Bob Scott and June Ball appeal from an order of the Benton County Circuit Court awarding attorney fees in the amount of $4,166.25 after Scott had submitted a fee petition asking for $32,623.90. On appeal, they argue that the trial court abused its discretion by reducing the amount of attorney fees, asserting that the evidence does not support the trial court’s award and that the requested fees were consistent with the statutory fee schedule for probating an estate.1 We hold that the order entered by the trial court does not comport with the standards established by our supreme court, and we reverse and remand this case for further consideration by the trial judge.
We note that the trial judge made no findings from the bench after holding a hearing on Scott’s fee petition; nor were findings requested by the appellants. Furthermore, in her order awarding fees, the trial judge merely recited that she had reviewed the testimony from the hearings, the pleadings, exhibits, and Rule 1.5 of the Arkansas Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and, without making specific findings of fact, made the fee award. On this record, we are unable to properly review the fee award.
Although the right to recover attorney fees is created by statute, see Arkansas Code Annotated section 28-65-319 (Repl. 2004), in Bailey v. Rahe, 355 Ark. 560, 142 S.W.3d 634 (2004), the supreme court imposed a requirement that trial courts in guardianship cases apply the factors set out in Chrisco v. Sun Indus., 304 Ark. 227, 800 S.W.2d 717 (1990), as a basis of evaluating the amount of attorney fees to award. The Bailey court listed the Chrisco factors as follows:
(1) the experience and ability of counsel; (2) the time and labor required to perform the legal service properly; (3) the amount involved in the case and the results obtained; (4) the novelty and difficulty of the issues involved; (5) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed upon the client in the circumstances; and (8) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
We are mindful that the factors concerning the reasonableness of an attorney’s fees that are listed in Rule 1.5 of the Arkansas Model Rules of Professional Conduct are similar to those articulated in Chrisco.2 However, we hold that this case does not turn on the mere fact that the Rule 1.5 factors are but an imperfect substitute for those articulated in Chrisco. In Bailey v. Rahe, supra, the trial judge made no findings of fact justifying an award of attorney fees that was less than was requested in a fee petition. The supreme court reversed, stating: “we are unable to discern exactly on what basis [the trial court] did so.” Id. Significantly, the Bailey court required that these findings be made on the trial court’s own motion and articulated with sufficient clarity that a review of the trial court’s reasons for setting the amount of the award would be discernable on appeal. Id. Here, as in Bailey, the trial court made no findings whatsoever. Accordingly, we, like the supreme court in Bailey, are “unable to discern exactly on what basis” the trial judge made her award. We therefore reverse this case and remand it to the trial court for the purpose of analyzing the fee award in accordance with the above referenced Chrisco factors and making findings that will enable us to review the fee award.
Reversed and remanded.
Bird, Griffen, and Vaught, JJ., agree. Roaf and Crabtree, JJ., dissent.Although June Ball is a named appellant and her requested fees as guardian of the person were also substantially reduced by the order appealed from, the argument herein only references the attorney fees; therefore, we consider any allegations of error regarding her fees to be abandoned on appeal.
2 In pertinent part, Rule 1.5 states:
(a) A lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(b) When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation.