(concurring):
I concur with the lead opinion except as to Part I, with which I concur in result only. Therefore, I address Part I separately.
At trial, the Mizells filed a motion in limine. They argued the court should prohibit examination of Dr. Marne about a previous lawsuit involving Dr. Marne. The sole argument in support of the motion was that the final judgment in the previous case did not address the issue of whether Dr. Marne had committed fraud.
The trial judge ruled Respondents could cross-examine Dr. Marne about the previous lawsuit and thereby attempt to impeach his credibility under Rule 608, SCRE. During the ensuing cross-examination, Respondents’ attorney confronted *582Dr. Marne with the jury interrogatory from the previous lawsuit.
The Mizells argue on appeal that the trial court erred by allowing the introduction of the jury interrogatory. However, them motion in limine merely sought to prevent mention of Dr. Marne’s previous lawsuit. There was no objection when Respondents’ counsel confronted Dr. Marne with the jury interrogatory. Specifically, the Mizells did not argue to the trial court that extrinsic evidence was inadmissible to prove Dr. Marne’s untrustworthiness. See Rule 608(b), SCRE. Therefore, the issue was neither raised to nor ruled upon by the trial court, and whether the jury interrogatory was extrinsic evidence and therefore not permitted under Rule 608(b), SCRE, is not an issue that can be addressed by this court. Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 497 S.E.2d 731 (1998).
Even if the jury interrogatory was extrinsic evidence and therefore inadmissible under Rule 608(b), SCRE, the error was harmless in light of Dr. Marne’s prior testimony. When asked whether he had “deliberately and knowingly made material misrepresentation to an insurance company to obtain benefits under a policy of insurance,” Dr. Marne responded, “That is correct.” This admission was virtually identical to the jury interrogatory at issue.