dissenting.
The majority must have read a record of the proceedings in this case different from the one that I reviewed. Assuming we all have reviewed the same record, the majority has put a twist on the evidence that is unwarranted and at odds with an objective, appellate analysis of this case.
The majority has concluded that Morrissey violated Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4) requiring a lawyer not to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that reflects adversely on a lawyer’s, fitness to practice law. This conclusion of the majority has two bases. First, Morrissey failed to make full disclosure to the crime victim that $50,000 might be available to settle her civil claim. Second, Morrissey failed to dis*345close to the criminal trial judge the full details of the plea agreement. I can agree that, given the relationship Morrissey assumed with the victim in his capacity as prosecutor, he probably should have made a fuller disclosure to her about the settlement offer. And, I can probably agree that this failure to disclose amounts to conduct involving misrepresentation that is violative of DR 1-102(A)(4). I cannot agree, however, that the second basis for the majority’s holding is supported by the record.
The evidence is uncontradicted that the criminal trial judge, when informed that the defendant’s attorney and Morrissey were “negotiating a civil aspect” of the criminal charge, said: “I don’t want to hear any of the details of it. ... I don’t want to hear any of that, any of the facts and circumstances.” During his testimony in the disbarment proceeding, the judge, when asked whether he made the foregoing responses upon being informed about a “civil resolution to the case,” stated: “I don’t ever want to hear anything about a civil settlement.” Later during his testimony, the judge indicated that if “anything had been mentioned about money the antenna would have gone up. I would have looked into it.”
This evidence clearly shows that the judge unmistakably communicated to the attorneys his reluctance to consider the details of a civil settlement, thus justifying Morrissey’s failure to pursue the matter with the court. Nevertheless, the majority twists this set of facts to find that Morrissey violated by his silence the ethical rule that he not engage in conduct involving misrepresentation. I believe this is an unwarranted view of the evidence and I would reverse the disbarment court’s finding insofar as it relied on this second basis.
The majority also has concluded that Morrissey violated Disciplinary Rule 8-101 (A)(3) providing that a lawyer who holds public office shall not accept anything of value from any person when it is obvious that the offer is made for the purpose of influencing the lawyer’s action as a public official. All lawyers who are elected representatives serving in state and .local government, and who receive campaign contributions, should pay close attention to this ruling.
The majority has concluded that Morrissey received a benefit from the charitable donations despite the stipulation between the parties to the contrary. There is absolutely no doubt about the stipulation. The Attorney General on brief states: “The parties *346stipulated, in lieu of hearing evidence from the numerous representatives [of the charities], that Morrissey made no requests for any benefit from these charities, and no benefit was given to Morrissey in return.” The majority avoids this stipulation of fact by saying that the stipulation was a “conclusion” and that “the State Bar did not stipulate the correctness of the witnesses’ conclusions.” To say, as does the majority, that Morrissey accepted something of value for the purpose of influencing his action as a public official in the face of a stipulation to the contrary places a twist on the record in this case that is unwarranted. I would conclude that Morrissey did not violate DR 8-101 (A)(3).
Consequently, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the proceeding for assessment of an appropriate punishment for the minor violation of DR 1-102(A)(4).