Dissenting opinion by
Justice WINTERSHEIMER.I must respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion that reverses the wanton murder conviction. The trial judge did not err in denying the motion for a directed verdict on wanton murder because there was substantial evidence that the death of the victim occurred while Turner was engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life.
The victim was found dead inside his home with a laceration on his scalp and an abrasion on his wrist. The residence was in disarray, apparently from a serious struggle. A crime scene photograph showed that the victim was found on the floor with his pants torn, blood stain on his clothing, a pair of scissors and a knife under his leg.
The cause of death was technically determined to be athrosporadic cardiovascular disease, sometimes known as coronary artery disease. Under all the circumstances surrounding the death, the medical examiner rendered an opinion that it was a homicide. Turner, her girlfriend Critten-don, and Crittendon’s son were all charged. The girlfriend pled guilty and testified against Turner. The trial has been called a swearing contest between the co-indictee and Turner — all the more reason to let a jury decide credibility.
The evidence indicates that Turner and two other defendants went to the home of the victim in order to borrow his car. When he refused to let them have it, Turner ordered Crittendon to take the victim’s keys. Crittendon did so, and in the process, the victim, an 87 year-old man, died sometime following the struggle. Certainly, the cardiac episode produced a fatal result for the victim, and it could reasonably be inferred that Turner was the cause. The keys were removed from the pocket of the victim apparently with such force that his pants were torn. There was testimony from the son of the victim that his father had been taking high blood pressure pills for three- or four years. The medical examiner reported that the victim was 5'5-l/2" tall, weighed 144 lbs., and had severe coronary disease in two of the three major coronary arteries of his heart. The medical examiner explained that if something happens to excite a person, or causes stress to a person who has coronary artery disease, it could make them have an irregular heartbeat.
When taken in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence, albeit circumstantial, strongly suggests that there was a further assault on the victim while he was having the heart attack, and while it was apparent that he was having such an attack. The victim was not only physically abused, but was left having a heart attack without access to telephone, vehicle or any apparent method to summon help.
*837In her statement to the police, Turner indicated that she was aware that the telephone had been jerked from the wall. Under all the circumstances, it was extreme indifference to the value of human life in that Turner was present with a man, apparently suffering a heart attack or severe manifestations of heart disease, where his telephone had been disabled and his car keys taken only so that she and others may obtain liquor. The death occurred under circumstances creating a grave risk of death, and the circumstantial evidence shows that the victim incurred additional injury while exclusively with the defendant. A wanton murder instruction was appropriate. See Adcock v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 440 (Ky.1986). The standard for the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction is set out in Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186 (Ky.1991), and in the federal case of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
On appellate review of a motion for a directed verdict, we must consider the evidence as a whole and determine if it was clearly unreasonable for the jury to find guilt. If so, then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. Benham, supra, at 187. Here, the evidence was substantive and sufficient to sustain a wanton murder conviction.
In ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial judge must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth, and then determine if such evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187. Here, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
It cannot be said that any rational trier of fact could not have found the essential elements of the crime beyond any reasonable doubt. It was not error to deny the motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. The evidence here clearly justifies the wanton murder conviction. KRS 501.020(3) states in pertinent part “the risk must be of such a nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.”
A trial judge must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth. The trial judge was correct and this Court should not substitute its version of the evidence.
The judgment of conviction should be affirmed as to the wanton murder charge.
GRAVES and SCOTT, JJ„ join this dissenting opinion.