specially concurring in part, and dissenting in part.
*432I cannot accept the definition of “class” devised by the majority. That definition would exclude the members of a separate and non-participating union consisting of an entirely distinct craft simply because the project on which they were employed was “integrated” and because they had a “community of interest” with a separate union involved in the labor dispute. Thus, the members of the carpenters union in the present case could be disqualified simply because they happened to be working on a project which required the co-ordination of their work with that of another craft and it was shown that their wages or other benefits traditionally rise sympathetically with those of the other craft. The majority judicially invents this broad definition of “class,” arguing that it is necessary to effectuate the legislative purpose which prompted the enactment of OBS 657.200 (3) (b) and its counterpart in other jurisdictions.
It is admitted that the purpose of this disqualifying provision is not evident in the legislative history of our statute or in the statutes of other jurisdictions. Finding no guide in the legislative history of these statutes, the majority indulges in the speculation that the legislative purpose was to disqualify any class of workmen employed on an “integrated” project if the workmen’s Wages or benefits happen to move sympathetically with those of another craft whose members participated in the strike. To support this speculation the majority points to the danger of the key man strike as one of the principal reasons for the enactment of disqualification statutes such as OBS 657.200. But, it is not pointed out why this extension of the definition of “class” to embrace two or more distinct crafts is necessary to obviate the supposed danger. I understand a key man strike to be a device, consciously em*433ployed, by which a union can hold up production by removing a handful of workmen from an integrated operation. The definition elaborated by the majority disqualifies members of a craft even though in all of its bargaining it remains separate and distinct from the striking union. In fact, the disqualification would apply even though the separate union was, in the particular instance, antagonistic to the striking union. It would seem that, if the majority is to sustain its position, it would be necessary to show that in the history of management-labor conflict separate crafts which bargain separately have joined together for the purpose of accomplishing a key man strike. We have no basis for assuming that this is so.
It may be noted that if one of the separate unions acts in consort with a sister union to effectuate a key man strike the members of both unions would be disqualified under ORS 657.200 (3) (a) because of their “participation” in the labor dispute.
In my opinion the elaborate and complicated definition of “class” developed by the majority not only exceeds the permissible bounds of judicial imagination in the interpretation of statutes, but it also sets up a test which is so indefinite and complex that it will be impracticable to apply in the administration of the act.
I believe that the term “class” should be given a simpler and more definite meaning. I agree that it should be related to the character of the dispute. Ordinarily the bargaining unit will constitute the class. However, under some circumstances the class may be smaller or larger than the bargaining unit. Thus, it is possible that where the labor dispute relates to conditions affecting only a part of the members of the bargaining unit the class may be smaller than the unit of which it is a part. Decisions under the Unemploy*434meat Insurance Acts, 1920-26, Case No. 8344 (July 10, 1924), reprinted in .Selected Decisions Given by the Umpire Prior to 19th. April 1928 respecting Claims to Benefit and Donation at 524 (1929); Shell Oil Co. v. Cummins, 7 Ill2d 329, 131 NE2d 64 (1955). Cf., Members of the Iron Workers of Provo v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 242, 139 P2d 208 (1943). On the other hand, where members of the same craft form separate local unions and the local unions do not join together for bargaining purposes, it is possible that the class would embrace all of the local unions thus recognizing that the craft is a class even though it nominally separates its bargaining units into local unions. It is not necessary for us to decide at this time the circumstances under which a class will be less or greater than the bargaining unit. We need only to decide in the present case whether, in the absence of any evidence of unity other than the unity of an “integrated” project and a so-called “community of interest,” different crafts, bargaining separately, are within the same class. I do not think that our statute intended them to be so considered.
There was some evidence of participation upon the part of individual workmen which would disqualify them and perhaps the other members of their union under OKiS 657.200 (3) (a). For that reason, I agree with the majority that the case must be remanded.
Perry, J., concurs in this opinion.