dissenting.
The Commission in this proceeding certified Clemons as a restricted parcel carrier. Previously certified qs a contract carrier, Clemons is authorized to transport property both as a contract carrier and a restricted parcel carrier. I have no quarrel with this.
Further, the Commission authorized Clemons to commingle in one motor vehicle both contract carrier consignments and restricted parcel consignments. The authorization applies throughout the State and without regard to the number of shippers using the restricted parcel service at the same time. This flies in the face of the clear and explicit two-consignor limitation contained in Code § 56-289:
A contract carrier of property may not transport on any one motor vehicle over any highway of this State, outside of the corporate limits of any city or town, property of more than two consignors at the same time . . .*
No other statute lifts the two-consignor limitation.
When a carrier transports property as a contract carrier, it acts as a contract carrier. This is true even though the carrier may act at the same time as a restricted parcel carrier. The limitation of § 56-289 therefore applies to commingled consignments.
The Commission found its action to be in the public interest, and this Court agrees. But the prerogative is not with the Com*402mission or this Court. The General Assembly, which has the prerogative, has declared the public interest by enacting Code § 56-289. Until the General Assembly lifts the two-consignor limitation, the Commission should honor it.
In granting a certificate to Clemons in this case, the Commission pointed out its past practice of granting similar certificates. But the Commission’s violation of a statute cannot operate to amend the statute.
THOMAS, J., joins in dissent.
The statute defines “consignors” for its purposes as bona fide owners of the property at the time of shipment.