concurring.
I concur in the result of the principal opinion but I am doubtful whether, on remand after further discovery, Powel’s claim can survive summary judgment.
An action “shall not be deemed to accrue when the wrong is done or the technical breach of contract or duty occurs, but when the damage resulting therefrom is sustained and is capable of ascertainment. ...” Section 516.100. I agree with the principal opinion that the “capable of ascertainment” standard is an objective one. Sheehan v. Sheehan, 901 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Mo. banc 1995). It is only “when contradictory or different conclusions may be drawn from the evidence as to whether the statute of limitations has run” that it becomes a question for the jury. Lomax v. Sewell, 1 S.W.3d 548, 552-53 (Mo.App.1999). I also agree with the principal opinion that “the statute of limitations begins to run when the ‘evidence was such as to place a reasonably prudent person on notice of a potentially actionable injury.’ ” (Citation omitted).
The circuit court believed it was bound by H.R.B. v. Rigali, 18 S.W.3d 440 (Mo.App.2000). H.R.B. may have gone too far in stating that “[wjhere an overt sexual assault occurs, the injury and damage resulting from the act are capable of ascertainment at the time of the abuse.” 18 S.W.3d at 443. There is an obvious difference in the ability of a five-year-old to ascertain damages and a 15-year-old. *587Without considering H.R.B., the circuit court on remand, after further development of the record, may consider a motion for summary judgment.
Is there a factual issue as to when Powers damages were “capable of ascertainment?” His deposition testimony indicates no such factual issue — his damages were ascertained at the time of the alleged abuses.
On the record so far, the factual issue that Powel creates, to avoid summary judgment, is with his own testimony. Powel in his affidavit says he repressed memory of the alleged sexual abuse, but Powel also testified in his deposition that he always remembered the alleged abuse. The affidavit of Powel’s expert, a psychologist, is based on Powel’s contradictory and unsubstantiated statement; it adds nothing to determine whether there is a factual issue.
This record developed thus far may show some confusion on Powel’s part, but it does not seem to create a “genuine issue of material fact” for a jury’s determination.
The Statute of Limitations
The purpose of statutes of limitations is to bar stale claims. Thatcher v. De Tar, 351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760, 761 (1943). The relevant statute of limitations here is five years after the cause of action accrued. Sections 516.120(4) and 516.100.1 The statute of limitations would have been tolled, however, based on Powel’s minority. Section 516.170; Strahler v. St. Luke’s Hospital, 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. banc 1986).2
The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense. Rule 55.08. Most often a statute of limitations defense is established as a matter of law, by reference to the face of the pleadings or upon a motion for summary judgment, as in this case.
Powel’s deposition testimony seems to demonstrate that his injuries were capable of ascertainment at the time of the alleged abuses. Furthermore, his testimony is that he always knew and remembered being molested, without any help from others.
The Facts Pertinent to the Statute of Limitations
Powel relies on his unsupported claim that “he did not realize he had suffered a wrong at the time” of the alleged abuse. This rebanee is contrary to the concept of an objective test: the question is whether a reasonable person in his situation would realize he had suffered a wrong. The situation Powel describes in his deposition would certainly have made a reasonable person aware of the wrong. Powel testified in his deposition as to the sexual abuse that he said occurred in 1973-1975 while he was a high school student at Chami-nade. He said he felt disgusted and “sick to [his] stomach” and associated physical and emotional pain after each of the alleged sexual assaults perpetrated by *588Woulfe. “I felt it was wrong,” he said. Powel also testified that he felt physically and emotionally sick after incidences in which Christensen engaged him in viewing x-rated films, oral sex, fondling, and anal sodomy. Powel’s psychologist report states that Powel reported feeling “dirty, confused, ashamed, and had to hold these experiences a secret from others.” Powel testified that he avoided Woulfe and Christensen after the abuses. Powel remembered being molested and abused until sometime during his 17th year. These incidences, if they occurred, were certainly “capable of ascertainment.” Nothing in the record refutes these admissions.3
Sometime around age 17 until he was 41, however, Powel said he repressed his memory of these abuses. His deposition testimony, however, acknowledges a statement that directly contradicts his story of repressed memory. Powel was asked about a statement contained in the psychological evaluation of the psychologist to whom he was sent by his attorney to substantiate his repressed memory theory. In deposition, Powel was first asked whether he told the psychologist that he always remembered the abuse. Powel avoided the question by claiming that his statement was taken out of context. So, Powel was asked directly: “[D]id you know, always know that you had been molested and remembered it from the beginning without any assistance from others?” His response: “Yes.” He twice gave an affirmative answer to this question.
Based on Powel’s deposition and other evidence presented in the summary judgment proceedings, the circuit court found that “there is no doubt here that [Powel] was consciously aware of the abuse when it occurred.” The court also found that “there is no question here that the abuse was emotionally traumatic and sometimes, physically painful when it occurred.” Even Powel’s response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment admits that the evidence “established that the alleged acts of sexual abuse, which occurred between 1973 and 1975, were overt, traumatic and painful at the time of their occurrence.”
Applying the Law
Whether Powel repressed his memory is irrelevant because his injuries were capable of ascertainment when the abuses occurred. As the principal opinion notes, at the time of the alleged wrong, there was no statute in effect that provided for tolling due to repressed memory.4
Powel’s damages were objectively capable of ascertainment when they occurred. Subjective knowledge of damages is not required. To hold that the statute of limitations began to run when Powel allegedly regained his memory, while completely ignoring the facts that Powel was harmed and knew — as any reasonable person would — that the abuse was wrong when it occurred, improperly institutes a discovery *589standard. The general assembly enacted a discovery standard for child sexual abuse cases in 1990 in section 537.046.5 Presumably this statute was enacted because the legislature believed one was needed. If having a repressed memory means that a plaintiffs damages were not capable of ascertainment under the statute of limitations in section 516.100, there would have been no need for section 537.046. If that were the case, Doe’s claim in Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Jefferson City would not have been barred.
At ages 15-17, Powell was a minor at the time of the alleged abuse. As such the statute of limitations was tolled until age 21. He had five years thereafter to file a claim. Section 516.170; Strahler, 706 S.W.2d at 11.
This is not the case of a very young child who does not know he or she is being abused when it occurs. There is an obvious difference in the ability of a five-year-old to ascertain damages and a 15-year-old. The 15 to 17-year-old Powel ascertained his damages. If his claim was ascertained at ages 15 through 17, his failure to bring the claim before his 26th birthday bars his claim.
Powel’s damages need not be complete at the time they are first ascertained. A cause of action accrues when a party can first ascertain the fact of damage, even though he may not know the extent of the damage. Business Men’s Assur. Co. of America v. Ghaham, 984 S.W.2d 501, 507 (Mo. banc 1999). The fact that Powel’s damages may not have become “complete” until after a period of memory repression is irrelevant. The fact that he suffered damages was known. The alleged memory repression, as an excuse for not filing his claim on time, does not create an issue to be tried.
Does Powel create a “genuine” issue of material fact?
Assuming, for sake of argument, that a repressed memory is a valid excuse for not filing his claim on time, Powel’s position seems unsupported. To defeat the motion for summary judgment, Powel submitted his own affidavit and that of a psychologist to make a genuine issue of fact by contradicting his own deposition testimony that he always remembered the abuse.
The summary judgment rule requires that evidence submitted by affidavit be admissible. Rule 74.04(e). The circuit court said that the affidavits of Powel and Dr. Greenberg were sufficient to rebut Powel’s deposition testimony.
On remand, I believe this position should be reconsidered, especially if the record does not change substantially. The circuit court could exclude the expert’s opinion in the affidavit under the standard for admissibility governed by section 490.065. Because Powel’s deposition testimony contradicts the expert’s factual basis for his opinion, the proposed purported expert testimony fails two key criteria set forth in section 490.065.
The first criterion that the expert’s opinion fails to meet is section 490.065.1, which provides that “if scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert ... may testify *590thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” (Emphasis added.) In this case, Powel’s deposition testimony is that he always remembered the alleged sexual molestation. It is difficult to see how an expert’s opinion, whose factual basis is contradicted by Powel’s sworn testimony, would at all “assist the trier of fact.” The expert’s report and affidavit go to some length to dispel the notion that Powel’s memory of molestation had been created by suggestion from a therapist. What the expert does not establish is any objective determination that Powel’s memory was in fact repressed. The expert describes Pow-el as a “reliable reporter” after trying to explain away psychological test results that show substantial psychopathology. The most that can be said of the expert’s opinion as to repressed memory is that it is based solely on what Powel told him. What does “reliable reporter” mean? For what it is worth, does the expert believe him?
The second criterion that the expert’s opinion fails to meet is the requirement of section 490.065.3 that the facts or data on which an expert bases his or her opinion “must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject” and the facts or data “must be otherwise reasonably reliable.” The fact — upon which the expert relied in rendering his opinion — is Powel’s statement that he repressed the memory of the events at about the age of 17 and did not remember them until after he suffered a brain tumor at age 41. That fact, however, is not reasonably reliable because it is contradicted by Powel’s own sworn testimony.
There is nothing in the psychologist’s affidavit to indicate that a fact derived from an interview — which not only contradicts sworn testimony, but is based solely on what Powel supposedly said to the psychologist — is of the type “reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.” This subjective and contradicted fact, which is the basis for the psychologist’s opinion, cannot be considered reasonably reliable in the absence of evidence that such facts are relied upon by experts in the field. As I indicated above, I am not even sure this expert believes him. Why should a court?
It is for the trial court to determine admissibility based on these criteria, and I would suggest that the court do so on remand. The factual basis of the expert’s opinion is not a jury question. It is a determination made by the trial judge in assessing whether or not the testimony of the expert is admissible. On remand, the trial judge would be justified in ruling that the opinion of the psychologist is inadmissible under section 490.065. See generally, State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146 (Mo. banc 2003) at pp. 152-158 (principal opinion) and pp. 160-161 (concurring opinion of Wolff, J.). I am not suggesting that the circuit hold a wide-ranging Daubert type hearing because section 490.065 does not authorize that kind of hearing.6 Missouri’s standard for admissibility of expert testimony in civil cases, which borrows some of the language from the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rules 702, 703, and 704(a), is a far simpler approach than the federal rules. Under Missouri’s approach, the trial judge must determine whether the testimony of the expert will assist the trier of fact and whether the expert’s testimony is based upon reliable facts or data.
*591Without the expert’s opinion, the circuit court is left with the sworn testimony of Powel himself. It is noteworthy that the expert’s affidavit was executed shortly after Powel’s deposition testimony, as was Powel’s affidavit. Both apparently were intended to contradict his deposition testimony so as to avoid summary judgment. Generally, “a party may not avoid summary judgment by giving inconsistent testimony and then offering the inconsistencies into the record in order to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact.” ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 388 (Mo. banc 1993). There may be circumstances in which a party may be permitted to contradict his own deposition testimony, where the deponent obviously was mistaken or misspoke. The context of Powel’s answer was what he told the psychologist in the interview, which Powel says the defense misconstrued. He acknowledged saying that he always remembered the sexual abuse. His deposition appears to be consistent with his earlier statement to the psychologist — his testimony certainly does not appear to be a misstatement. The circumstances in this case, therefore, do not justify allowing Powel to establish an issue of fact with his own testimony.
The fundamental difficulty that I find in this case is that Powel’s wholly subjective account — that his memory was repressed for 24 years — can be used to defeat a statute of limitations that should have barred this claim nearly 25 years ago. That his account is repeated by an expert, with no further substantiation or documentation, does not make his account any less subjective.
The statute of limitations in this case is tolled solely on the basis of what Powel says was in his mind (or was not in his mind for a period of years). Can a statute of limitations be nullified by a party who says he forgot something? Why have a statute of limitations?
The rule requires that summary judgment be granted where there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact.” Rule 74.04(c). To find a genuine issue of material fact in this case is to re-institute the requirement of the former Rule 74.04(h) that summary judgment can only be granted where a movant establishes the right to judgment by “unassailable proof.” This requirement was deleted in 1988 to mirror the language of the federal rule. ITT, 854 S.W.2d at 378.7 The attempt to create an issue of fact with Powel’s own testimony should not be countenanced by considering it a genuine issue of fact. It is not.
Neither Powel’s revised testimony nor his expert’s questionable opinion can produce an issue of material fact in the face of this admission and clear testimony that he had ascertained his injury at the time it allegedly occurred. Even where admissible expert testimony may support a repressed memory theory, courts should be very skeptical of this theory in light of the scientific literature.8 It is not necessary, *592however, to weigh in on the scientific.question in this case. The record of Powel’s testimony as well as, presumably, his statement to the psychologist who examined him for this lawsuit show that, whatever its supposed validity, the so-called repressed memory theory simply does not fit.
Conclusion
This case starkly presents the genuine need for a dispassionate evaluation of the evidence on summary judgment that relates to the statute of limitations. Powel’s deposition testimony avers that he has had a very troubled and difficult life, recounting many years of sexual abuse from a very early age.
The allegations that he was sexually abused by Father Christensen and Brother Woulfe in 1973-1975 are not said to be causally or otherwise related to the other incidents of sexual abuse. However much a court or jury may wish to help Powel with an award of damages because of injustices and injuries he has suffered throughout his life, it is highly speculative to suppose that these clerics and their superiors are the ones who owe him. Powel’s feeling that he was “let down and betrayed by the church and its representative, particularly in light of the proper duties of church officials,” as the psychologist reports, is undoubtedly widely shared. That some Catholic clerics have been credibly accused of sexual abuse and that some in the church hierarchy have covered up sexual abuse in other cases do not make all such allegations worthy of trial.
The just purpose of the statute of limitations is to avoid presenting stale claims to a finder of fact, claims that are often difficult to prove or rebut. Powel’s own testimony on this record shows that the statute of limitations bars his claim.
The Court remands this case to the circuit for further development of the record without the H.R.B. precedent. The remand should give the defendants, as well as Powel, the opportunity to show whether or not there is a genuine issue of fact to be tried under the “capable of ascertainment” standard. On the record thus far, I do not think that there is such an issue. But perhaps Powel can establish that there is an issue for trial. If not, summary judgment will be appropriate.
. Unless otherwise noted, all statutory citations are to RSMo 2000.
. "Except as provided in section 516.105, if any person entitled to bring an action in sections 516.100 to 516.370 specified, at the time the cause of action accrued, be either within the age of twenty-one years, or mentally incapacitated, such person shall be at liberty to bring such actions within the respective times in sections 516.100 to 516.370 limited after such disability is removed.” Section 516.170. (Emphasis added.)
. Powel admits in his response to defendant's statement of uncontroverted material facts that he felt physically and emotionally ill after the alleged abuses.
. Section 537.046, enacted in 1990, cannot be applied to revive claims on which the statute of limitations has run. Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Jefferson City, 862 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Mo. banc 1993).
. Section 537.046.2 provides:
2. Any action to recover damages from injury or illness caused by childhood sexual abuse in an action brought pursuant to this section shall be commenced within ten years of the plaintiff attaining the age of twenty-one or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, that the injury or illness was caused by childhood sexual abuse, whichever later occurs.
. Cf., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).
. Federal courts have often been overly aggressive in granting summary judgment under the Celotex trilogy of United States Supreme Court decisions. This, fortunately, has not been the case in Missouri courts although the standard stated is basically the same. See ITT, 854 S.W.2d at 378-379, citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
. See, for example, Loftus, E.F. Bernstein, D. M., “Rich False Memories: The Royal Road to Success,” in A.F. Healy (Ed) Experimental Cognitive Psychology and its Applications, Washington DC: Amer. Psych. Assn. Press, p. 101-113 (2005); Loftus, E. F., "The Dan*592gers of Memory,” in R.J. Sternberg (Ed) Psychologists Defying the Crowd, Washington, DC: Amer. Psych. Assn. Press. Pp. 105-117 (2003). References in the legal literature include Gary M. Ernsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories Lie? Words of Caution about Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory Repression, 84 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 129, 155-164 (1993); Wendy J. Kisch, From the Couch to the Bench: How Should the Legal System Respond to Recovered Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse?, 5 Am. U.J. Gender & L. 207 (1996).