concurring. I concur in the decision to reverse and remand this case, but write separately because I believe that the Commission correctly found that the injury was idiopathic in nature. However, I believe the Commission erroneously concluded that appellant’s work did not contribute to a risk of fall or increase the effect of the fall.
The injury was not unexplained because the appellant’s testimony and the medical evidence indicated that he suffered from osteoarthritis and the tear of the posterior horn of the medial meniscus was a “large degenerative tear.” Therefore, there is substantial evidence that the injury was personal to the appellant and idiopathic. However, in ERC Contractor Yard & Sales v. Robertson, 335 Ark. 63, 977 S.W.2d 212 (1998), the supreme court held that a claimant who suffered an idiopathic fall was nonetheless entitled to compensation where the employment contributed to the injury by placing the employee in a position that increased the dangerous effect of the fall. In ERC the claimant was on scaffolding twelve to fifteen feet above the ground; in the case at bar the appellant was descending from a truck step that was described as “pretty high” and required a female employee to have assistance when getting out of the vehicle.
While the increase in dangerous effect is not as pronounced in this case as in ERC, the difference is only of degree and not of substance. I would hold that the Commission’s conclusion that there is no credible evidence that the appellant’s work either contributed to the risk of fall or increased the effect of the fall is not supported by substantial evidence.