with whom COMPTON, Justice, joins dissenting.
I would affirm the superior court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction in the circumstances of this case.
In deciding to issue a preliminary injunction the superior court applied the “serious and substantial question”1 standard and found that the Kluti Kaah would suffer two forms of harm unless an injunction was issued: more particularly, the court concluded that the Kluti Kaah would be denied the opportunity to transmit knowledge of traditional and customary hunting patterns to their children, and that their 1991-92 winter subsistence needs for moose could possibly go unfulfilled. Since the Kluti Kaah established both irreparable injury and substantial questions going to the merits, I am of the view that the superior court did not err in granting Kluti Kaah a preliminary injunction.
Kluti Kaah claimed that the seven day season would irreparably harm them because they will be denied the ability to maintain and transmit to their children knowledge of the Ahtna people’s traditional and customary methods of subsistence hunting. The superior court agreed, noting:
There is no question that the traditional Ahtna method of hunting this game population encompassed much more protracted opportunities to engage in this activity with the younger generation. To compress the long standing custom into a sport hunter’s seven-day ‘vacation’ is to legislate a substantial departure from the historical subsistence hunting experience.
The superior court concluded that the provisions of AS 16.05.258(f)2 supported the Kluti Kaah’s contention that the Board was obligated to consider customary and traditional hunting patterns (methods and means), not just quantitative requirements, in determining the appropriate length of season for the moose hunt in question.3 The superior court interpreted the length of time which Kluti Kaah members needed to traditionally harvest moose to come within the ambit of “means” as used in AS 16.05.258(f).4 Because the Board failed to consider the historical duration of the Aht-na people’s traditional and customary patterns of hunting moose in the relevant game management unit the superior court concluded that:
*1276[I]t is highly questionable whether the Board was ‘reasonably’ regulating the season in this case, when it failed to take the historical hunting period into account.
The superior court’s reasoning is sound. The provisions of AS 16.05.258(c) and (f) required the Board to consider traditional and customary methods and means of hunting in determining the length of the moose hunting season. In Madison v. Alaska Department of Fish & Game, 696 P.2d 168 (Alaska 1985), we held that “the phrase ‘customary and traditional’ modifies the word 'uses’ in [the statute]. It does not refer to users.” Id. at 174. However, we also stated that,
[t]he legislative history indicates that the legislature intended to protect subsistence use, not limit it. The words ‘customary and traditional’ serve as a guideline to recognize historical subsistence use by individuals, both [Njative and non-[N]ative Alaskans.
Id. at 176.
“[CJustomary and traditional” uses is employed to modify and define “subsistence uses” in AS 16.05.940(30) as follows:
“subsistence uses” means the noncommercial, customary and traditional uses of wild, renewable resources by a resident ... for direct personal or family consumption as food, shelter, fuel, clothing, tools, or transportation, for the making and selling of handicraft articles out of nonedible by-products of fish and wildlife resources taken for personal or family consumption, and for the customary trade, barter, or sharing for personal or family consumption....
(Emphasis added.) “Subsistence hunting” is defined by AS 16.05.940(29) as follows:
“subsistence hunting” means the taking of, hunting for, or possession of game by a resident ... of the state for subsistence uses by means defined by the Board of Game;5
(Emphasis added.) Since “subsistence hunting” incorporates “subsistence uses,” and “subsistence uses” contemplates “customary and traditional uses,” reading the subsistence statute as a whole leads me to conclude that subsistence hunting encompasses customary and traditional use patterns, methods and means.
In addition to the above, I am of the view that the Kluti Kaah established irreparable harm in connection with their claim that given the truncated hunting season, their winter subsistence needs could possibly go unfulfilled. In previous years, Kluti Kaah members enjoyed a substantially longer hunting period.6 As the superior court found, the Board established a seven day general hunt. The limited hunt was imposed on the Kluti Kaah even though the state’s own expert from the Subsistence Division, Dr. James Fall, made it clear that a shortened season would not satisfy traditional harvest practices. In the course of discussing the merits of a shortened season at the Board’s March 1991 meeting, Dr. Fall stated:
We know from working with subsistence hunting and fishing systems is [sic] that one important aspect that I think *1277the boards have tried to provide for in the management system is flexibility and, in other words providing windows, of opportunity for people to engage in hunting and fishing efforts, certainly an average of about six days might be what people spend but of course those six days might come at different times within that larger window of opportunity. We know that people’s choices, decisions about when to hunt are influenced by a variety of factors, one of the major ones of course is where the animals are in relation to a particular communities’ traditional hunting area or access place, weather of course plays a major role in choosing when to go hunting and poor weather can pretty much eliminate hunting opportunity in a short season. Likewise, other kinds of subsistence activities that are taking place within a period of time also influence the choice of just what to do and could preclude a particular activity if the window of opportunity was rather short.
Another issue in the Copper Basin has been the issue of hunter numbers and crowding we do know that large numbers of hunters in the field in a short period of time can inhibit hunting or inhibit hunting success.
The Board rejected Dr. Fall’s advice despite the statutory mandate that the Subsistence Division “participate with other divisions in the preparation of statewide regional management plans so that those plans recognize and incorporate the needs of subsistence users of fish and game.” AS 16.05.094(7) (emphasis added).
I also must note my disagreement with the court’s conclusion that the superior court erred in its conclusion that the injury or harm to the public and the state would be insignificant. In regard to this issue the superior court stated:
Plaintiff essentially seeks only that it be allowed a period from August 25 through September 20 to conduct its subsistence hunt. The Board already incorporated Kluti Kaah’s need for 40 moose into the 600 moose limit. There is no evidence before the court to suggest that extending the time period for plaintiff’s members to conduct their hunt would significantly impact the total numbers of moose harvested.
Such a remedy would benefit a particular subgroup of subsistence users. Such relief would not, however, be based on a rural preference or on any other prohibited classification. Plaintiff’s members would receive favorable treatment only because (1) they brought this action; and (2) the impact on the state and other moose hunters of affording this relief to Kluti Kaah can be evaluated based on the existing record.
Should the only change in the hunt be the extension of the season for the members of Kluti Kaah, the court can perceive no adverse impact on the state from a procedural standpoint. Nor would the public in general or sports hunters in particular suffer any material infringement of hunting opportunity or diminution of the moose population. With a cap of 40 moose, any advantage obtained by the people of Kluti Kaah would be de minimus.
State v. Kluti Kaah, No. 3AN-91-04554 Cl (Alaska Super., August 16, 1991).
I cannot find an abuse of discretion in the superior court’s analysis and resolution of this issue. The Kluti Kaah persuasively argue that other moose hunters in the affected unit are neither assisted nor harmed by the terms of the preliminary injunction since the seven day general hunt remains in effect for them and no evidence was adduced by the state that the injunction would result in harm to the particular moose resource. Nor did the superior court’s injunction impinge on the Board’s expertise since the Board had previously allotted 40 moose for the Kluti Kaah in its overall determination that 600 moose could be taken in the season and game unit in question.
Admittedly, it is unfortunate that the Kluti Kaah had to resort to the courts for vindication of their customary and traditional subsistence hunting patterns. Nevertheless, such action is well within the traditions of our legal system which afford *1278litigants the opportunity to obtain a determination as to the legality of the substantive content of a particular regulation in light of constitutional or controlling statutory criteria. See AS 44.62.3007; see also Powers v. Public Employees’ Retirement Bd., 757 P.2d 65, 67 (Alaska 1988) (supreme court may review administrative regulations to determine if they are within the statutory authority granted to agency by legislature); Madison v. Alaska Dep’t of Fish & Game, 696 P.2d 168, 173 (Alaska 1985) (statutory interpretation of the words “customary and traditional” and the question of whether the board has acted within the scope of its authority fall into the realm of special competency of the courts). The rush to the courthouse fears of the majority can ordinarily be attenuated and accommodated by established procedures which permit consolidation,8 or class certification9 where appropriate10, and by restraint on the judiciary’s part when the circumstances permit deference to the administrative agency's initial determination of the particular issue. Cf. 4 Kenneth Culp Davis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22:1, 81 (1983) (“Primary jurisdiction is a doctrine of common law, wholly court-made, that is designed to guide a court in determining whether and when it should refrain from or postpone the exercise of its own jurisdiction so that an agency may first answer some question presented.”); see also State v. Zia Inc., 556 P.2d 1257, 1262 (Alaska 1976) (under doctrine of primary jurisdiction a court may stay or dismiss pending litigation so as to enable agency to initially pass on an aspect of the case calling for administrative expertise).
I would affirm the superior court’s preliminary injunction for the reasons stated by that court, namely:
Because plaintiff has established irreparable injury and substantial questions going to the merits, and because plaintiff has further demonstrated that if limited relief is afforded Kluti Kaah, the harm to the state and the public will be insignificant, the balance of hardships tilts clearly in plaintiff’s favor.
State v. Kluti Kaah, No. 3AN-91-04554 Cl (Alaska Super., August 16, 1991).
. In State v. United Cook Inlet Drift Ass’n, 815 P.2d 378 (Alaska 1991), we said that this standard:
applies only where the injury which will result from the temporary restraining order or the preliminary injunction can be indemnified by a bond or where it is relatively slight in comparison to the injury which the person seeking the injunction will suffer if the injunction is not granted.
(Citations omitted), id. at 379.
. AS 16.05.258(f) provides in relevant part:
Takings authorized under this section are subject to reasonable regulations of seasons, catch or bag limits, and methods and means.
. The superior court additionally relied on the text of AS 16.05.258(c) which reads in part:
The boards shall adopt subsistence fishing and subsistence hunting regulations for each stock and population for which a harvestable portion is determined to exist under (b)(1) of this section.... If it is necessary to restrict subsistence fishing or subsistence hunting in order to assure sustained yield or continue subsistence uses, then the preference shall be limited, and the boards shall distinguish among subsistence users, by applying the following criteria: ....
. See note 2, supra, for the text of AS 16.05.-258(f).
. Under AS 16.05.940(31) "take" is defined in the following manner:
"take” means taking, pursuing, hunting, fishing, trapping, or in any manner disturbing, capturing, or killing or attempting to take, pursue, hunt, fish, trap, or in any manner capture or kill fish or game;
. The regulatory history for moose taken in the Copper River Basin since statehood was summarized for the Board of Game at its March 1991 meeting by Dr. James Fall, an anthropologist with the Subsistence Division of the Alaska Department of Fish and Game:
I reviewed it back to 1959 and it looks like the shortest period that we’ve had available to subsistence hunters in that unit is 20 days, it was as long as 50 days back in the 50’s and 60’s and through much of the early 1980’s, there was a 20 day season available to subsistence hunters and in about '86 or ’87 the board added on 6 days at the beginning of the season for subsistence hunters, it was a subsistence only season.... [sic]
The state now asserts that there was no reduction in hunting days this year because only five days were provided last year, so that the "status quo from the perspective of the hunter is five days.” The state’s argument is unpersuasive because in addition to the general five day fall hunt, Kluti Kaah members also had a 31 day Tier II season in December, for a total of 36 hunting days. See 5 AAC 85.045(11) (July 1991 Supp.).
. AS 44.62.300 provides in relevant part:
Judicial review of validity. An interested person may get a judicial declaration on the validity of a regulation by bringing an action for declaratory relief in the superior court. In addition to any other ground the court may declare the regulation invalid (1) for a substantial failure to comply with AS 44.62.010— 44.62.320.
. Alaska Civil Rule 42(a) provides:
When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay....
. Alaska Civil Rule 23(a) provides:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
.I note that in the instant case the record shows that the original preliminary injunction was granted on August 16, 1991, prohibiting the state from enforcing the seven-day general moose hunt against the 267 residents of Kluti Kaah. Thereafter the superior court entered a supplemental order on August 21 that limited the Kluti Kaah residents to a harvest of no more than forty moose. On August 23, 1991, seven additional Native villages filed an expedited request to share in the Kluti Kaah hunt. However, this court entered a stay of the superior court's preliminary injunction on the same day, August 23, 1991, pending announcement of this court’s decision whether to grant or deny the state’s petition for review.