dissenting.
Because Georgia does not provide for a private right of action under 47 USC § 227, I respectfully dissent.
The provision in question states that a person or entity may, “if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State,” bring an action based on a violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Whether Nicholson’s class action suit is proper turns on the interpretation of “if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State.”
When the language of a statute is plain and susceptible of but one reasonable construction, we have no authority to place a different construction on it but must construe it according to its terms. State Farm &c. Ins. Co. v. Ainsworth, 198 Ga. App. 740, 742 (402 SE2d 759) (1991). Here, the plain language of the statute does not accord with the majority’s conclusion. The majority opinion ignores the language of the statute and changes “otherwise permitted by” to “unless prohibited by,” an unwarranted construction under the “plain language” rule.
Even if there were some ambiguity in the meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation do not support the majority’s conclusion. “The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the legislative intent, keeping in view at all times the old law, the evil, and the remedy.” Kemp v. City of Claxton, 269 Ga. 173, 175 (496 SE2d 712) (1998). The legislative history shows that the purpose of the Act was to supplement State law in this area. “Over half the States now have statutes restricting various uses of the telephone for marketing, but telemarketers can evade their prohibitions through interstate *369operations; therefore, Federal law is needed to control residential telemarketing practices.” 47 USC § 227, Congressional Statement of Findings (7). Thus, the purpose of this statute was not to go beyond what the State was already doing to regulate the telemarketers, but rather to allow the States to reach those telemarketers which were evading state jurisdiction by operating interstate.
Unlike the New York opinion cited by the majority, a Texas appeals court determined that Congress intended that the States would pass their own legislation providing for these private rights of action. Autoflex Leasing v. Manufacturers Auto Leasing, 16 SW3d 815 (Tex. App. 2000). In reaching this conclusion, the Texas court noted the remarks of Senator Hollings, on this provision of the Act:
The substitute bill contains a private right-of-action provision that will make it easier for consumers to recover damages from receiving these computerized calls. The provision would allow consumers to bring an action in State court against any entity that violates the bill. The bill does not, because of constitutional constraints, dictate to the States which court in each State shall be the proper venue for such an action, as this is a matter for State legislators to determine. Nevertheless, it is my hope that States will make it as easy as possible for consumers to bring such actions, preferably in small claims court. . . . Small claims court or a similar court would allow the consumer to appear before the court without an attorney. The amount of damages in this legislation is set to be fair to both the consumer and the telemarketer. However, it would defeat the purposes of the bill if the attorneys’ costs to consumers of bringing an action were greater than the potential damages. I thus expect that the States will act reasonably in permitting their citizens to go to court to enforce this bill.
137 Cong. Rec. S16205-06 (daily ed. November 7, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings). Thus, we see that Congress intended that the States, if they chose to permit a private right of action, would implement guidelines providing for how and where these claims could be brought.
Moreover, it is interesting to note that when this case was removed to federal court, the district court granted Hooters’ motion to dismiss, holding that the plain language and legislative history of the TCPA support the conclusion that a private cause of action may not be brought under the TCPA unless the State has authorized private civil enforcement of its own telecommunications regulations. *370Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, No. 95-00101-Cv-1 (S.D. Ga. 1996).9
Finally, even assuming the majority’s interpretation of the federal statute is correct, Georgia does not permit a private right of action for this claim, but rather has expressly stated that enforcement of this claim is entrusted to the public service commission. OCGA § 46-5-25, Transmission of unsolicited commercial facsimile messages, provides in pertinent part:
(e) The commission is charged with the responsibility of civil enforcement of this Code section and the commission shall require local exchange companies to file with the commission appropriate tariff revisions to implement this subsection. Any person who violates the provisions of this Code section shall be subject to disconnection of telephone service if the violation does not cease within ten days from the date of notification to such person by the local exchange company; and the tariff revisions filed by local exchange companies shall provide for the giving of such notification by local exchange companies and for such disconnection of service.
In contrast, the General Assembly did provide for a private right of action in OCGA § 46-5-27 which deals with telephone solicitations to residences:
(i) Any person who has received more than one telephone solicitation within any 12 month period by or on behalf of the same person or entity in violation of subsection (c) or (g) of this Code section may either bring an action to enjoin such violation; bring an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such knowing violation or to receive up to $2,000.00 in damages for each such knowing violation, whichever is greater; or bring both such actions.
Under the rules of statutory construction we must construe all related statutes together, giving meaning to each part of the statute. Also, we must presume that when the legislature enacted OCGA § 46-5-27 and included a private right of action, it was aware of existing law at the time and therefore aware that it did not include a private right of action in OCGA § 46-5-25. See Hart v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 250 Ga. 397, 400 (297 SE2d 462) (1982). Therefore, we must also presume that the legislature’s failure to include a private right of *371action under OCGA § 46-5-25 was a matter of considered choice. Transp. Ins. Co. v. El Chico Restaurants, 271 Ga. 774, 776 (524 SE2d 486) (1999).
Decided July 14, 2000 Reconsideration denied July 27, 2000 Fulcher, Hagler, Reed, Hanks & Harper, Mark C. Wilby, Elizabeth McLeod, Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore, Emmet J. Bondurant, Frank M. Lowrey IV, for appellant. Burnside, Wall, Daniel, Ellison & Revell, Harry D. Revell, for appellees. Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Robert S. Bomar, Deputy Attorney General, Harold D. Melton, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Stacey Ferris-Smith, Assistant Attorney General, amici curiae.Although there could be some ambiguity if this were simply a question of construing a federal statute, that does not arise in this case because the Georgia legislature has already spoken on this issue. Georgia has a statute in place that covers the claim in this lawsuit. Nicholson could not proceed under that statute because Georgia law does not permit a private right of action.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Blackburn joins in this dissent.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit determined that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction of private actions under the Act. Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, 136 F3d 1287 (11th Cir. 1998).