dissenting:
The majority holds that under the circumstances of this case, the defendant used his fist as a deadly weapon as that term is defined in section 18-l-901(3)(e), 8B C.R.S. (1986). Because the common understanding of the language of section 18-1-901(3)(e) and the structure of that section limit the definition to objects independent of the human body, and because even if the statute is ambiguous on this point, the rule of lenity requires us to construe penal stat*1315utes in favor of the accused, I respectfully dissent.
The defendant, Howard Ross, was charged with and convicted of second-degree assault1 and assault on the elderly by means of a deadly weapon.2 These convictions resulted from a dispute between Ross and seventy-two-year-old Samuel Cohn during which Ross struck Cohn with his hand,3 severely injuring Cohn. Ross challenges his conviction for assault on the elderly by means of a deadly weapon on the basis that a fist is not a deadly weapon under Colorado law.
Definitions of the term “deadly weapon,” whether statutory or judicial, vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In employing these assorted definitions courts have disagreed concerning whether a fist may be considered a deadly weapon. The majority has referred to several decisions holding that a fist, in certain circumstances, is a deadly weapon. Maj. op. at 1314. Other courts, however, have held that fists do not constitute deadly weapons. E.g., Roney v. Commonwealth, 695 S.W.2d 863, 864 (Ky.1985) (court held instruction authorizing conviction for aggravated assault if jury believed defendant’s fists and feet were dangerous instruments was erroneous); Commonwealth v. Davis, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 190, 406 N.E.2d 417, 420-21 (1980) (court announced per se rule that human teeth and other body parts should be removed from consideration as dangerous weapons); People v. Van Diver, 80 Mich.App. 352, 263 N.W.2d 370, 373 (1978) (court held that term dangerous weapon cannot be interpreted to encompass the bare hand). In Colorado, the term deadly weapon is defined by statute. Section 18-l-901(3)(e) provides:
“Deadly weapon” means any of the following which in the manner it is used or intended to be used is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury:
(I) A firearm, whether loaded or unloaded;
(II) A knife;
(III) A bludgeon; or
(IV) Any other weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance, whether animate or inanimate.
“Our primary task in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly.” People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo.1986); accord, e.g., State v. Hartsough, 790 P.2d 836, 838 (Colo.1990). To determine legislative intent we look first to the language of the statute. District Court, 713 P.2d at 921; B.B. v. People, 785 P.2d 132, 138 (Colo.1990). Statutory terms and phrases should be given their plain and obvious meanings, People v. Owens, 670 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Colo.1983), and not strained or forced interpretations, Hartsough, 790 P.2d at 838.
In holding that a fist is a deadly weapon within the meaning of section 18-1-901(3)(e) in this instance, the majority focuses on the intended use of Ross’s fist. I agree that when determining whether an object other than a firearm, knife, or bludgeon is a dangerous weapon, we must look to the manner of its use or intended use. See Bowers v. People, 617 P.2d 560, 562-63 (Colo.1980). However, such an analysis does not obviate the need to determine first whether the object being considered is a “weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance” within the meaning of section 18-l-901(3)(e). I disagree with the majority that a fist falls within the plain meaning of the phrase “[a]ny other weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance, whether animate or inanimate.” § 18-1-901(3)(e)(IV). The enumerated terms are not commonly understood as referring to a part of the human anatomy. See Roney, 695 S.W.2d at 864. The majority does not explain or support the contention that these terms, as they are commonly understood, encompass a human fist.4
*1316Moreover, the structure of section 18-1-901(3)(e) demonstrates a legislative intent not to include a human fist within the definition of the term “deadly weapon.” According to a familiar rule of statutory construction, where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the general words will be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or class as those enumerated. Martinez v. People, 111 Colo. 52, 57-58, 137 P.2d 690, 692-93 (1943); accord People v. District Court, 808 P.2d 831, 836 (Colo.1991). In section 18-l-901(3)(e), the language “[a]ny other weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance” is preceded by a list of specific items — a firearm, a knife, and a bludgeon — that may be utilized by persons to inflict injury but remain distinct and separate from the human body. Accordingly, the more general phrase that follows should also be restricted to such items.
It is also important that this case involves the construction of a penal measure because “Colorado criminal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the accused.” People v. Roybal, 618 P.2d 1121, 1125 (Colo.1980); Van Gerpen v. Peterson, 620 P.2d 714, 715 (Colo.1980). Should there be ambiguity in a criminal statute, the construction favoring the defendant must be adopted. In People v. Newton, 764 P.2d 1182, 1189 (Colo.1988) we explained that
[w]hen ... an ambiguity in a criminal statute renders it capable of alternative and conflicting constructions, it is appropriate to resort to the rule of lenity in an effort to arrive at an appropriate interpretation. The rule of lenity requires that in resolving such a statutory ambiguity the construction that favors the liberty interests of the accused should be adopted.
(Citations omitted.) Accord S.G.W. v. People, 752 P.2d 86, 88 (Colo.1988). In accord with this rule of statutory interpretation, even if section 18-l-901(3)(e) is not entirely clear, it must be construed so that human fists do not fall within the definition of the term deadly weapon. See Roney, 695 S.W.2d at 864 (court applies rule of lenity to exclude fists from definition of term “dangerous instrument” because it is not clear whether the legislature intended that fists be considered a dangerous instrument as that term is used in the first-degree assault statute).
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
. § 18-3-203(l)(a), 8B C.R.S. (1986).
. § 18-3-209(1), (2), 8B C.R.S. (1986).
. Ross struck Cohn with a cupped hand; the parties refer to this as a fist.
.The fact that the definition extends to animate as well as inanimate objects does not lend support to the majority’s construction of § 18 — 1— 901(3)(e). The term "animate” was likely included in the statute so that the term deadly *1316weapon would include vicious animals. See People v. Nealis, 283 Cal.Rptr. 376, 379, 232 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 (1991) ("depending upon the circumstances of each case, a dog trained to attack humans on command, ... may be considered a 'deadly weapon or instrument' within the meaning of [the relevant statute]”); State v. Bowers, 239 Kan. 417, 721 P.2d 268, 274 (1986) ("a Doberman pinscher is not a deadly weapon per se, but an ordinary object used in a deadly manner is a deadly weapon within the meaning of [the relevant statute]” (emphasis in original)).