Muldawer v. Stribling

Jordan, Justice,

dissenting.

From time immemorial courts have made the distinction between covenants running with the land and mere personal obligations resulting from an agreement restricting the use of real estate. The controlling factor is that there must be "privity of estate” in order to create a covenant running with the land. This principle was clearly enunciated in an opinion by Chief Justice Nichols in Johnson v. Myers, 226 Ga. 23 (172 SE2d 421) (1970). *677The majority opinion recognizes this principle and apparently concedes that the agreement between Muldawer and Stribling’s predecessor in title was not a covenant running with the land but merely a personal obligation binding only that predecessor in title.

But the majority opinion then holds that the subsequent conveyance of the property to a grantee who assumed the personal obligation mumbo jumbo converted the personal obligation into a covenant running with the land. This is clear error. A personal covenant cannot be converted into a covenant running with the land by reference thereto in a subsequent deed which will bind all the successive owners of the realty. It can only bind the grantee in whose deed it appears as a personal obligation. Since the terms of the personal agreement do not appear in the deed to Stribling, its terms were not accepted by him and cannot be binding on him.

This principle of law was succinctly stated in James Talcott, Inc. v. Roy D. Warren Commercial, 120 Ga. App. 544 (171 SE2d 907) (1969) as follows: "If a covenant is personal, it binds only the original parties and those who may assume its obligations, and upon a conveyance of the land . . . the transferee takes free of the obligation of any personal covenant appearing in the deed . . .”

The trial court correctly relied on the authorities cited above in granting a summary judgment for Stribling, a grantee who did not assume what everyone concedes to be a personal obligation between thé original contracting parties.

I would affirm the trial court and therefore dissent from the majority opinion.