dissenting, with whom CARDINE, J. joins.
I respectfully dissent.
In this case we must review the district court’s application of Wyo.Stat. § 1-22-108 (June 1988), as substantive law providing a procedure for contested adoptions. Matter of Adoption of GSD, 716 P.2d 984, 987 (Wyo.1986). GSD was the first case in which this court reviewed a district court’s application of the law in question. This case is now the second.
I agree with the majority’s analysis up to a point. I agree that BDR, the biological father who is contesting the adoption, established his claim to paternity. I also agree that the district court erred when it found the evidence insufficient to prove that BDR had evidenced an interest in and responsibility for the child within the requisite thirty-day period. Those factors, paternity and interest/responsibility, however, are but two of the four factors that a court must consider.
I part company with the majority in its analysis, or rather lack of analysis, of the two remaining factors. Those factors are the validity of the contesting biological father’s objections to the adoption and the best interests of the child. In GSD a unanimous court established the method of review for a case like this. Writing for that court, Justice Cardine made clear that we review the district court’s findings as part of the four-part test of Wyo.Stat. § 1-22-108(c)(iHiv). GSD, 716 P.2d at 987. We can reverse a district court’s factual determinations in a contested adoption “only if the court has abused its discretion.” Id. at 988. Justice Cardine emphasized that the district court bases its decision “on the manner in which the [four] factors balance.” Id. at 987. Since the district court’s decision is the product of a balancing of four factors, obviously none of those factors is talismanic, none is entitled to more weight than any other. In GSD, for example, the court found that the al*203leged father had established his paternity claim as the biological father and that he had evidenced an interest in the child within the requisite time period. However, with respect to the two remaining factors, validity of objections and best interests of the child, the court found against the contesting biological father.
Following GSD’s method of review with respect to those two remaining factors, I would hold that the district court was correct in finding that BDR’s objections to the adoption were invalid and that the adoption was in the best interests of the child. Let us consider these two factors one at a time.
The majority declares that the district court’s determination of BDR’s objections to the adoption as invalid “is clearly without foundation.” Having read BDR’s pleading entitled “Objection to Adoption” and BDR’s hearing testimony, I must respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion. In reality, BDR’s objections were nonexistent. Like the contesting biological father in GSD, BDR’s stance, from both a pleading standpoint and evidentiary standpoint, “was essentially defensive because he was trying to prevent the adoption.” GSD, 716 P.2d at 989. All that his objections amounted to were his feeble protestations, unsupported by evidence, that he was not an alcohol abuser and he was a fit person to have custody of the minor child “until such time as it is demonstrated that his care of the child is in fact detrimental to the physical wellbeing of said child.” The district court here found correctly that the biological father, BDR, had not produced any evidence that the quality of the relationship between the child and the adoptive parents was unsatisfactory. This was the court’s unanimous holding in GSD. In fact, BDR conceded, as he must since the evidence is overwhelming, that the adoptive parents are exemplary human beings and demonstrate without question they would be parents of high quality.
In my judgment, the district court wisely determined from the evidence presented at the hearing that BDR’s “objections” to the adoption were invalid. The majority is in error when it states that the adoptive parents have the burden of proving that the biological father’s objections to the adoption are invalid. Under the statute,
the court shall hear the evidence in support of the petition to adopt and in support of the objection to the petition and shall then determine whether:
(iii) The putative father’s objections to the petition to adopt are valid.
Wyo.Stat. § l-22-108(c). That language tells me that the contesting biological father must carry the burden of proof as to the validity of his objections. And that same language told the same thing to the unanimous GSD court. GSD, 716 P.2d at 989.
With respect to the fourth part of the four-part test, the best interests of the child, the majority did not review the district court’s finding on this factor due to the majority’s erroneous decision that the adoptive parents had failed to prove that BDR’s objections were invalid. The adoptive parents presented strong evidence that the adoption was in the best interests of the child. They proved their own outstanding personal characteristics and qualifications as fit and proper parents and also proved BDR’s unfitness. As to BDR’s unfitness, his actions spoke more eloquently than his words. With his words, BDR weakly protested the allegations that he abused alcohol, women, and children. With hard evidence, the adoptive parents proved clearly and convincingly that he is an abuser of alcohol; has experimented with controlled substances; has participated in illegal controlled substances activity; is the product of a dysfunctional alcoholic family; is a womanizer; is verbally and physically abusive to women and children; and is violent, unpredictable, and unstable in his interpersonal relationships. From this evidence, the district court wisely concluded that the adoption was in the child’s best interests.
I am satisfied that the district court carefully balanced the four statutory factors and soundly exercised its discretion as required by the teachings of GSD.
*204Finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion, I would affirm.