dissenting. I find myself unable stice, suspending Judge Fred D. Davis from all of his duties as a Circuit Court Judge in the Eleventh Judicial District and respectfully dissent from the blanket suspension. As stated by the majority Judge Davis was arrested in Garland County and cited for three misdemeanors: a) driving while intoxicated, b) failure to register vehicle, and c) unlawful use of dealer tags. The Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission (“Commission”) filed a petition seeking an order of this court temporarily suspending Judge Davis with pay from performing the duties of his office pending the outcome of any disciplinary determination by the Commission.
No felony charges have been brought by the prosecuting attorney, and no determination of the guilt or innocence of Judge Davis as to the misdemeanor charges has been made. No formal hearing has been conducted by the Commission and Judge Davis was not permitted to participate in the closed meeting of June 23, 2004, at which the Commission approved the filing of this petition in this court, contending that the existence of these charges adversely affects the ability ofjudge Davis to perform the duties of his office, and seeking his temporary suspension with pay.
The issue presented by this case is whether misdemeanor charges filed against a judge should require that the judge be suspended with pay from consideration of all cases pending before him. I believe that the majority’s decision is too broad and submit that the filing of misdemeanor charges should not disqualify a judge from hearing unrelated civil cases that do not involve criminal sanctions when the judge has not been convicted of any misdemeanor or charged with any felony. The Commission approved this principle in In Re Van B. Taylor, Case No. 90-163, where the matter involved a chancellor who was charged with driving while intoxicated and related matters. The Commission determined that the misdemeanor charges against Chancellor Taylor did not adversely affect his ability to perform the duties of his office in light of the fact that he did not sit on criminal cases.
Our precedents support the principle that to ensure public confidence in the integrity and fairness of the judiciary, a judge should recuse himself from consideration of criminal cases while criminal charges against that judge are pending. See In Re Lee Munson, Case No. 99-204. If a sitting judge fails to recuse himself from participation in criminal cases during the pendency of criminal charges against that judge, I believe we should use our superintending power over the judicial branch to suspend the judge from trying or considering criminal cases that might otherwise be assigned to him. This court should prohibit the judge from acting on criminal cases while criminal charges against him remain unresolved.
Pursuant to this broad precedent of today’s majority, I am concerned that this court is inviting the filing of frivolous charges in order to remove a judge from considering unrelated cases. There is no need to overreact. Our order should be appropriate to the offense and for these reasons I respectfully dissent.