dissenting.
1. I concur with the dissent of Presiding Judge McMurray in that we have no transcription of the argument of the solicitor and must base our decision solely upon the colloquy of counsel as to what was said or was not said. The defendant has a remedy under Code Ann. § 6-805 (d) (Ga. L. 1965, pp. 18, 24) to supplement the record as to this matter and did not avail himself of such right. This court can not correctly reconstruct the proceedings from "colloquies of counsel.”
No tenet of law is more basic or sound than that which holds: " 'The burden is on him who asserts error to show it affirmatively by the record.’ Roach v. State, 221 *221Ga. 783 (4) (147 SE2d 299).” Kemp v. State, 226 Ga. 506 (2) (175 SE2d 869). Secondly, the defendant complains about that which he does not show of record and has made no attempt to correct the record as provided by statute. There is nothing for us to review. Smart v. State, 147 Ga. App. 117 (5) (248 SE2d 185); Allen v. State, 230 Ga. 772 (2) (199 SE2d 246).
2. I regret that I can not concur with the majority’s conclusion that the "trial courrrefused a request to give a curative instruction after denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial.” The Court stated: "Now what we need to do in this case, or so it seems to me, Mr. Brackett [defendant’s counsel], is to have some suitable instruction to the Court and an absolute lack of any further statements by either side relative to the matter.” The court further stated: "I addressed [the question] to Mr. Brackett, I told him that’s what I think. Now if he doesn’t want me to do it, I won’t... Mr. Brackett: Your Honor, please, with regard to your request that I approve an instruction that you’re about to give and haven’t given yet, I — I will stand on my earlier — earlier objection — I do not believe that a curative instruction will satisfy this because there have been — The Court: In that case I won’t give it. Bring the jury back in. I’ll just overrule the motion.” From this discussion , I must conclude that the court offered to give the curative instruction and the defendant’s counsel declined it and elected to stand on his objection. Accordingly, the issue is whether the alleged error, which was denied by the solicitor, and is unsupported by the transcript, could have been cured by proffered instructions by the court but was refused by defendant’s counsel who elected to stand on an "all-or-nothing” mistrial motion.
Code Ann. § 81-1009 (Code § 81-1009) leaves to the discretion of the trial judge the decision of granting or denying a mistrial for improper remarks of counsel within the presence of the jury. If the remark alleged had been made, and I do not find it supported by the record, the trial court could have rebuked counsel, given curative instructions to the jury, and denial of the motion for mistrial would not have been an abuse of discretion. Johnson v. State, 142 Ga. App. 526 (1) (236 SE2d 493); Moore v. State, 228 Ga. 662 (4) (187 SE2d 277); Lenear v. *222State, 239 Ga. 617, 621 (238 SE2d 407).
Counsel could have had curative instructions but. refused to accept that remedy. He elected to stand on his motion for mistrial. Mistrial is not demanded per se for such remark which may be cured by rebuke of counsel and instructions to a jury. Lenear v. State, 239 Ga. 617, 621, supra. Counsel may not now complain of alleged error below where he was offered and declined corrective instructions in the trial court. Mosley v. State, 150 Ga. App. 802. Mistrial was not demanded under the facts of the instant case.
. 3. The second division of the majority opinion held: "The charge given by the court in this case concerning the defendant’s right to remain silent was incomplete and. ambiguous. Coupled as it was with the impermissible comment of the prosecutor, there is a substantial risk that the jury was given to understand that the defendant could be penalized for exercising his constitutional right to remain silent.”
The error enumerated by the defendant was: "It was reversible error for the trial court to comment on the failure of the defendant to testify by giving an erroneous, incomplete charge to the jury concerning the defendant’s right to remain silent.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The defendant failed to provide a record citation to the objectionable "trial court... comment...” This failure to comply with our appellate practice rules constitutes abandonment of the enumeration. Burchfield v. Byers, 121 Ga. App. 152 (2) (173 SE2d 230). I assume the offensive "comment” was the charge that: "I instruct you as a matter of law that in Georgia one accused and on trial charged with the commission of a crime may testify in his own behalf or not, as he pleases.” First — this is not a comment by the trial court on the failure of the defendant to testify. Secondly — it is a correct statement of law. Code Ann § 38-415, as amended through Ga. L. 1973, pp. 292, 294). The correct charge amounted to nothing more than advising the jury of what the defendant’s rights consisted of. In Roberts v. State, 231 Ga. 395 (202 SE2d 43), the Supreme Court held that instructing an accused in the presence of the jury of his right to testify, or to make an unsworn statement was not reversible error in the *223absence of an objection or motion for mistrial. There was no objection here, motion for mistrial, or request for any curative instructions if counsel deemed such charge a comment on defendant’s silence. Later, in Scott v. State, 233 Ga. 815, 817 (213 SE2d 676), the Supreme Court held that an "instruction given the accused as to his unsworn statement did not constitute comment upon his failure to testify.”
In Linder v. State, 132 Ga. App. 624 (3) (208 SE2d 630), this court held that a "charge that the defendant has the right to either testify or to remain silent, as the burden is not on him to establish his innocence, but upon the state to prove guilt... was violative of Code Ann. § 38-415 ...” The Supreme Court in Woodard v. State, 234 Ga. 901, 905 (218 SE2d 629) expressly disapproved of the "holding that such a charge was error...” Accordingly, I do not find the charge to be a comment by the trial court oh the silence of the defendant.
I can not concur with the statement of the majority that the charge was error because it "was imcomplete and ambiguous.” Our Supreme Court, in Spear v. State, 230 Ga. 74 (1) (195 SE2d 397), held that "[wjhile present law exempts the defendant in a criminal case from the strict requirements imposed on litigants in civil cases to preserve an issue on the giving of or the failure to give instructions to the jury [Cit.], this does not relieve him from the necessity of requesting instructions, or making timely objection in the trial court on the failure to give instructions . . .” This ruling was clarified in Thomas v. State, 234 Ga. 615, 618 (216 SE2d 859), when the court held "where a criminal defendant fails to request a charge, or fails to object to the trial court’s omission to charge, such failure to request or object has been decisive against him.” In the instant case there was no request to charge and no objection to the charge given. If the charge given was incomplete or ambiguous he should have requested a fuller instruction. Billups v. State, 236 Ga. 922 (1) (225 SE2d 887). Failure to request illuminating instructions is tantamount to waiver. See Collins v. State, 146 Ga. App. 857, 861 (3) (247 SE2d 602).
For the foregoing reasons I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Deen and Presiding *224Judge McMurray join in this dissent.