dissenting.
In my opinion, Rule 1-8-1-.01 of the Georgia Public Service Commission (Commission), as properly construed, imposes on the insurer *270a requirement to provide coverage up to the actual limits of its policy, without regard to whether all of the motor carrier’s vehicles are specifically listed in the policy. Therefore, the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurer in this case should be reversed, and I respectfully dissent, to the majority’s contrary holding.
The purpose of a policy issued pursuant to OCGA § 46-7-12 is not to benefit the motor carrier, but to benefit those who are injured by the negligent operation of the carrier’s vehicles. Great American Indem. Co. v. Vickers, 183 Ga. 233, 236 (188 SE 24) (1936). The Commission’s Rules are promulgated to effectuate this purpose. See Great American Indem. Co. v. Vickers, 53 Ga. App. 101, 104-105 (185 SE 150) (1936), aff’d, Great American Indem. Co. v. Vickers, 183 Ga., supra. Therefore, the Rules must be interpreted so as to protect those members of the public who have claims based upon the negligent operation of the motor carrier’s vehicles.
By its terms, Rule 1-8-1-.01 merely provides that the insurance policy must afford coverage in “not less than” certain prescribed amounts, regardless of whether the carrier’s “motor vehicles are specifically described in the policy or not.” Nothing in this Rule authorizes the insurer to provide coverage in the minimum prescribed amounts for claims arising from the operation of motor vehicles which are not specifically described, while furnishing coverage in greater amounts for claims arising from the operation of the specifically described motor vehicles. The Rule clearly indicates that the prescribed limits of coverage are the minimum which are acceptable to cover claims for damages arising from the operation of the carrier’s motor vehicles, whether or not listed in the policy. Thus, all of the carrier’s vehicles must be covered by the same limits, which limits must be at least as great as those prescribed in Rule 1-8-1-.01. Accordingly, where, as here, the insurer has issued a policy which has higher limits, those higher limits apply even as to claims for damages arising from the operation of one of the carrier’s vehicles which was not specifically described in the policy. See Herring v. Rabun Trucking Co., 147 Ga. App. 713 (250 SE2d 167) (1978).
As did the Court of Appeals, the majority finds support for its holding in the “Form F” endorsement which was executed by the insurer and the motor carrier. However, this “Form F” merely amends the policy generally so as to afford insurance “to the extent of the coverage and limits of liability required by” the applicable statutes and Rules. Form F further provides
“that the [motor carrier] agrees to reimburse the company for any payment made by the company which it would not have been obligated to make under the terms of this policy *271except by reason of the obligation assumed in making such certification.”Decided March 2, 1998 Reconsideration denied April 2,1998. Philip M. Castro, for appellant. Long, Weinberg, Ansley & Wheeler, Kenneth M. Barre, Haas, Bridges & Kane, Alvin L. Bridges, Jr., Temple, Strickland & Counts, William D. Temple, for appellees. Robert A. Del Bello, John G. Nelson, amicus curiae.
The majority concludes that this general language has the effect of incorporating the minimum coverages of Rule 1-8-1-.01 as the specific applicable limits of coverage afforded for the carrier’s unlisted vehicles. However, I believe that the “Form F” requirement refers to the actual limits of liability coverage of a particular policy, which limits cannot be “less than,” but can be more than, those prescribed by Rule 1-8-1-.01. Thus, Rule 1-8-1.01 requires the insurer to afford the same amount of coverage for claims arising from the negligent operation of all of the carrier’s motor vehicles, but “Form F” obligates the carrier to reimburse the insurer for any payment made for a claim arising from the negligent operation of a vehicle which was not specifically described in the policy. Therefore, the risk of loss from the carrier’s failure to list all of its vehicles would fall, as it should, on the carrier, rather than on the insurer or the injured party.
In my opinion, the majority’s construction of Rule 1-8-1-.01 and “Form F” is not supported by the language of either and is contrary to the intent underlying OCGA § 46-7-12 to benefit those who are injured by the negligent operation of a carrier’s vehicles. For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this dissent.