(concurring) — I agree with the majority’s analysis of the law and of the 1993 amendment. I also, therefore, reluctantly agree with the conclusion that plaintiffs here are not statutory beneficiaries. I write separately to urge the legislature to close yet another loophole in these statutes.
The facts here starkly present the realities of modern life. Mary Douglas began caring for her niece Amber Tait full time on the day Amber was born, because of Amber’s mother’s severe disabilities. Amber and her family were financially dependent upon Mary Douglas. Yet because Amber Tait’s degree of relation to Mary Douglas is one step removed from the statutory class, she does not meet the “second tier” beneficiary definition, and cannot recover the losses she and her children will suffer as a direct result of Mary Douglas’ wrongful death. Instead, the tortfeasor receives a windfall, and the welfare system may receive another client. No public policy supports this result.
In today’s world, the extended family is frequently called upon to respond to the needs of its members. And some*776times, legal family ties do not exist—some “grandmothers” are not related at all to those they care for and support. But the loss of her support is no less devastating to those financially dependent upon her. Perhaps the problem with the wrongful death statute lies in its definition of the second tier statutory beneficiaries based entirely upon family ties. Where actual dependence can be established, degrees of family relationship seem irrelevant. One who is financially dependent upon another should not lose both life support and legal remedy in one tortious moment. A strict test for establishing the fact of dependence would serve to eliminate frivolous claims.
Expanding the second tier statutory beneficiaries to include those actually dependent would serve justice. At minimum, it should include extended family members who were financially dependent upon the deceased. The delivery truck driver who ran down Mary Douglas in a marked crosswalk should not receive a benefit simply because Amber Tait is Douglas’ brother’s child, rather than Douglas’ brother or sister.
I thus urge the legislature to reexamine the statutory scheme in light of the injustice represented by this case.
Review denied at 140 Wn.2d 1015 (2000).