(dissenting). I would concur in the majority opinion if cause) No. 27458 in the district court of Creek county were an attempt to “review, affirm, reverse, or remand any action of the Corporation Commission with respect to the rates, charges, services, practices, rules or regulations of public utilities, or of public service corporations, or to suspend or delay the execution or operation thereof, or to enjoin, reverse or interfere with the Corporation Commission in the perform-*138anee of its official duties”, for then the district court would have no jurisdiction of the action. But, as I see it, the Creek county case was one to compel the Oklahoma Natural Gas Company to do its duty under the law and furnish gas to petitioners according to the terms of their contracts with Oklahoma Natural entered into pursuant to a valid and subsisting order of the commission, to wit: Rate Schedule “1-1”. The district court of Creek .county undoubtedly had jurisdiction of such an action. Dickinson, Trustee, v. Southwestern Natural Gas Co., 179 Okla. 524, 66 P. 2d 511.
Oklahoma Natural objected to the jurisdiction of the district court and in its answer alleged, among other things, that subsequent to the date on which Rate Schedule “1-1” was put into effect the Corporation Commission entered its order putting into effect Rate Schedule “PG”, under which a new and favored class among industrial users was created and that gas users such as the petitioners herein might at their option contract with Oklahoma Natural under this rate schedule for an uninterrupted supply of gas for an additional consideration. That petitioners had been given an opportunity to take advantage of the provisions of Rate Schedule “PG” but they had refused to do so. Also that the Oklahoma Natural has customers who have contracted with it under Rate Schedule “PG” and that the purposes of the last-named Schedule would be defeated if the relief sought by petitioners should be granted. Also, that the proceeding in the Creek county district court was an attack on a rate order which only the Corporation Commission had jurisdiction to hear and determine.
It is said in the majority opinion that it was the purpose of the district court suit (No. 27458) to compel Oklahoma Natural to cease furnishing gas to its customers under Rate Schedule “PG”. Such was not the purpose of that suit, but it was to compel Oklahoma Natural to furnish petitioners gas contracted for under Rate Schedule “1-1”, about the validity of which there is no question. It is true that Oklahoma Natural, for its defense, alleged that it could not be compelled to perform its contracts under Schedule “1-1”, for by so doing it would not be able to perform its contracts under Schedule “PG”. This was purely defensive and could not serve to divest the district court of its jurisdiction of the mandamus action, lawfully acquired, nor could it convert the mandamus action to compel the performance of a contract into an action attacking the validity of a rate order.
It is true that the district court had to determine whether Rate Schedule “PG” was valid or void on its face in order to determine whether Oklahoma Natural had stated and proved a defense to the mandamus action. This, in my opinion, that court had the jurisdiction and power to do. The Southern Pine Lumber Co. v. W. B. Ward et al., 16 Okla. 131, 85 P. 459 (affirmed 208 U. S. 126, 28 S. Ct. 239, 52 L. Ed. 420).
For the foregoing reasons I think the writ sought herein should not be granted.