dissenting.
Construing the statutory language “first sale for use or consumption,” the majority holds that the ten-year limitation period of OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (2) did not commence until the spinal plate was implanted in Pafford’s back, more than ten years after it was sold to the hospital. In reaching this conclusion, the majority places great emphasis on the legislature’s use of the words “use” and “consumption” while ignoring basic rules of statutory construction and the full language of the statute which ties the running of the statute of repose to the first sale for use or consumption rather than the first use of the spinal plate. Because I believe the ten-year limitation period commenced when the spinal plate was first sold to the hospital for use by the hospital, I would hold that § 51-1-11 (b) (2) prevents the accrual of Pafford’s cause of action.
It is the duty of a court, in construing a statute, to ascertain the legislative intent and purpose in enacting the statute and to give full effect to the legislative intent. City of Roswell v. City of Atlanta, 261 Ga. 657 (410 SE2d 28) (1991); Board of Trustees v. Christy, 246 Ga. 553, 554 (272 SE2d 288) (1980); OCGA § 1-3-1. Section 51-1-11 (b) (2) was enacted in 1978 for the purpose of imposing a ten-year limitation period on claims brought under the Georgia Products Liability Act and specifically provides:
No action shall be commenced pursuant to this subsection with respect to an injury after ten years from the date of the first sale for use or consumption of the personal property causing or otherwise bringing about the injury.
Like other statutes of repose, the purpose of § 51-1-11 (b) (2) is to grant manufacturers “repose” from claims arising from a particular product ten years after the date the product is first sold “for use or consumption” by providing a definite time beyond which a manufacturer is no longer subject to liability. Such limitations on the accrual of a right of action are “based upon reasonable expectations about the useful life of ... a manufactured product.” Hill v. Fordham, 186 Ga. App. 354, 357 (367 SE2d 128) (1988); see Craven v. Lowndes County Hosp. Auth., 263 Ga. 657, 660 (437 SE2d 308) (1993) (through statutes of repose, the legislature has concluded “that the time may arrive when past transgressions are no longer actionable”); Wright v. Robinson, 262 Ga. 844, 845 (426 SE2d 870) (1993) (“[a] statute of repose stands as an unyielding barrier to a plaintiffs right of action”).
Statutes of repose are also intended to eliminate stale claims brought after records have been lost or disposed of, witnesses have died or moved away, and when proof of causation is more difficult due to the possibility of third-party neglect or abuse, mishandling, or poor *546maintenance of the product. See Craven, 263 Ga. at 659. In this regard, statutes of repose are similar to statutes of limitation in that they are
designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just claim[,] it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.
Allrid v. Emory Univ., 249 Ga. 35, 39 (285 SE2d 521) (1982).1
Consistent with the legislative intent in enacting § 51-1-11 (b) (2), the language of the statute ties the running of the limitation period to the “first sale for use or consumption” of a product and not the product’s “first use” as urged by the majority opinion. Indeed, in holding that the limitation period found in § 51-1-11 (b) (2) did not begin to run until 1988 when the plate was surgically implanted, the majority abrogates the clear purpose of the statute, rendering the defendants’ liability indefinite and dependent not upon the “first sale for use or consumption” of the product or the expected useful life of the product but upon the hospital’s arbitrary retention of the plate.
I believe a better construction, and one which gives § 51-1-11 (b) (2) its intended meaning, is that the spinal plate was “first [sold] for use or consumption” sometime between 1972 and 1977 when it was sold to the hospital. The plate was not sold to the hospital as a “dealer” or for “mere static retention” in the hospital’s inventory, majority opinion at 542, but for use by the hospital as part of its provision of professional medical services. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, comment 1 (1965) (including within the definition of “consumer” one who prepares the product for consumption and *547within the definition of “user” one who uses the product for the purpose of doing work on it). This construction serves the dual purpose of the statute in that it provides a definite and ascertainable date beyond which the manufacturer of the plate may no longer be held liable for manufacturing defects and it eliminates Pafford’s stale claim with its inherent unreliability and concomitant evidentiary problems.2
Decided September 19, 1994 — Reconsideration denied October 17, 1994. Sutton & Associates, Berrien L. Sutton, for appellant. John A. Gilleland, Sullivan, Hall, Booth & Smith, John E. Hall, Jr., Roger S. Sumrall, T. Andrew Graham, Love & Willingham, Michael J. Hannan III, for appellees.Despite the disadvantage to Pafford, it is plain that the legislature intended to create a definite ten-year period beyond which the manufacturer of a product would no longer be held liable for manufacturing defects. Because Pafford’s cause of action did not accrue within the statutory time period, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Hunt joins in this dissent.As stated by the Oregon Supreme Court in Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., 530 P2d 53, 56 (270 Or. 694) (1974), the rationale behind the preclusion of a right of action by way of a statute of repose, often even before an injury occurs, is two-fold.
The first concerns the lack of reliability and availability of evidence after a lapse of long periods of time. This rationale primarily protects defendants who, without prior notice of pending claims, would necessarily find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to mount a defense because of the nonpreservation of evidence and the disappearance or death of witnesses after a long lapse of time. However, the reliability of plaintiff’s evidence relating to long-past occurrences, transactions or conditions is also a relevant feature.
The second rationale concerns the public policy of allowing people, after the lapse of a reasonable time, to plan their affairs with a degree of certainty, free from the disruptive burden of protracted and unknown potential liability. [Cits.]
After more than five years of discovery neither party has been able to produce any documents or records regarding the hospital’s purchase of the plate or conclusively establishing who made the subject plate. In addition, it appears from the record that the hospital employee who informed one witness that the plate had been at the hospital for more than fifteen years has since retired, sustained a stroke, and is now incompetent to testify.