concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority opinion’s conclusions that (i) there is no private civil remedy under the Federal Gun Control Act, and (ii) KRS 446.070’s use of “any statute” is limited to Kentucky statutes. However, because I believe that the Supreme Court of Kentucky should look to Kentucky public policy in determining the boundaries of the universal duty of care in this state, I dissent.
I begin by noting that nothing in Kentucky law prohibits anyone from transferring a handgun to an eighteen-year-old individual. Rather, the General Assembly, by statutes enacted in 1994, has drawn that line at persons under the age of eighteen, specifically by criminalizing the act of providing a handgun to someone under eighteen, outside certain situations. See KRS 527.100 — .110. Whether the policy behind these statutes is the correct choice is irrelevant to our analysis. The simple fact remains that Kentucky’s arbiter of public policy — the General Assembly — has simply chosen not to embrace those aspects of the Federal Gun Control Act that limit the sale of guns to persons under the age of twenty-one. In short, I think that the General Assembly’s refusal to pass a law that incorporates the relevant Federal standard, particularly given its express adoption of a different standard, is a clear statement of the relevant public policy in Kentucky and is therefore fundamental to the resolution of the question before us.
As the majority correctly points out, we have recently stated that the “universal duty of care” is not boundless. Grand Aerie Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Carneyhan, 169 S.W.3d 840, 849 (Ky.2005). In determining the appropriate boundaries of that duty, “consideration must be given to public policy, statutory and common law theories in order to determine whether a duty existed in a particular situation.” Id. (quoting Fryman v. Harrison, 896 S.W.2d 908, 909 (Ky.1995)). Although the majority has engaged in this process to a certain extent, its analysis has focused on the impact of federal law on how the duty of care should be defined. Specifically, the majority opinion embraces the Federal Gun Control Act as defining the boundaries of Kentucky’s common law duty of care as it relates to the sale of guns.
I believe, however, that when determining the scope of the duty of care under Kentucky law, we should be guided by *534Kentucky public policy, statutory and common law theories. Though this approach may seem somewhat counter-intuitive— since it leads to the seemingly paradoxical notion that a violation of federal criminal law would not violate a state’s common law duty of care — it is a necessary aspect of a system of dual-sovereign federalism. The federal courts recognize this concept in diversity jurisdiction cases and rely on state law principles to decide all substantive questions, while eschewing, for the most part, any notion of a federal common law of torts.
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state. And whether the law of the state shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 822, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 1141, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965) (“[Erie ] held that federal courts sitting in diversity cases, when deciding questions of ‘substantive’ law, are bound by state court decisions as well as state statutes. The broad command of Erie was therefore identical to that of the Enabling Act: federal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.”). If the federal courts have been unwilling to impose a federal common law rule, why should we do so?
The obvious rejoinder is that the majority opinion is not imposing a federal common law rule, but that it is instead adopting a state common law rule that just happens to be informed by a federal statute. But it does so while stating that the federal statute is merely a criminal statute which creates no federal private right of action. Stranger still, the majority chooses to apply the federal standard of correct behavior despite the fact that the General Assembly has also spoken on the issue.
Were the Court writing on a blank slate, reference to and reliance on the federal statute as evidence of the applicable standard of care might be appropriate. But the Court is not addressing an area in which the General Assembly has been silent. To the contrary, the General Assembly has spoken loud and clear on this issue. We should defer to its declaration of the public policy of Kentucky. See Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Ky.1983) (“The enunciation of public policy is the domain of the General Assembly. We do not propose to invade their jurisdiction in any respect. The courts interpret the law. They do not enact legislation.”); Fann v. McGuffey, 534 S.W.2d 770, 779 (Ky.1975) (“It is elementary that the legislative branch of government has the prerogative of declaring public policy and that the mere wisdom of its choice in that respect is not subject to the judgment of a court.”); Pyles v. Russell, 36 S.W.3d 365, 368 (Ky.2000) (“The enunciation of public policy is the domain of the General Assembly.”).
The Castle unquestionably violated a federal criminal law and is subject to federal criminal prosecution for its actions. That, however, should be the limit of the role of federal law in this matter, since, as the majority has held, Congress did not also create a private cause of action under the Federal Gun Control Act. I would note that it is not surprising that the General *535Assembly has a different view of firearms than Congress given the long tradition of firearms ownership in Kentucky. See Posey v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 170, 184-87 (Ky.2006) (Scott, J., dissenting) (discussing in detail Kentucky’s long history of support of gun rights and gun ownership). But absent express statutory preemption by Congress, e.g., by creating a civil remedy, our own public policy, as announced by the General Assembly, should control in this matter. I for one believe that the public policy of our Commonwealth is best defined by the elected representatives from places like Sandy Hook, Allen, Winchester, Fairdale, Tomp-kinsville, and Paducah — not by representatives from Massachusetts, New York, California, Florida, Wisconsin, Oregon, and Hawaii.
Because The Castle did not violate any duty under Kentucky law when it sold a handgun to Scott Greer, I respectfully dissent.
GRAVES, J., joins this opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part.