I dissent.
The salutary purposes of the Subdivision Map Act and the ordinances passed in conformity with it were succinctly described in Pratt v. Adams (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 602, 606 [40 Cal.Rptr. 505]: “to regulate and control the design and improvement of subdivisions, with proper consideration for their relation to adjoining areas (Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal.App.2d 631, 638 [318 P.2d 561]; Newport Building Corp. v. City of Santa Ana, 210 Cal.App.2d 771, 776 [26 Cal.Rptr. 797]); to require sub-divider to install streets (Hoover v. County of Kern, 118 Cal.App.2d 139, 142 [257 P.2d 492]; Evola v. Wendt Constr. Co., 170 Cal.App.2d 21, 25 [338 P.2d 498]; County of Kern v. Edgemont Development Co., 222 Cal.App.2d 874, 879 [35 Cal.Rptr. 629]; to require subdivider to install drains (City of Buena Park v. Boyar, 186 Cal.App.2d 61, 67 [8 Cal.Rptr. 674]); to prevent fraud and exploitation (10 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 203, 204; 27 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 66); and to protect both public and purchaser (38 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 125, 128). (See Taylor, Current Problems in California Subdivision Control, 13 Hastings L.J. 344.)”
Mandamus is, of course, an equitable remedy. It cannot be employed to compel the performance of acts which are illegal or contrary to public *982policy. (Sutro Heights Land Co. v. Merced Irr. Dist. (1931) 211 Cal. 670, 705 [296 P. 1088].) The results sought by petitioners, whether calculated or innocent, are illegal and contrary to public policy.
The building permit sought here will perpetuate violation of the Subdivision Map Act; it will apply to one of ten parcels carved out of a tract without compliance with the Subdivision Map Act, which requires approval of subdivisions consisting of more than four parcels. The act was adapted to the locale through a Santa Cruz County ordinance, a matter of public record after having been duly published and enacted by the governing agency of the county. Compliance with local subdivision ordinances is required by state law. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 11565.)
It is settled that the owner of land may be denied permission to subdivide by sale, lease or contract until he complies with the statute pertaining to the filing and approval of a subdivision map. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 11538.) It is equally well established that a purchaser of land who is demonstrably aware of the illegalities in the subdivision may be denied a permit to build on his property. (Pratt v. Adams, supra, 229 Cal.App.2d 602; Cooper v. County of Los Angeles (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 75 [170 P.2d 49].) While a certain amount of sympathy is aroused for careless purchasers who neglect to investigate their grantor’s compliance with the Subdivision Map Act, or for wholly innocent purchasers who may have been misled by their predecessor in interest, their failure to satisfy requirements of the Subdivision Map Act produces a deleterious effect upon the public no different than that caused by the malevolent or knowledgeable purchaser. In the comparable field of zoning laws strict enforcement has consistently been upheld regardless of the character of the current owner of the property. (See, e.g., Roney v. Board of Supervisors (1956) 138 Cal.App.2d 740 [292 P.2d 529].)
Article 3 of the Subdivision Map Act prescribes rights and remedies under the statute. Section 11540 provides that any deed of conveyance, sale or contract to sell made contrary to the provisions of that statute is voidable at the sole option of the grantee. This indicates that the Legislature contemplated the plight of innocent purchasers, but instead of carving out exceptions from requirements of statutory compliance, a remedy was provided by permitting them to declare the sale voidable. Even knowledge of the seller’s failure to file maps does not prevent voiding the sale of the property. (Longway v. Newbery (1939) 13 Cal.2d 603 [91 P.2d 110]; White v. Jacobs (1928) 204 Cal. 334 [267 P. 1087].) The grantees also have the traditional remedy for fraud in the event the seller was the violator of the Subdivision Map Act and knowingly conveyed the property for the purpose of deliberate avoidance of the statute.
*983And, finally, as provided in Business and Professions Code section 11542, the subdivision map statutes do not bar “any legal, equitable, or summary remedy” to which any aggrieved municipality or any person may otherwise be entitled. This section clearly implies not only protection of the rights of an innocent purchaser against the seller, but also indicates a municipality loses none of its rights by virtue of sales of any nature made in violation of the statute.
The majority’s reliance upon Munns v. Stenman (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 543 [314 P.2d 67], is misplaced. The plaintiff in Munns was an innocent purchaser by virtue of the fact that he filed his application for a building permit prior to the date on which the zoning ordinance was adopted by the city council and signed by the mayor. In the instant case the Subdivision Map Act and ordinance were in effect prior to the original subdivision of the tract and the subsequent sale to these petitioners.
The majority appear to be concerned about the pragmatic effect of their decision, as they should be, for they indicate the county may still require the petitioners to comply with “reasonable conditions” as indicated by “the public interest and for the protection of plaintiffs’ property and of neighboring property.” While this apprehension for the orderly development of the community as a whole is commendable, it is an inadequate substitute for uniform compliance with the Subdivision Map Act.
The petitioners should not seek their remedy from the county and thus perpetuate deviation from the pattern of community development. They should look for redress to their predecessors in interest who were responsible for the violation of law.
The judgment granting a writ of mandate should be reversed.
Sullivan, J., concurred.