dissenting.
¶ 11 I must respectfully dissent. While I agree that the exercise of special action jurisdiction is appropriate because of the inadequacy of any other remedy, I disagree that relief is warranted.
¶ 12 The State brought this special action. Yet it effectively challenged only one half of the trial court’s two key findings.8 While the State contended a pretrial interview to establish bias was unjustified,9 it failed to attack the trial court’s finding that the interview was necessary for defendant to defend herself on the substance of the charge. The State’s only argument that encompassed the pretrial interview to obtain the substance of the testimony was that the victim’s right to refuse an interview is unfettered — a proposition all of us reject because of the supremacy of federal constitutional rights.
¶ 13 In my view, this is fatal to the State’s petition. Special action relief is, after all, extraordinary. Indeed, the procedure is simply a substitute for the traditional “extraordi*262nary writs.” See, 1 Arizona Appellate Handbook § 7.1.2, at 7-2 (Hon. Sheldon H. Weisberg & Paul G. Ulrich eds., 3d ed.1998). It is available in this case only if the trial court made “a determination [that] was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion.” Ariz. R.P. Spec. Actions 3(c).
¶ 14 The State, as the petitioner, bears the heavy burden of persuading us that the trial court made such an egregious error as to require our intervention.
The special action petitioner’s success will depend mainly upon whether the appellate court is persuaded, balancing all factors involved, that an exception should be made to the usual rule limiting appellate review to final judgments. This requires an understanding of the appellate courts’ reluctance to interfere with ongoing superior court proceedings, as well as their limited ability to make decisions on significant issues without a fully-developed factual record. Since these factors undoubtedly influence appellate courts in their determination of special actions, they should also be of primary concern to the petitioner in making any initial decision to seek special action relief, and thereafter in the special action’s preparation and presentation.
1 Arizona Appellate Handbook, § 7.2, at 7-3. The State has not contended that the trial court erroneously found that defendant needed the interview to be able to defend herself. The majority is satisfied that the State attacks defendant’s position. See n.7, supra. That overlooks that the petition challenges the trial court’s order, and that the petitioner’s burden is to show that the order was so clearly wrong that extra-ordinary relief is required. As a result, I am unable to find in the State’s papers a warrant for special action relief.
¶ 15 Yet the majority grants relief on the ground that the trial court had an insufficient basis for ordering the interview. It characterizes her ruling as relying on “generic considerations” that interviewing a victim witness is always helpful to a defendant. Not only is granting relief on that ground a mistake because it is not argued in the petition, but it is an unfair characterization of the trial court’s decision.
¶ 16 It is unfair first because the trial judge made an order that set forth two specific bases for her order after hearing argument and reading pleadings regarding the particulars of this case. In other words, the judge did not enter a “generic” ruling. Her decision is not based on any notion that defendants are entitled routinely to interview victims. Instead, she made a determination that the majority concedes, at least in principle, she may make: The federal right to a fair trial may require in a particular case that a victim interview be permitted despite the state constitutional ban. That should be — and based on the lack of other special actions on the point, apparently is — a rare case. But such a ruling is not without legal authority.
¶ 17 Both we and the Arizona Supreme Court have previously said that federal due process and trial rights may supersede the state provision. “[I]f, in a given case, the victim’s state constitutional rights conflict with a defendant’s federal constitutional rights to due process and effective cross-examination, the victim’s rights must yield. The Supremacy Clause requires that the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution prevail over state constitutional provisions.” State v. Riggs, 189 Ariz. 327, 330-31, 942 P.2d 1159, 1162-63 (1997) (citing U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2).10
*263¶ 18 In the case cited by Riggs, we held that “When there is a conflict, the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution prevails over a provision of a state constitution by virtue of the Supremacy Clause....” State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court (Roper), 172 Ariz. 232, 236, 836 P.2d 445, 449 (App. 1992). “Due process of law,” we wrote, “is the primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom in our legal system.” Id.
¶ 19 The majority’s characterization is unfair, secondly, because we lack the trial court record. This is a special action, in which we receive only the documents provided to us by the parties. That record represents something considerably less than the totality of the case. And yet it is the context of the case that gives meaning to the judge’s finding. That is, she determined that an interview was necessary in the circumstances of this case. She knew what those circumstances were. We may or may not know, depending on how much of the judge’s knowledge of this case is conveyed by the limited record before us.
¶20 Finally, the majority’s characterization of the order is unfair because it is inaccurate. Based on the portions of the record we have received, the ruling is not generic and does not wholly lack a logical or factual basis.
¶ 21 Let us consider what we do know of this case. The defendant, Robin Treen, is the wife of Larry Treen. He is charged in connection with the same incident as is Robin. Both are charged with theft of a Chevrolet Camaro automobile. The two are being prosecuted in separate actions. Due to his right against self-incrimination, Larry is not necessarily available as a witness for his wife.
¶ 22 Larry and not Robin Treen obtained the vehicle. James Hickey, then Larry Treen’s lawyer, gave the vehicle to Larry. Hickey either provided it as a favor to Larry or to permit Larry to perform work on the vehicle as partial payment of legal fees. Robin’s involvement appears to be that she was present when the vehicle was stopped by police, and consented to a police search.
¶ 23 If Larry is unavailable as a witness, then only Hickey will testify. Did James Hickey and Larry Treen agree that the car was on indefinite loan, or for a definite period? Did Hickey demand return of the vehicle and, if so, when?11 Did Hickey’s permission to use the vehicle include Robin? Did Hickey discuss Robin’s use with Larry? These questions are potentially pivotal in this case. As the trial court found, “any breach of that [Hickey and Treen’s] agreement ... becomes the essence of the offense----”
¶ 24 These questions cannot be answered except by asking Hickey. The trial judge determined that, to effectively defend herself, Robin Treen needed to know the answers before she asked the questions on cross-examination at trial. The judge also had evidence of a rocky relationship between James Hickey and Larry Treen that suggested possible bias in Hickey’s testimony. Based on the record, the court’s decision does not appear unreasonable, and the petitioner State has not even contended that it is. The majority appears to decide this question de novo, but I believe that the trial judge is entitled to some deference based on her direct familiarity with the case. As we recognized in a prior decision, balancing the state and federal rights “is a difficult task.” Roper, 172 Ariz. at 236, 836 P.2d at 449. Given the unlimited variety of factual circumstances and trial judges’ superior knowledge of their cases, I would not upset their decisions unless they are “arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion.” Ariz. R.P. Spec. Actions 3(c).
¶ 25 Accordingly, I dissent.
. The State also has not challenged that part of the trial court’s order allowing defendant to cross-examine the witness about his refusal of a pretrial interview.
. The majority’s characterization of the State’s position relates to this argument. See n.7, supra.
. To the extent that the majority suggests, see supra, n. 4, that the Brady standard defines the defendant’s due process rights in this situation, the majority errs. While Brady may apply when the prosecutor controls exculpatory information, due process is implicated even when the prosecutor has no such control. For example, in a case cited by the majority, Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987), the information was withheld by a state agency pursuant to a statutory privilege and thus was equally unavailable to prosecution and defense. See also Coleman v. Saffle, 912 F.2d 1217, 1230-31 (10th Cir.1990) (Tacha, J., concurring) (Ritchie "presents an entirely different question” than did Brady ); Roper, 172 Ariz. at 239, 836 P.2d at 452 (“Brady emphasizes suppression of evidence by the prosecution, but does not require the victim to cooperate with the defense.”). Indeed, my concurring opinion in Roper made clear that a Brady situation was not the only one in which due process could require that victim protection yield. See, 172 Ariz. at 241, 836 P.2d at 454.
. Our record includes a letter from Hickey to Larry Treen. The letter refers to a 1978 model Camaro and to a 1969 Camaro, but not a 1979 Camaro, the vehicle involved in this case. We do not know whether the letter is mistaken and intends to refer to the 1979 vehicle or is accurate and simply does not refer to it.