dissenting. I disagree with the result reached in Divisions 1 and 2 of the opinion, since I think the facts here make this case distinguishable from the holding in Seagraves, relied upon as authority in the majority opinion.
First of all, the tax returns involved in Seagraves were actually admitted in evidence, the trial court ruling out only the figures under the column headed “city assessment” and “county assessment,” and this ruling was upheld by the Supreme Court on the ground that such assessments did not appear to have been made by the person making the return and that the exclusion of these assessments did not violate the general rule governing the admissibility of such tax returns.
The Supreme Court in Seagraves stated the general rule to be that such tax returns are admissible as evidence for the purpose of showing the amount and value of the property admitted by the defendant to be his, citing Tolleson v. Posey, 32 Ga. 372, 375, in which it was stated, “There can be no more reliable evidence to show a given amount of wealth than his own verified statement, given as the measure of liability for taxation.” (Emphasis supplied.) This general rule was followed in State Hwy. Dept. v. Wilkes, 106 Ga. App. 634, 639 (127 SE2d 715), in which Judge Frankum writing for the court said, “Under Georgia law, in cases involving value of property, tax returns made by the owner of the property in question, which set forth a particular value on such property, are admissible as a circumstance for the consideration of the jury to show the value placed on the property by the owner.” (Citing cases).
What did not appear in the record in the Seagraves case, and which does appear on the tax return involved in this case, was an oath signed by the taxpayer’s agent as follows:
“I do solemnly swear that I have carefully read (or have heard read) and have duly considered the questions propounded in the foregoing tax list, and that the value placed by me on the property returned, as shown by said list and all attached returns, is at the true market value thereof. . .”
*82This oath, admittedly signed by the taxpayer’s agent in this case, clearly shows that the figures shown under the city and county assessment columns were indeed adopted as his own and became in fact the valuations placed thereon by the taxpayer even though physically placed on the return by someone else. Once this oath is signed the return is complete and it becomes the taxpayer’s “own verified statement,” referred to in Tolleson, supra. This oath is an integral part of the return and figures or assessments placed thereon have no probative value unless and until the taxpayer executes the same and adopts the figures and writings on such return as his own. As was stated in McLendon v. Dunlap Hdw. Co., 3 Ga. App. 206, 210 (59 SE 718), “This oath was a part of the returns, and was necessary, to make the returns complete or of any probative value.”
The majority opinion raises the technical objection that the tax return in this case is incomplete and of no probative value since it does not appear that the taxpayer’s oath was administered and attested by the receiver of tax returns as required by statute and that the jurat appears to be incomplete. Such technical objections as raised in this portion of the majority opinion were dealt with by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Ga. v. Johnson, 214 Ga. 607 (106 SE2d 353). In that case the Board of Education for Savannah and Chatham County sought by mandamus to compel the tax commissioner to actually administer to each person making a return of taxable property the oath required by law and to otherwise follow strictly and technically the statute governing the returns of property. The tax commissioner filed an answer in which he admitted that he was required to perform certain ministerial duties but that the duty rests upon the taxpayer to estimate the value of the property listed on his return; that the law does not require him to personally present the list of questions to the taxpayer nor to personally administer the oath to each taxpayer, since these were ministerial acts which could be properly delegated to deputies and assistants; and that the law requires no more than a substantial compliance by his duly constituted deputies and assistants with the provisions of the Code; and that to apply the law and the strained construction insisted upon in the peti*83tion would be to require him to perform an impossibility, as shown by the number of returns received, and the time that would be required to receive them in the manner insisted upon in the petition. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Head, while denying the mandamus on other grounds, went on to consider these issues and say (p. 611): “The acts sought by the relator to be required of the respondent must of necessity be performed under varying conditions as to the number of taxpayers seeking to make returns, and other conditions not readily anticipated. ‘While mandamus will lie to compel performance of specific acts, where the duty to discharge them is clear, it is not an appropriate remedy to compel a general course of official conduct for a long series of continuous acts to be performed under varying conditions.’ Jackson v. Cochran, 134 Ga. 396 (67 SE 825, 20 AC 219). See also Bahnsen v. Young, 159 Ga. 256 (125 SE 459); Atlanta Title & Trust Co. v. Tidwell, 173 Ga. 499 (160 SE 620, 80 ALR 735); Richter v. Jordan, 185 Ga. 39 (193 SE 871); Murphey v. Brock, 206 Ga. 9 (55 SE2d 564).
“The complaint that the respondent (whether on his own motion, or in conjunction with the tax assessors) entered certain property on the returns to be made by the taxpayers, would not of itself invalidate the returns. This procedure may well have been used to expedite a return of the taxpayer’s property, but in any event, under Code § 92-5703, property subject to taxation is to ‘be returned by the taxpayers,’ and the taxpayer would not be relieved of his responsibility to return his property because it might appear that certain items of his property had previously been entered on his return.”
It can thus be seen that the Supreme Court has recognized the impossibility and impracticability of requiring the tax commissioner to personally administer and subscribe the taxpayer’s oath to each individual taxpayer and that “a substantial compliance” is all that is required in dealing with the technical provisions of these Code sections. Viewed in the light of this opinion it can be seen that the tax return involved in this case was complete as to the taxpayer and that the law was substantially complied with. In such an instance the taxpayer cannot *84be held to complain of some minor or technical defect in the administering and attestation of his oath. In any event, a jurat is not a part of the oath and no objection was raised on this point in the trial court.
The return admitted in evidence in this case is headed “Taxpayers Returns of Property for Taxation” under which is listed the property and valuation, followed by the taxpayer’s oath. If the taxpayer’s oath was subscribed to the return in the Sea-graves case, it does not appear in the record and there was thus no showing that the “assessment” figures which were excluded were ever adopted or admitted by the taxpayer to be his own.
The very purpose of the oath and signature of the taxpayer on a return is that it shall become his own true and verified return. Our laws require that “all property or other things of value . . . shall be returned by the taxpayers.” Code § 92-5703. The return cannot be made by a tax commissioner or tax receiver or city or county assessors. It is a matter of common knowledge that most returns are filled in and completed based on the prior year’s return and submitted to the taxpayer at the time he makes the return. It does not become a complete return, however, unless and until the taxpayer or his agent adopts it as his own and subscribes to the taxpayer’s oath. Our laws provide adequate procedures for arbitration and other remedies where the taxpayer is dissatisfied with the figures or assessments made on his property. Code Ann. § 92-6912. If he pursues none of these remedies and subscribes under oath that the figures shown on the return represent “the value placed by me on the property,” should he later be heard to complain that the figures are not his own? Certainly not, and once such a return is made accompanied by the oath adopting such return as his own, it becomes absolutely immaterial that the figures might have been physically inserted therein by someone other than himself. Technicalities have their place in our system of jurisprudence but they should not be honored to the point of absurdity.
I do not think the Seagraves case is controlling here, for the Supreme Court did not pass upon the exact question here presented. In this case we have the clear assent, concurrence and *85adoption by the taxpayer of the assessment figures placed on the return.
The returns were admitted in evidence by the trial court under appropriate instructions that they did not represent the value or just and adequate compensation for the property but “just one element of evidence that you may consider with all the other evidence in the case and your honest, conscientious efforts to arrive at what constitutes just and adequate compensation for this property.” Under our general rule allowing the admission of such documents in cases of this nature, and under the facts in this case, I do not think the trial court was in error in admitting same into evidence.
Likewise, such returns being properly admissible, it was not error to allow argument based thereon as set out in Division 2 of the opinion.
I am authorized to state that Felton, C. J., Russell and Pannell, JJ., concur in this dissent.