dissenting.
Sentencing is primarily a function of the trial court. Trial judges have considerable discretion in sentencing, particularly in sentencing a first felony offender, such as Buza, who had no prior criminal record and a significant history of positive accomplishments in his life. Given Buza’s prior history, Judge Hunt had discretion to treat him with leniency. On the other hand, Buza’s crime was a serious class B felony. Buza embezzled approximately $100,000 from his employer, engaging in numerous separate thefts over a lengthy period of time.
This court has upheld as not clearly mistaken sentences of up to eight years with four years suspended for theft in the first degree. Brezenoff v. State, 658 P.2d 1359 (Alaska App.1983). In State v. Karnos, 696 P.2d 685 (Alaska App.1985), a similar case, we held that the trial judge was required to impose a sentence which involved serving at least ninety days of imprisonment. We pointed out:
[Pjeople who commit relatively petty thefts frequently are sentenced to jail terms. We believe that a probationary sentence unduly deprecates the seriousness of the nature of [the defendant’s] crime and does not serve to reaffirm societal norms against this type of major theft.
However, we went on and stated:
[W]e certainly believe that this was an appropriate case for the trial judge to consider having [the defendant] serve time on weekends if this would help to preserve his employment. The court could also have allowed [the defendant] to perform some community service time to substitute for some incarceration time.
Id. at 687.
Judge Hunt did impose substantial sanctions in this case. Buza is required to per*1323form five hundred hours of community service. The legislature allows the court to substitute eight hours of community service for a day of imprisonment. AS 12.55.055(d). Therefore, under AS 12.55.055(d), five hundred hours of community service is equivalent to sixty-two and one-half days of imprisonment.1 In addition, Judge Hunt imposed a fine of approximately $50,000. This is a substantial penalty, even for someone with Buza’s wealth, amounting to ten percent of his net worth. In my opinion, the majority opinion unduly minimizes this sanction. According to the record which we have, Buza made full restitution. Therefore, I believe that Judge Hunt could properly regard the $50,000 fine as a substantial sanction.
I see this ease as different from Kamos because in Kamos the trial judge did not impose any imprisonment, did not impose any community service, and did not impose a fine. I regard Judge Hunt’s sentence as imposing sufficient sanctions to minimally comply with the Kamos decision. I am concerned that if we disapprove Judge Hunt’s sentence, we will unduly restrict trial judges in imposing alternative sentences, sentences not involving incarceration, in appropriate cases. It seems to me that trial judges need to have this authority in order to make sure that there is sufficient jail space for violent and dangerous offenders.
Frankly, I do not disagree with the majority’s concern that a sentence which does not involve some jail time for Buza could send the wrong message. Petty thieves are frequently jailed, and offenders similar to Buza have served long terms of imprisonment. Although Judge Hunt imposed substantial sanctions in this ease, a minimal period of imprisonment, perhaps twenty to thirty days, would have been a better sentence since it would have emphasized the fact that Buza had engaged in serious criminal conduct. As we indicated in Kamos, Judge Hunt could have arranged to have Buza serve the time on weekends or in some other way so that it would not have interfered with his employment. However, because I conclude that Judge Hunt could properly find that Buza was particularly deserving of lenient treatment because of his exemplary background, and because I believe she did impose substantial sanctions in this case, I conclude that the sentence which she imposed was not clearly mistaken.
. Of course for an offender such as Buza, eight hours of community service is probably much less onerous than having to spend a day in jail. However, the legislature’s formulation in AS 12.55.055(d) at least allows us some basis to compare sanctions which are, in essence, fundamentally different.