(concurring) — This is an action for the death of a child. The facts are set forth in the majority opinion and in an opinion in an earlier appeal of the same case. Wilson v. Lund, 74 Wn.2d 945, 447 P.2d 718 (1968).
Several questions are presented in this appeal. The question herein discussed is the measure of damages, or otherwise stated, the proper interpretation of RCW 4.24.010.
The main parts of RCW 4.24.010 have been the law in Washington for 102 years, having been passed by the legislative session of 1869. Laws of 1869, ch. 1, § 9, p. 4 reads:
A father, or in case of the death or desertion of his family, the mother may maintain an action as plaintiff for the injury or death of a child, and a guardian for the injury or death of his ward.
*103The provision was reenacted in 1873 and 1877. In 1881, it was included in the code of that year. The reenactments through and including the Code of 1881 were identical with the original language used in 1869.
In 1927 the legislature passed chapter 191 of the Laws of 1927, which read as follows:
Section 1. That section 9 of the Code of Washington Territory of 1881, (section 184 of Remington’s Compiled Statutes; section 8264 of Pierce’s 1919 Code) be amended to read as follows:
Section 9. A father, or in case of his death or desertion of his family, the mother may maintain an action as plaintiff for the injury or death of a minor child, or a child on whom either is dependent for support, and the mother for the injury or death of an illegitimate minor child, or an illegitimate child on whom she is dependent for support.
It is, therefore, obvious that for 98 years the statute law of Washington, both as a territory and as a state, had not undergone any change which concerns this problem. The right of action was given, but no measure of damages was fixed. Chapter 191 of the Laws of 1927 became RCW 4.24.010.
The extraordinary session of 1967 passed inter alia, chapter 81, which read:
Section 1. Section 9, page 4, Laws of 1869 as last amended by section 1, chapter 191, Laws of 1927 and RCW 4.24.010 are each amended to read as follows:
A father, or in case of his death or desertion of his family, the mother may maintain an action as plaintiff for the injury or death of a minor child, or a child on whom either is dependent for support, and the mother for the injury or death of an illegitimate minor child, or an illegitimate child on whom she is dependent for support.
In such an action, in addition to damages for medical, hospital, medication expenses, and loss of services and support, damages may be recovered for the loss of love and companionship of the child and for injury to or destruction of the parent-child relationship in such amount as, under all the circumstances of the case, may be just.
*104■ Chapter 81 was originally Senate Bill No. 519 and passed the Senate March 31, 1967. It was passed by the House on April 18, 1967 and was signed by the Governor April 26, 1967. The dates are important because on April 20, 1967, this court filed the opinion in Lockhart v. Besel, 71 Wn.2d 112, 426 P.2d 605 (1967). A comparison of the dates definitely establishes the Lockhart case and chapter 81 were a “coincidence” as said in a footnote to Clark v. Icicle Irrigation Disk, 72 Wn.2d 201, 432 P.2d 541 (1967). The language of the statute therefore must be construed without regard to Lockhart.
. Usual and accepted rules of statutory construction must be followed. One of the most fundamental of those rules is to give due consideration to the evil sought to be corrected.
We said in State v. Stewart, 52 Wash. 61, 64, 100 P. 153 (1909):
It is a familiar canon of the law that, in the construction of a statute, courts will look to the old law, the mischief, and the remedy.
It is well known there was widespread dissatisfaction with the measure of damages for the death of a child.
Loss of services as a measure was universally recognized to be a fiction. Of necessity, it led to lack of uniformity in verdicts, since juries were without any real guidance in fixing damages. For those and many other reasons the use of loss of services as a measure of damages for the death of a child was widely criticized.
With that background, the legislature in 1967 passed the addition to RCW 4.24.010. The first paragraph was unchanged, and a second paragraph was added which reads:
In such an action, in addition to damages for medical, hospital, medication expenses, and loss of services and support, damages may be recovered for the loss of love and companionship of the child and for injury to or destruction of the parent-child relationship in such amount as, under all the circumstances of the case, may be just.
The legislature acted. It must be presumed the action Was for a definite purpose, to change the rule of damages. *105The statute, which was well and carefully drawn, provides for compensation, “in such amount as, under all the circumstances of the case, may be just.”
Instruction No. 12 contained the following language:
In making your determination, you should not consider any grief, mental anguish or suffering of the parents or the pain and suffering of the child.
The words “or the pain and suffering of the child” are proper since the action is one by the parents for the injury to them by the loss of the child. However, the words “you should not consider any grief, mental anguish or suffering of the parents” limit the measure of damages as set out in the statute. This the trial court may not do.
The language of the statute is clear. The jury is required by the statute to fix the damages, “in such amount as, under all the circumstances of the case, may be just.” The limitation placed upon the jury by the words, “you should not consider any grief, mental anguish or suffering of the parents” is error.
Appellants also assign as error the refusal of the trial court to admit the testimony of a psychiatrist by deposition relative to the effect on the plaintiff mother of the death of the child. The trial court has wide discretion in such matters. Myers v. Harter, 76 Wn.2d 772, 459 P.2d 25 (1969); Weber v. Biddle, 72 Wn.2d 22, 431 P.2d 705 (1967).
The qualifications of expert witnesses are to be passed on by the trial court. It is within the sound discretion of the court and rulings on such matters will not be disturbed except for a manifest abuse of discretion. Czarecki v. Seattle & S. F. Ry. & Nav. Co., 30 Wash. 288, 70 P. 750 (1902).
In White v. Fenner, 16 Wn.2d 226, 244, 133 P.2d 270 (1943), we said:
Whether or not a witness is qualified to testify as an expert upon a particular subject is largely within the discretion of the trial court, and the appellate court will not disturb the ruling of the trial court unless its discretion has manifestly been abused.
(Citations omitted.)
*106We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court when it can not be said the trial court abused its discretion. In the case at bar there is no showing of abuse of discretion. There is, therefore, no error.
This case should be remanded for a new trial on the issue of damages, with the jury to be instructed in accordance with the requirements of RCW 4.24.010.. The other assignments of error are fully and correctly covered by the majority opinion.