dissenting.
In my opinion the majority opinion overlooks the manifest intent of the statute. Its provisions apply only when the owner of the repaired or stored vehicle cannot be ascertained. The statute requires that the person removing or storing the vehicle "shall diligently seek the identity of the owner and shall notify such owner of the vehicle.” Code Ann. § 68-2302. The statute provides that "if the owner cannot be ascertained, the person impounding” can then proceed with the advertising and sale of the vehicle and disposition of the proceeds of the sale as provided in the statute.
Clearly, then, if the owner has been ascertained or comes forward to claim the vehicle, the vehicle is no longer an "abandoned” vehicle and the person holding the vehicle cannot proceed under the terms of the statute but must take recourse against the owner as provided by the *637lien statutes or other available remedies which provide the owner with notice and hearing to comport with due process.
It was clearly held in Miller v. Self, 137 Ga. App. 717 (224 SE2d 823) (1976) that once the owner makes a claim to the vehicle or takes some action to show the vehicle is not abandoned, the vehicle is not an "abandoned automobile” as defined by the statute and that a sale is unauthorized under the provisions of the Act. Therefore, no deprivation of due process can result to "an owner” under the provisions of the Act.
In my opinion the Act is constitutional, and I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hill joins in this dissent.