(concurring) — Today’s decision requires the trial court to reapportion 100 percent of the fault between two entities, each previously found 10 percent at fault. The tort reform act, which was enacted in part to ensure that liability and fault are equivalent, appears to require this anomalous result. While I reluctantly concur with the majority, I urge the Legislature to review this inequity.
The facts are short and simple. On March 4, 1987, 4-year-old Bradley Lanchester walked to the front of a Kitsap Transit bus while holding the hand of his father, Nelson Lanches-ter. Somehow, Bradley managed to trigger a well-protected emergency stop switch. The bus, which already was slowing down to allow passengers to disembark, immediately stopped. Carl Price, a passenger, was thrown forward by the sudden stop, which he claimed aggravated his preexisting injuries.
The trial court apportioned 10 percent of the fault to Kit-sap Transit, 10 percent to Nelson Lanchester, and the remaining 80 percent to young Bradley. Total damages were assessed at $259,535, of which Kitsap Transit was severally liable for 10 percent.5
As the majority discusses at length, the trial court mistakenly apportioned fault to young Bradley. In tort actions to recover damages for injuries, the tort reform act directs the trier of fact to apportion responsibility among all "entities” at fault. RCW 4.22.070(1). The Legislature, in drafting the tort reform act, defined fault in terms of negligence and recklessness. RCW 4.22.015. As a result, the trier of fact cannot apportion fault to individuals whose actions fall outside the legal definition of recklessness or negligence.
We have a long tradition of exempting children under 6 from contributory negligence.6 Von Saxe v. Barnett, 125 *471Wash. 639, 642-46, 217 P. 62 (1923). By defining fault in terms of negligence, the Legislature effectively precludes a trier of fact from apportioning fault to young children no matter how negligent the behavior.
While the tort reform act attempted to provide a measure of relief to relatively innocent defendants from whom recovery is sought simply because of their ability to pay, this case demonstrates that the goal has not been fully achieved. See Schmidt v. Cornerstone Invs., Inc., 115 Wn.2d 148, 161-62, 795 P.2d 1143 (1990). The trial court apportioned 80 percent of the fault to Bradley, who activated the emergency stop causing Price’s injury. Clearly, Bradley was the party most "at fault” in this accident. On remand, the trial court is now faced with the very difficult task of reapportioning fault from an incomplete cast of characters. This apportionment leaves only Kitsap Transit and Bradley’s father, Nelson Lanchester.
The settlement agreement reached between the Prices and the Lanchesters prior to the original trial bars the Prices from actually collecting further monetary award from the Lanchesters. Regardless of the trial court’s reapportionment of fault between Kitsap Transit and Bradley’s father, the Prices will receive an award based only on the percentage of fault attributed to Kitsap Transit. For reapportionment to accurately reflect Kitsap’s fault, however, the Prices’ settlement agreement with the Lanchesters should not influence the trial court on remand. Under the tort reform act, the trial court must hold Kitsap Transit liable according to the degree of its fault, no more, no less.
While I agree with the majority that there was sufficient evidence supporting a finding of some negligence on the part of Kitsap Transit, there is nothing in the record indicating that Kitsap Transit had any control over, nor any duty to exercise control over, Bradley’s actions.
However contrary to the spirit of the tort reform act this result may appear, the tort reform act is a product of the *472Legislature, and any misgivings with it must be resolved there. The Legislature is presumed to know the law when drafting statutes. Woodson v. State, 95 Wn.2d 257, 262, 623 P.2d 683 (1980). It is for that body to determine whether public policy and fairness require apportionment of fault to all parties, including young children.
Andersen, C.J., concurs with Durham, J.
The Prices settled with Nelson and Bradley Lanchester prior to trial for $3,000, a sum judicially determined reasonable.
There is something inherently distasteful about the majority’s likening young children to inanimate objects and forces of nature. Young children, while sometimes unable to exercise appropriate judgment, often can determine right from wrong, and feel regret over their mistakes. Unlike inanimate objects and *471forces of nature, we do not expect young children to be uncontrolled and uncontrollable, and if they are, we do not expect them to remain that way.