specially concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority’s resolution of Issues I, II, IV, and V.
I dissent from the majority’s conclusion under Issue III that claimant had no right to reimbursement for the costs he reasonably incurred in an effort to recover benefits which were unlawfully terminated unless those costs are provided for in § 25-10-201, MCA.
Claimant’s right to recover costs in this case is governed by the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The provision of that Act which relates to claimant’s right to recover costs is correctly identified by the majority as § 39-71-611, MCA, which provides in relevant part that:
(1) The insurer shall pay reasonable costs and attorney fees as established by the workers’ compensation court if:
(a) the insurer denies liability for a claim for compensation or terminates compensation benefits;
(b) the claim is later adjudged compensable by the workers’ compensation court....
As noted in the majority opinion, those conditions have been satisfied in this case. The only question was whether the costs claimed by claimant were “reasonable.”
In Baeta v. State Compensation Mutual Insurance Fund (1992), 254 Mont. 487, 839 P.2d 566, this Court acted as a legislature, rather than a court, by adding qualifications to a claimant’s right to recover costs that are not provided for in the Workers’ Compensation Act. In doing so, that decision relied on prior cases which discussed costs in the context of district court litigation, rather than Workers’ Compensation Court litigation. It also relied on § 25-10-201, MCA, which is a rule of civil procedure. Although we have, in the past, looked to the Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance where the Workers’ Compensation Act does not deal with a subject, see Moen v. Peter Kiewit & Sons’ Co. (1982), 201 Mont. 425, 434, 655 P.2d 482, 486, the Workers’ Compensation Court is not otherwise bound by the Rules of Civil Procedure. In this case, the Workers’ Compensation Act did cover the subject of costs which can be awarded to a successful claimant. The only limitation placed on those costs that may be recovered is that they be reasonable.
*476I would reverse Baeta and follow the Workers’ Compensation Act, rather than irrelevant rules of civil procedure. For that reason, I dissent from that part of the majority’s opinion which refuses to do so.
Furthermore, after reviewing the arguments of the parties, I conclude that claimant’s claim for costs incurred to hire an investigator was reasonable and that under the terms of the Act he should have been reimbursed for those costs.
For these reasons, I would reverse that part of the judgment of the Workers’ Compensation Court which denied claimant’s costs, and I dissent from that part of the majority opinion which holds otherwise.
JUSTICE HUNT joins in the foregoing concurring and dissenting opinion.