dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, although I acknowledge that the principal opinion is well reasoned based upon precedent from Missouri and elsewhere.
Whether the remarks here were, in fact, defamatory may be questioned, but the only issue presented on this appeal is subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants assert that the trial court had no subject matter jurisdiction over this matter because of the statement in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof’. I believe the trial court has jurisdiction as processing a defamation action against these defendants is not “an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”
How this constitutional phrase could ultimately result in prohibiting suits similar to this, I find puzzling. Not only does such a result take away the rights of those who elect to belong to an organized religion, it can shield those associated with an organized religion from some wrongful actions, a privilege not generally available to others.
The principal opinion relies extensively on State ex rel. Gaydos v. Blaeuer, 81 S.W.3d 186(Mo.App.2002), and its conclusion that “jurisdiction over disputes which are either essentially religious in nature or sufficiently intertwined with church polity as to constitute a threat of entanglement with religious doctrine or practice” is prohibited under the First Amendment. Id. at 192. Even if correct, I do not believe *62this logically leads to the conclusion that redress for a pastor’s defamatory remarks regarding a parishioner’s church membership are outside the jurisdiction of the civil courts.
Those in a pastor’s position likely have a higher degree of credibility with the members than most and they should be held accountable when they violate that credibility. I cannot believe that defaming parishioners is condoned by any respectable or generally recognized religious group; thus, this case does not conflict with church government or become entangled in religious doctrine or practice.
Gaydos also discusses comments of James Madison, who is described as the primary draftsman of the phrase in question, for his assertion that the establishment clause was intended to deny jurisdiction over religious matters to the three branches of government. 81 S.W.3d at 196. Whether that was his intention is irrelevant, as it is not what he may have intended but what the clause says. It seems elementary that what the wording says to others is conclusive, not what someone intended the words to say, if such is not apparent in the wording. It would not be fair for others who are considering this language, whether in adoption or application, to be bound by the hidden intentions of the drafter. I see no way that the establishment clause could be a prohibition on the courts, and certainly not in this situation.
I respectfully dissent.