated condition of the property and the improvements thereon. Despite this oral testimony, the majority nevertheless deems it necessary to reverse the jury’s verdict because no other photographs were admitted into evidence. I can find no rule of evidence, nor does the majority cite one, that photographs occupy some higher level of evidence than oral testimony so that the one can never adequately substitute for the other. Thus, even though there may be truth in the popular adage that a picture is worth a thousand words, where the “thousand words” are present, as here in the transcript, the absence of the picture does not constitute reversible error under this State’s law. Rather, construing the other evidence at trial to uphold the verdict, Ackerman/Adair Realty Co., supra, I must concur with the trial court’s determination that because there was other evidence cumulative of the excluded evidence, see generally Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Luther, 128 Ga. App. 178, 185 (6) (196 SE2d 149) (1973), the failure to admit the DOT’s photographs does not require reversing the jury’s verdict. See generally Whitehead v. Cogar, 180 Ga. App, 812, 813 (1) (350 SE2d 821) (1986).
2. The trial court refused to allow the DOT to cross-examine two witnesses regarding a lawsuit between two of the condemnees or to allow the DOT to introduce into evidence the voluminous record of that lawsuit. The majority concurs with the DOT that since a jury is allowed to consider “all the elements reasonably affecting value” under Wright v. MARTA, 248 Ga. 372, 375 (283 SE2d 466) (1981), this testimony and documentary evidence should have been admitted so that the jury could take into consideration whether a prospective purchaser of the property as of the date of taking might have been negatively affected by the existence of the lawsuit. Condemnees, on the other hand, argue that evidence regarding litigation among themselves was not admissible as an element affecting value since no evidence was introduced or proffered that the dispute would have reasonably affected or impacted on any sale or lease of the property. Secondly, the condemnees point to the extreme confusion introducing such other litigation would create which, along with the prejudicial effect of that evidence on the jury, would far outweigh its relevancy.
This court has held that the admission of evidence of factors which may reasonably influence a prospective purchaser’s decision is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. Macon-Bibb County &c. Auth. v. Reynolds, 165 Ga. App. 348, 350-351 (299 SE2d 594) (1983); see also Department of Transp. v. Sequoyah Land Invest *643ment Co., 169 Ga. App. 20, 21 (2) (311 SE2d 488) (1983). I find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion here. A careful review of the record supports the trial court’s determination that the DOT did not demonstrate how this evidence was relevant to the issue of value, especially in view of the confusion caused by introducing the record in that litigation into a complex and bitterly contested condemnation suit as well as the prejudicial impact on the jury of evidence of infighting among the condemnees. “A trial judge has the discretion to exclude even relevant evidence if he finds that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission will unduly prejudice or mislead the jury or confuse the issues being tried. [Cits.]” Kilpatrick v. Foster, 185 Ga. App. 453, 456 (3) (364 SE2d 588) (1988). I would find no reversible error in the trial court’s refusal to admit this evidence. See generally Kane v. Cohen, 182 Ga. App. 485, 487 (2) (356 SE2d 94) (1987).
3. The DOT’s experts testified that their opinions as to the value of appellees’ property were based in part on the fact that the improvements on the property were vacant on the date of taking. In rebuttal, condemnees were allowed to testify that they had difficulty trying to lease the improvements on their property during the six-year interval between the public announcement of the DOT’s plans and the actual date of taking because of the DOT’s many changes in plans and that due to the vacancy of the improvements, the appearance, though not necessarily the value, of the property had dramatically deteriorated. The majority finds that this evidence was inadmissible under Josh Cabaret, Inc. v. Dept. of Transp., 256 Ga. 749 (3) (353 SE2d 346) (1987) and “undoubtedly caused the jury to infer that DOT was somehow guilty of pre-taking bad faith,” citing in support of this statement language from appellees’ closing argument. Aside from the fact that the cited language has been taken out of context (appellees’ counsel was not arguing appellees should receive compensation for pre-taking damages: he was urging the jury not to be misled about the true value of the property by the property’s dilapidated appearance after six years of neglect), the record clearly discloses no objection was interposed by the DOT to this allegedly improper argument. Any error stemming from that language was waived. Saxon v. Toland, 114 Ga. App. 805, 806 (3) (152 SE2d 702) (1966).
As to the actual testimony at trial, the record is clear that appellees were not litigating an inverse condemnation suit against the DOT. Nor were they seeking compensatory damages for any losses incurred in the period prior to the date of taking. What is clear is that Josh Cabaret, supra, is totally inapposite here. As to the inference that the DOT was “somehow guilty” of pre-taking bad faith, there is no evidence whatsoever in the record that the DOT defrauded appellees or acted outside its official capacity when it altered the plans in*644volving appellees’ property in the years prior to the taking. Rather, the record fully supports the trial court’s determination that the evidence considered objectionable by the DOT and the majority was relevant and admissible both as evidence relating to the value of the property as of the date of taking and as rebuttal evidence to the testimony by the DOT’s experts.
While the DOT evidently believes that the inevitable response of any jury informed of the DOT’s pre-taking activities will be to impute bad faith and fraud to the DOT, I do not agree that the hostility the DOT imputes to juries renders inadmissible evidence relevant to the value of the condemned property as of the date of taking, especially where, as here, the evidence is necessary to rebut testimony by the DOT’s own experts using the effect of the pre-taking activity as a basis for a lower value for the property. The rule is too well established that where evidence is pertinent and admissible, it cannot be excluded merely because it would be prejudicial. Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 171 Ga. App. 331, 339 (4) (319 SE2d 470) (1984). Accordingly, I find no reversible error in the admission of this evidence. See generally Rosenthal v. Hudson, 183 Ga. App. 712 (2) (360 SE2d 15) (1987).
4. The majority determines the jury’s verdict must be reversed because the trial court excluded the DOT’s “quantifying and clarifying” statistical evidence regarding actual traffic accidents at or near the Piedmont-Lindbergh intersection where appellees’ property is located. This was not some hotly contested issue at trial which required reams of statistical evidence to persuade the jury. The DOT’s detailed compilation of statistics was cumulative of other evidence regarding the well known and uncontroverted traffic and safety problems at this intersection. Under the circumstances of this case, I cannot understand how the majority can hold that the trial court’s exercise of its discretion by refusing to admit repetitive evidence regarding a minor undisputed evidentiary matter “practically wronged” the DOT so as to mandate reversal of the jury’s verdict. See Leverett v. Flint Fuel, 183 Ga. App. 75, 78 (3) (357 SE2d 882) (1987).
5. Regarding the testimony relative to the City of Atlanta’s denial of building permits, the record consists of Robert Batcher’s statement that they had decided to abandon a building project on the property because “[w]e couldn’t get any permits to do anything to the building,” and James Beak’s statement during his explanation of the potential value of a building on the property that “the building could structurally be used if we could get a permit to use the building.” Beak’s follow-up statement was stricken by the trial court on hearsay grounds. The record clearly reveals that there was no other testimony by witnesses on this matter.
As to the comments cited by the majority which were made dur*645ing trial by counsel and trial court on this matter, the question posed by the trial court to a witness, and the comments made by appellees’ counsel during argument before the jury, the record discloses that the DOT failed to make any objections, motions for mistrial, or requests for jury instruction. Thus, the DOT waived any error in the comments by trial court and counsel during trial, see Palmer v. Stevens, 115 Ga. App. 398, 401 (5) (154 SE2d 830) (1967); Saxon, supra at 806-807 (5); waived any error in the trial court’s questioning of witnesses, see Pulliam v. State, 196 Ga. 782, 790-791 (6) (28 SE2d 139) (1943); and waived objection to the alleged improper arguments. Saxon, supra at 806 (3).
Turning to what the transcript reveals was actually said by witnesses at trial, I cannot agree with the majority that there is any merit in the DOT’s assertion that the admission of Batcher’s and Beak’s statements constitutes reversible error under Department of Transp. v. Poole, 179 Ga. App. 638, 639 (1) (347 SE2d 625) (1986). The case sub judice stands in striking contrast to the situation in Poole, in which we held that the trial court had erroneously allowed the condemnee to introduce evidence showing that the denial of her zoning requests made more than 10 years before the date of taking had been influenced by the DOT in an attempt to obtain her property at a lower cost. As the quotations from the transcript reveal, no witness in the case sub judice indicated or otherwise implied that the DOT was responsible for or had any influence over the decision denying the permits or even that there was any impropriety in the denial of those permits so as to intimate that the condemnees were relitigating the issue in the condemnation proceeding. The only remarks intimating such matters were made by trial court and counsel and cannot serve as the basis for reversal where no objection was made. Palmer, Saxon, Pulliam, supra.
“ ‘Questions of relevancy of evidence, which include the issue of materiality, are for the [trial] court, and in the absence of an abuse of judicial discretion, this court will not interfere.’ [Cit.] ‘[B]road discretion is reposed in the trial court whose decision will not be disturbed except in cases demonstrating a clear abuse of that discretion.’ [Cit.]” Metropolitan Property &c. Ins. Co. v. Shepherd, 166 Ga. App. 300, 301 (1) (304 SE2d 74) (1983). I find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in admitting this testimony.
6. Based on the above discussion and my review of the remaining enumerations, I can find no reversible error in the trial court’s order denying the DOT’s motion for new trial. Since I would affirm the judgment in Case No. 76525, I respectfully dissent to the majority’s opinion in that case.
*646Decided November 29, 1988 — Rehearing denied December 15, 1988 Weiner, Dwyer, Yancey & Mackin, Dennis S. Mackin, Beryl H. Weiner, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, for appellant. Peek & Whaley, J. Corbett Peek, Jr., James Garland Peek, Grizzard, Simons & Martin, D. Michael Sweetnam, Warren W. Wills, Jr., for appellees.