(Concurring specially) .
I concur in the majority opinion in all regards except as to its conclusion that withdrawals from the fund paid to Mr. Coughlan under the classification of “Investigation and Hearings” as insurance losses, are payments authorized by I.C. § 72-927.
I.C. § 72-901 quoted in the majority opinion provides for the creation of the fund, the payment to be made to it, and the purposes for which the fund shall be applicable.
I.C. § 72-910 establishes the State Treasurer as custodian of the fund further defines how payments shall be made from the fund as follows:
“ * * * all disbursements therefrom shall be paid by him [State treasurer] upon warrants signed by the state auditor, or upon sight drafts signed by the state insurance manager as provided by section 72-927.”
There are thus only two methods by which moneys may be withdrawn from the fund, i. e., by a warrant executed by the state auditor, or upon sight draft by the state insurance manager.
I.C. § 72-927 limits payments by sight draft of the manager of the fund to disbursements for workmen’s compensation insurance losses and premium refunds. That section provides for the manager to submit to the state board of examiners his estimated requirements for moneys for the payment of such items during the following month, and upon such approval, the manager is authorized to draw sight drafts im*92mediately payable by the state treasurer. The sight drafts by the terms of the statute must be limited to workmen’s compensation insurance losses and premium refunds. This limitation of the statute in my opinion, only has reference to the payment in settlement of obligations of the fund arising under outstanding insurance policies for workmen’s compensation, occupational disease compensation, national guard, and premium refunds. Such conclusion is based on a consideration of the threefold purposes for which the fund is made applicable, (I.C. .§ 72-901).
a. To the payment of lossses sustained on account of insurance written by the fund.
b. To the payment of compensation under the workmen’s compensation and the occupational disease compensation laws.
c. To the payment of expenses of administering such fund.
The following statement in American Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Cummings, 218 Ark. 888, 239 S.W.2d 10, 11, is particularly applicable here:
“The word ‘loss’ has an established meaning in the field of insurance, which is: ‘Death, injury, destruction, or damage, in such a manner as to charge the insurer with a liability under the terms of the policy.’ ”
The term “losses” as used in I.C. § 72—927 would thus have reference only to the-obligations arising under policies of insurance issued by the fund, which obligation would be settled by payment to the employee for his injury (I.C. § 72-201), or payment to the employee’s dependents for his death (I.C. § 72-301), or on the employee’s behalf for medical attendance, etc., (I.C. § 72-307). The terms employed in I. C. § 72-927 would thus limit payment by sight draft to items embraced in first two. of the three purposes of the fund mentioned above, both of which items are for or on behalf of the employee. The payments for the third purpose of the fund, i.. e., expenses of administration, would be-disbursed through the warrants of the state-auditor. Payments made for attorney’s, fees (which are not for the benefit of the particular injured employee, and are not in settlement of obligations arising under the-policies isstted), are not payments within, the purview of “losses” as mentioned in I. C. § 72-927; they are rather expenses of administration provided for by I.C. § 72-901, payment of which has been authorized by the biennial appropriation act of the-legislature.
The payments, however, having been-made to Mr. Coughlan, for services deemed' by the manager of the fund as “necessary and convenient in the administration of the-fund”, cannot be said to be illegal or unlawful, as they have been approved, as-*93the record discloses, by the Board of Examiners of this state, and paid. This Board having approved the monthly requests and statements of disbursements of the manager, covering these items, appellant cannot now be heard to complain.
For these reasons, I concur.