Dissenting opinion by
Justice JOHNSTONE.I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion holding that Appellant was not prejudiced by the testimony of Sheriff Cooper and D.C. I believe that the cumulative .effect of. their, testimony denied Appellant a fair trial. I further dissent from the majority’s opinion with respect to the peremptory challenges issue and join Justice Cooper’s dissent on that issue.
Sheriff Cooper's testimony
The majority concludes that because the camouflage bag and its contents were admitted without objection, it was subject to fair, and apparently unfettered, .comment. I disagree.
The bag, found during' a search of Appellant’s residence, contained miscellaneous items including twine, lighter fluid, a deck of cards, an empty address book, pens and pencils, glow sticks, military rations, Tabasco sauce, and a magnifying glass. On direct examination, the prosecutor specifically asked Sheriff Cooper if he had a term for such a bag, to which the Sheriff responded that it was a “rape kit.” At that point, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, which was denied. During cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to mitigate the situation by delving further into Sheriff Cooper’s characterization of the bag. The sheriff explained that he had recently attended a seminar where he learned that the bag and the items found inside could be used to “stalk someone.” Sheriff Cooper conceded, however, that two important items, a camera and binoculars, were not found inside the bag, nor was the bag in Appellant’s possession at the time of his arrest. Further, Sheriff Cooper agreed that the items were consistent with those often found in a hunting or fishing bag.
Although the Commonwealth focuses on the fact that defense counsel requested a mistrial rather than an admonition, I must agree with Appellant that an admonition would not have cured the prejudicial effect of Sheriff Cooper’s reference to a “rape kit.” Further, I wholly disagree with the majority opinion that simply because this was not a rape case, any mischaracterization of the bag’s contents was harmless and did not contribute to Appellant’s convictions. On the contrary, Sheriff Cooper’s testimony, considered in conjunction with D.C.’s testimony, amounted to error which clearly affected Appellant’s substantial rights and denied him a fair trial. RCr 9.24.
D.C.’s Testimony
During direct examination by the Commonwealth, D.C. testified that on the night in question, Appellant told her that he had been in her house on at least one prior occasion and that, in fact, he had been in “hundreds of houses in Ballard County.” Defense counsel objected and again requested a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion, but advised the prosecutor that if “[D.C.] popped her mouth one more *143time,” they would be trying the case again. Nonetheless, several minutes later, D.C. made a second reference to Appellant having been in hundreds of other houses, although the prosecutor attempted to cut her off midsentence.
During cross-examination, defense counsel asked D.C. whether she was aware that Appellant had been in her residence prior to the night in question. D.C. responded that she did not actually know whether he had been in her trailer, only that he told her so. Again, D.C. told the jury that Appellant said he had been in “hundreds of houses in Ballard County.” In overruling defense counsel’s objection to this third reference, the trial court ruled that counsel had opened the door by asking D.C. whether she knew Appellant had previously been in her trailer. I disagree. Defense counsel’s question was limited solely to D.C.’s knowledge of whether Appellant had previously been in her residence, not that of anyone else.
The Commonwealth argues, and the majority agrees, that because Appellant refused the trial court’s offer of an admonition, he cannot now be heard to complain of any error. I am of the opinion, however, that an admonition would have only further exacerbated the error by drawing attention to D.C.’s statement, made not once, but three times during her testimony.
Although the Commonwealth agreed pri- or to trial not to introduce any evidence of other crimes or bad acts, testimony that Appellant had allegedly entered other houses in Ballard County unquestionably falls within the arnblt of KRE 404(b). “[EJvidence of criminal conduct other than that being tried is admissible only if probative of an issue independent of character or criminal predisposition, and only if its probative value on that issue outweighs the unfair prejudice with respect to character.” Billings v. Commonwealth, 843 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Ky.1992); see also Bell v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 882 (Ky.1994). Even more damaging is the fact that there was no evidence to support a claim that Appellant had illegally entered other houses in Ballard County. Thus, D.C.’s testimony had absolutely no probative value, and served only to inflame the jury and further prejudice Appellant.
Interestingly, after the jury had returned its verdict, the trial court explained in open court several of the evidentiary rulings that had been made. With respect to D.C.’s testimony, the trial court commented:
I had taken the position that knowing most of you, that you’ve got sense enough to know that you’ve got to take everything that you do here on the proof, whatever the proof is, not somebody’s opinion of whether it had been 100 houses or two houses or five houses. There’s no consequence. The issue was whether or not this boy broke into the mobile home of [D.C.] and did what the proof here indicates that he did. That’s all. Whether he had been peeping into a bunch of other homes and houses or broke into them had nothing whatsoever to do with it. Did that have any effect on any of you? Or did any of you even notice that statement?
One juror did respond that he [or she] had taken note of D.C.’s statement.
Admittedly, I am perplexed by the majority’s conclusion that this was not KRE 404(b) evidence, but rather evidence of intimidation as a form of restraint under KRS 509.010. The majority analogizes this case to Gilbert v. Commonwealth, 838 S.W.2d 376 (Ky.1991), wherein we held that evidence pertaining to the defendant’s use of alcohol, marijuana, and pornographic movies was relevant to showing how he forced his step-daughters to engage in *144adult sexual activity. Here, the majority opines that Appellant told D.C. that he had entered hundreds of houses in Ballad County to control and intimidate her. Thus, the majority concludes that Appellant’s statement was as much of a weapon as the shotgun and knife he used to restrain D.C. I vehemently disagree.
The majority fails to recognize that there was absolutely no evidence that Appellant had actually entered other houses in Ballard County or, quite frankly, that he even made the alleged statement to D.C. Furthermore, the Commonwealth clearly did not offer Appellant’s statement as evidence of a “tool of domination” or “mental restraint,” as posited by the majority. Simply put, D.C.’s testimony was unsolicited, irrelevant, and certainly prejudicial. Moreover, D.C.’s testimony, coupled with Sheriff Cooper’s testimony, created the inference that Appellant was a habitual stalker and potential rapist, a characterization that was not supported by the evidence presented at trial. Because the Commonwealth introduced no other evidence of Appellant’s alleged activities, the testimony in question must be deemed reversible error.
LAMBERT, C.J., and COOPER, J., join this dissenting opinion.