dissenting opinion.
I must respectfully dissent, as this is not a case of just giving “notice” via “recreational trespasses.” This is a case about flagging the entire boundary line of the claimed property with brightly-colored engineering flagging and “No Trespassing” signs which gave notice to anyone near, or, or about the property that it was the “private property” of the Appellees, who had continuously put up the flags and signs— not that of Appellants — who claimed most of the “disputed property” under quitclaim deeds their counsel drafted after the dispute began — and these deeds purported to recognize that it was Appellants’ Grantor, Walter Ruby, that had adversely possessed the “disputed property.”
I. Background
This “Quiet Title” action was instituted by Appellees in the Hopkins Circuit Court on November 1, 2002, after Appellants questioned Appellees’ ownership following Appellant’s initial purchase of the adjoining “Ruby Farm” in 1999. The question of adverse possession was tried before a jury in October of 2005, whereupon the jury entered a verdict finding that Appellees had adversely possessed that portion of the “disputed property” for which they requested their titled be quieted.2 3 How*85ever, months later, the trial court entered a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV) in favor of Appellants. The Court of Appeals then reversed in favor of Appel-lees and we granted discretionary review.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review of a JNOV
“A motion for JNOV shall not be granted unless ‘there is a complete absence of proof on a material issue or if no disputed issues of fact exist upon which reasonable minds could differ.’” Bierman v. Klapheke, 967 S.W.2d 16, 18-19 (Ky.1998). “Upon review of the Order Granting JNOV, we must examine the trial court’s decision under the clearly erroneous standard. That is to say, we must review all the evidence presented to the jury and must uphold the trial court’s decision if ‘after all the evidence is construed most favorably to the verdict winner, a finding in his favor would not he made by a reasonable [person]. ’ ” Moore v. Environmental Const. Corp., 147 S.W.3d 13, 16 (Ky.2004) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
B. The Elements of Adverse Possession
“The ‘open and notorious’ element [of adverse possession] requires that the possessor openly evince a purpose to hold dominion over the property with such hostility that will give the non-possessory owner notice of the adverse claim.” Appalachian Regional Healthcare, Inc. v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., Inc., 824 S.W.2d 878, 880 (Ky.1992) (citing Sweeten v. Sartin, 256 S.W.2d 524, 526 (Ky.1953)). “To be ‘open and notorious’ the possession must be conspicuous and not secret, so that the legal title holder has notice of the adverse use.” Id. (citing Sweeten, 256 S.W.2d at 526). Thus, “[i]t is the legal owner’s knowledge, either actual or imputable, of another’s possession of lands that affects the ownership.” Id. (citing Am. Jur.2d Adverse Possession, § 71 (1986)). Moreover, “the character of the property, its physical nature and the use to which it has been put, determine the character of the acts necessary to put the true owner on notice of the hostile claim.” Id. (citing Ely v. Fuson, 297 Ky. 325, 180 S.W.2d 90 (1944)).
And, in Le Moyne v. Litton, 159 Ky. 652, 167 S.W. 912 (1914), the question was presented as to what “established a well-marked or a well-defined boundary.” Id. at 913. The tract in question involved a portion of land in Whitley County which had been cleared and cultivated and upon which was erected a house, with the remainder of the tract left as woodlands, “which the Defendant ha[d] used in a general way as farmers ordinarily use such lands.” Id. The respondent contended that “the proof for Defendant failed to establish a well-marked or well-defined boundary.” Id. “It was shown by evidence that, when the survey was made, all the corners called for in the certificate of the Cordell survey were still standing and marked; and that there were marked line trees on all the lines except one, which [passed] through cleared ground.” Id. at 913-14. Upholding the marking of the line by “marked trees,”4 the Court noted that “[t]he purpose of marked lines is to give notice to the world that the possession and claim of the occupant is co-extensive there*86with. If the lines are sufficiently marked, that purpose is served.” Id.
Also, in Le Moyne v. Neal, 168 Ky. 292, 181 S.W. 1119 (1916), our predecessor Court noted:
When D.B. Neal gave the land to his son, the appellee, he went upon it with him and showed to him the boundary of it and the marked line which surrounded it, and appellee has claimed to be the owner of it ever since, to the boundary showed him by his father; that the corner trees to the boundary of the land, with the exception of one, which has been cut down and the stump of its remains, were all marked in the ordinary way as corner trees are marked to land boundaries; that the corner tree which has been cut down, when standing, was marked in the same way; that all of the lines surrounding the lands are marked upon the trees along the lines sufficiently to enable one to follow the line around the tract and to locate the boundary by the markings upon the trees, by which the lines pass. All of the markings upon the trees appear to be very old, and were there before Gil-reath entered upon the land, and was the same marked line to which D.B. Neal had claimed for many years.
Id. at 1121. Upon such evidence, the Court concluded:
It is apparent that the evidence going to uphold the contention that the land is surrounded by a well-marked and well-defined boundary is sufficient to take the case to the jury, and, there being no evidence to the contrary, the verdict of the jury, if it found that there was a well defined and marked boundary, was not contrary to the evidence and was sufficient to support the verdict.
Id. For context, it is appropriate to note that the appellee in Neal also cut trees on the property, as did Appellees here. Id. at 1120. It has also been said:
It is difficult to lay down a precise rule applicable to all cases, as much must depend upon the nature and situation of the property, and the uses to which it can be applied. For example, in the case of a farm, if the possession is open and notorious, comporting with the ordinary management of farms, it is not necessary that the whole farm be either improved or inclosed [sic], at least where the unimproved part, as woodland, is subservient to and connected with that which is improved, and, for the same reason, the rule requiring actual and visible occupancy will be more strictly construed in an old and populous country, where land is usually improved and inclosed [sic], than in a new country recently settled, in which the land is only partially improved.
Culton v. Simpson, 265 Ky. 343, 96 S.W.2d 856, 860 (1936) (“The size of this property is not disproportionate to its use as a farm. It was not all cleared, and perhaps not all inclosed [sic], but fifty years ago that was true of many farms in Kentucky.”).
It was also noted in Gillis v. Curd, 117 F.2d 705 (6th Cir.1941), that:
According to the settled doctrine of the above statutes as declared by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, when applied to lands in a community where fences are not customary, a person, by entering upon a part of a tract or parcel of unin-closed [sic] land in the name of the whole, may gain title to all of it by adverse possession. When such person settles within a large body of wild, uncultivated, unenclosed [sic], vacant land, his title by adverse possession, and those claiming under him, ripens to the following boundaries: (1) to buildings, clearings or inclosed [sic] lands where maintained for the statutory period, (2) *87to boundaries kept marked for such period and in such way as to give to the owner of the land ... notice that it was a marked boundary and that some person was claiming to be in hostile possession of the land therein, (3) by putting to record in the County Clerk’s office of the County where the land is located for the statutory period, a deed describing its boundaries by natural or artificial objects so that it can be run by a surveyor, although the boundary described in the deed need not be sufficient to constitute a well-marked boundary without the deed.
Id. at 708; see also Feldman Lumber Company v. Meece, 2006-CA-001812-MR, 2006-CA-001841-MR, 2007 WL 2382585 at *2 (Ky.App.2007) (“For nearly 30 years, Defendants have marked the outside boundary with ‘No Hunting’ signs thereby giving open and notorious notice of their claim.”) (reversed on other grounds by Meece v. Feldman Lumber Company, 290 S.W.3d 631 (Ky.2009)).
Quite pointedly, the Court in Panter v. Miller, 698 S.W.2d 634, 636 (Tenn.Ct.App.1985), observed that:
One does not ordinarily fence in inaccessible mountain land to show ownership. It is ordinarily done by marking or painting trees and putting up signs. This is exactly what the defendant did. The land was not susceptible to farming. About the only other thing the defendant could have done to make his possessory claim any clearer to the public at large would have been to hire armed guards to shoot anyone who set foot on the land.
(Emphasis added). The Court in Beam v. Kerlee, 120 N.C.App. 203, 461 S.E.2d 911, 919 (1995), also explained:
When questioned about other people’s use of the land, defendant testified that he put up no trespassing signs in 1991 and asked hunters he found on the property to leave. Defendant said he had been running people off the land long before he posted the property — “for twenty plus years.” This evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s claim that his possession of the land was exclusive and adverse as to all others.
C. The Cases Relied Upon By the Majority
For a contrary opinion, the majority relies upon Noland v. Wise, 259 S.W.2d 46 (Ky.1953), Marsee v. Colson, 307 Ky. 328, 210 S.W.2d 952 (1948), Flinn v. Blakeman, 254 Ky. 416, 71 S.W.2d 961 (1934), Griffith Lumber Company v. Kirk, 228 Ky. 310, 14 S.W.2d 1075 (1929), Fields v. Wells, 224 Ky. 620, 6 S.W.2d 1110 (1928), as well as Craig-Giles Iron Co. v. Wickline, 126 Va. 223, 101 S.E. 225 (1919). Flinn involved an attempt to acquire a 2500-acre tract lying in Knox County by adverse possession. There, the court noted:
While there is no satisfactory evidence that Campbell Smith had a well-marked boundary around this entire 2,500 acres, still he could not while living on the “Reservation” acquire title through such a stretching operation to other property about which he might mark a line. A disseizor to acquire title by adverse possession must have possession of the property he hopes to acquire. He is not in possession of it, if while he is living on another tract, he simply mentally extends his claim over it. He must be there with his flags flying and his possession openly and visibly manifested.
71 S.W.2d at 972. Moreover, in Flinn, the Court acknowledged that “[ajdverse possession cannot be sustained by proximity or intention. It can only rest on physical acts, such as will give to the real owner of the land notice that some other person is in possession of it.” Id. (quoting Whitley County Land Co. v. Powers’ Heirs, 146 *88Ky. 801, 144 S.W. 2, 7 (1912)). Thus, seasonal, or sporadic acts, such as “the masting of hogs thereon, or the ranging of cattle, or the conducting of a sugar camp, will not constitute such adverse possession within the meaning of the law.” Id. (quoting Courtney et al. v. Ashcraft et al., 31 Ky.L.Rep. 1324, 105 S.W. 106 (1907)). Of course, hogs only mast when the “mast” (acorns, walnuts, beech nuts, etc.) is on the ground in the woods, i.e., fall. Cattle only “range” through the woods looking for water or grass that grows in cleared areas. And, one only makes sugar from sugar maples in the spring. Cane for “cane sugar” grows in cleared fields.
In Noland, the court noted that:
Neither appellees nor their predecessors in title have ever occupied the land in controversy. It is rough, mountainous land, with no clearings, buildings, or enclosures, although there is some evidence of an old fence along a part of one of the boundary lines.
The only act of possession ever exercised by appellees or their vendors was the occasional cutting of timber.
259 S.W.2d at 48. The Court further noted that: “[t]his Court has consistently held that the occasional cutting of timber and payment of taxes do not constitute an adverse holding sufficient to acquire title by adverse possession, even though such acts continued sporadically for the prescriptive period.” Id. (emphasis added). Marsee held only that “[e]ntries upon unenclosed land to cut timber do not constitute an adverse holding, even though the acts continue sporadically for the prescriptive period.” 210 S.W.2d at 953. Griffith Lumber Co. noted that:
[T]he only acts of possession consisted of cutting some timber, and the extent of it is not definitely described. The land in question was a wooded boundary with no one living upon it. A tract of probably 40 acres had been cleared, but no one had lived there, and the proof was wholly inadequate to establish adverse possession of any particular land.
14 S.W.2d at 1076. Fields held that, “[s]o long as their acts denoting adverse possession were confined to the boundaries of the surveys, title of which they owned, their possession was likewise so confined.” 6 S.W.2d at 1111. Craig-Giles Iron Co. had nothing to do with the flagging and marking of lines with “No Trespassing” signs. 101 S.E. at 225.
D. The Evidence of the Marked Lines
“Marked lines” made on a survey differ from the marking of the disputed boundary in this case. Trees marked in the old surveys occurred only at the end location of each call — the corner tree. Here, Mr. Stills testified:
My system was to put your flags within sight of each other where you could stand at one flag and you could see a flag in one direction, you could turn your back and you could see a flag in the other direction. And I say about every third or fourth tree, you put a posted [No Trespassing] sign.
Quite pointedly, none of the cases relied upon by the majority involve the use of the disputed property along with its marking around the boundaries with bright engineering tape and “No Trespassing” signs, as well as the “putting off’ of the property those who came on without Appellees’ permission. Clearly, the continuous marking of the lines in this case totally differs from the boundaries marked in the late-1800s through the early-1900s, where one made a “slash” mark on trees with an axe around a survey or a boundary and then never came back to make sure the marking remained fresh and visible. Here, the brightly colored engineering tape flagging and “No Trespassing” signs were continu*89ally redone as they would deteriorate (or were later torn down), thus maintaining a visible line which continually indicated that Appellees were there claiming, and exercising dominion — indeed, essentially flying their flag — over, the disputed boundary.
Moreover, the majority concedes that the disputed property is “an area of wild, formerly strip-mined land adjacent to and east of the 289-acre farm [Appellees] acquired through their parents from their grandfather.” Op. at 74. Being spoil (strip-mined) land, you could not plow it with a team of mules! Moreover, the topography was uneven as demonstrated by Stills’ testimony that the bank going down to the “Blue Lake — which lay within the perimeter of the disputed tract — was steep. Numerous hills, rock piles, and ridges were disclosed on the video played at trial.
The majority also acknowledges that Roy Stills, a Winstead family member and manager of the family’s Winstead farm, testified
that for as long as he had been connected with the Winstead family, from well before 1982, he and other family members had regularly used the disputed tract for hunting, fishing, hiking, and riding four-wheelers. He described the construction of deer and turkey blinds, the occasional clearing of undergrowth to facilitate shooting, and the expulsion of uninvited hunters from the property. Again, several other witnesses confirmed that petitioners, a few of them at least and principally Stills and his guests, had regularly used the disputed land in that manner.
Op. at 76. In fact, Stills testified that he used the land year-round and that, from time to time, the family even kept a boat on the “Blue Lake.” Additionally, Stills and his family “logged” one hundred thirty-four trees off of the disputed property in 1999. This was the same year Appellants (apparently unrelated to Walter Ruby) bought their original interest in the adjoining “Ruby” farm. Their later “quitclaim” deeds — purporting to recognize Ruby’s title to the “disputed property” by adverse possession — came two years into the dispute and years after the statutory period had ran.
Evidence of the marking and defining of the boundary lines was presented at trial via the testimony of Mr. Stills, Robert Chillout, David Humpres, Dennis Hart, Roy Eugene Stills, Dunham Box, Norris Slaton (an adjoining owner), and Jerry Flener. The boundary lines were continuously flagged with the bright engineering tape and “No Trespassing” signs during the adverse possession period. As mentioned, the flags tied around the trees were done with brightly-colored engineering tape. Mr.' Stills noted that as the “flags ... would deteriorate, they would have to be replaced, but they were on there from 1982 up until ... late-1999 or early-2000.” This was about the time of the timbering (and Appellants’ initial purchase) and “from then on they had been disappearing.”5 Mr. Chillcut testified he saw the flags. Mr. Hart testified, “[t]he boundary lines were marked continuously and we also re-flagged them as needed.” He also helped put up the “No Trespassing” signs. As to where the flagging and signs were posted, he testified they were placed “[o]n all the boundary lines. We *90didn’t do just one side, we did the whole farm.” Roy Eugene Stills testified, “[a]nd I had walked it over and helped him flag the whole farm.” Mr. Box also testified he helped put up signs and that they were “[o]n all the boundary lines. We didn’t just do one side, we did the whole farm.”
In addition, Frank Williams, a licensed surveyor, testified that Mr. Stills’ way of marking lines with flags and signs is a general way of signaling boundary lines and not uncommon in the area. In fact, he stated that “I mark my lines the same way.” When asked if it was a well-defined boundary and could you write a legal description from it, he testified, “yes.”
Thus, in this instance, it is inappropriate to dismiss Appellee’s actions as “mere recreational use,” when, in fact, their use was open — it was posted and flagged, and thus, notorious; it was continuous from 1982 — no one testified otherwise; it was exclusive — all persons found upon the property without permission were “put off’ the property. And given the signage and flagging, as well as exclusive claim to, and use of, the disputed property, it was obviously “hostile”. See Appalachian Regional Healthcare, 824 S.W.2d at 878. Even by the time of the timbering in October of 1999, the required fifteen-year time period had elapsed.
In fact, that Appellees actually believed that their claim extended all the way out to the eastern line was supported by the deed for the Winstead farm is an inescapable conclusion. This was not a line established for the purposes of adverse possession; it was a line recognized by the family. Moreover, all the evidence introduced is consistent with the recognition of this same eastern boundary line by Appellees’ predecessor in title, Walter Ruby. There is no evidence in the record that Mr. Ruby ever objected to, or insisted upon, a differing line from the 1960s all the way up to the time when Appellants bought their initial interest in the “Ruby Farm” in October of 1999 (well after the limitations period) and started trying to survey the boundary lines. The only question remaining is the claim to a well-defined boundary.
E. The Well-Defined Boundary
As aforementioned, in reviewing a JNOV, “we must review all the evidence presented to the jury and must uphold the trial court’s decision if after all the evidence is construed most favorably to the verdict winner, a finding in his favor would not be made by a reasonable [person].” Moore, 147 S.W.3d 13, 16 (Ky.2004) (emphasis added) (internal citation and punctuation omitted). In this regard, the majority concedes that the eastern dividing line of the disputed tract (“the green line”) between the Winstead heirs’ farm and the Ruby farm, as well as the western line, was established sufficiently by the proof. They conclude, however, that proof of the much shorter “northern” and “southern” boundary lines was insufficient, and with regard to the various witnesses that testified otherwise, they assert “no rationale juror could deem that scant testimony clear and convincing evidence that the northern and southern boundaries have been clearly marked for the entire limitations period.” Op. at 82-83 (emphasis added).
In support of this statement, they also assert that “[w]e have not been referred to any other evidence tending to establish that the northern and southern boundaries were continuously marked for fifteen years, and thus, on this ground too, the trial court’s JNOV was proper.” Id.
However, at trial, with a marker pen, Mr. Stills drew the boundary of the “disputed property” on an overlay over an enlarged aerial photograph of the area, *91which was then filed as Exhibit 1, 2. In regards to this line, as he was drawing it, he testified:
This road right here is Pennyrile Parkway, this is the early bypass, and here is Blue Valley Road coming up through here. Our property line starts on the farm basically right here [southern end of west line and beginning corner of south line]. Blue Valley Road comes around, and this [as he marks] is on the western boundary, western side of the I.E. Winstead Farm. Blue Valley Road comes right up through here, back up through here, round over through here, there is a big boulder right in here about thirty [30] yards off of Blue Valley Road [the ending corner of the south line, to which he drew a straight line from the beginning corner, the southern end of the western line] [,] and we have claimed this boulder [the end corner of the south line]; pretty well there is a ridge comes all the way down through down here, right down through here, comes up between the two lakes here ... starts right inside here, the thirty [30] yards off the curve [indicating the boulders, the end call of the southern line and the beginning call of the eastern line (“the green line”) ]; comes into a ridge right down through here, comes in between these two lakes....
.... I figure our property line [now drawing and discussing the eastern line] [,] what we have always been told by ancestors, the property line comes right up between those two lakes, comes up on the ridge, right in through here. There is an old barbwire fence line right in through here. You just follow that barbwire fence line, comes down right down through here, here’s the three-way intersection right through here and up through here [three-way trails intersection], Barbwire fence line comes down through here and we turn and our property line [continued east line] will cut across and cut back over through here ... [there’s an] old ridge over through here ... there’s a gas line right in here, PVC pipes are here, there’s an old railroad bed through here, go on this other side of this railroad bed and there’s a, there was an old gum tree that had three big stumps growing out of it, [it was] considered the property line [the northern end of the eastern side]. It’s been rotted out, you can see where it’s at; if you can’t, the tree’s not there anymore. The old railroad bed has got concrete right-of-way markers on it and we used a concrete right-of-way marker out there that has got a lot of fence in it [where the gum tree stump was]. The barbwire is all rotting off, but you can see the barbwire comes out three different directions from this way, then that way, coming that way [the northern line back to the north end of the west line]. We were always told that I.E. Winstead property was right here [as he completes the north line], the Norris Slaton property was right there [his northern neighbor], and [the] Walter Ruby property was up through here.
Even Norris Slaton supported the northern corner of the eastern line at the “gum tree stump” by the old concrete right-of-way marker. Interestingly enough, Norris Slaton was the adjoining owner on the north side of the disputed property. According to him, the deed for his farm referenced the gum tree stump as an intersection between the Winstead farm, the Ruby farm, and his property — the same one claimed to by Appellees and testified to by Mr. Stills.
Mr. Stills was later asked by counsel, “[f]or purposes of your adverse possession claim, what boundary line have you been adversely possessing to or claiming as your own under a mistaken belief?” He *92again replied, “[a] cross the boundary line that we’ve got marked on the map over there [referring to plaintiffs exhibits 1 and 2] that our ancestors have shown what we own.” These lines enclose the “disputed property” on the enlarged aerial photo on all sides (north, west, south, and east).
Jerry Flener also testified and was asked, and answered, as follows:
Counsel: Earlier, I had Roy draw what he calls a boundary line pointed out by his ancestors, are you familiar with that line?
Flener: Yes I am.
Counsel: Do you believe that line is in the place that Roy drew?
Flener: I firmly believe, after my dad and my granddaddy told me that that is the line that the property actually lays on. I have no other reason not to believe that it didn’t.
In reference to Appellees’ evidence to a well-defined and marked boundary, a portion of which I have recited, this Court said in Neal that:
All of the markings upon the trees appear to be very old, and were there before Gilreath entered upon the land, and was the same marked line to which D.B. Neal had claimed for many years. It is apparent that the evidence going to uphold the contention that the land is surrounded by a well-marked and well-defined boundary is sufficient to take the case to the jury, and, there being no evidence to the contrary, the verdict of the jury, if it found that there was a well defined and marked boundary, was not contrary to the evidence and was sufficient to support the verdict.
181 S.W. at 1121. Thus, plainly, a claim to a well-defined and well-marked line does not require a claim to a “survey” line; albeit, the descriptions contained in Appellants’ two quitclaim deeds for tracts I-V, did provide survey descriptions by which the smaller boundary sought by Appellants and lying within the larger disputed tract (to which the Appellees claimed in their complaint and upon which they wanted and received a jury verdict) can be surveyed on the ground. In fact, these survey description tracts were plotted by engineers and introduced as Plaintiffs’/Appellees’ exhibits 3 and 6. This also includes tract VI, which is formed by an extension of the northern line of tract IV and the eastern side of tract V.6
In reviewing a trial court’s grant of a JNOV, “we must review all the evidence presented to the jury [and can only] uphold the trial court’s decision if ‘after all the evidence is construed most favorably to the verdict winner, a finding in his favor would not be made by a reasonable [person].’ ” First and Farmers Bank of Somerset v. Henderson, 763 S.W.2d 137 (Ky.App.1988).
Using this standard, this Court should not reverse the Court of Appeals. Thus, I also dissent to the majority’s conclusion that the jury verdict was unsupported by evidence of a well-defined and well-marked boundary to which the Appellees claimed.
F. The Recreational Use Statute, KRS 411.190(8)
KRS 411.190(8) provides that, “[n]o action for the recovery of real property, including establishment of prescriptive easement, right-of-way, or adverse possession, may be brought by any person whose claim is based on use solely for recreational purposes.” KRS 411.190(2) establishes *93that “[t]he purpose of this section is to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons entering thereon for such purposes.” “Recreational purposes” is defined to include, but not limited to “any of the following, or any combination thereof: hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, bicycling, horseback riding, pleasure driving, nature study, water-skiing, winter sports, and viewing or enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic, or scientific sites[.]” KRS § 411.190(l)(c).
Quite clearly, no evidence was introduced by Appellants tending to establish, in any way, that the “disputed area” was ever set aside for any period of time “to the public for recreational purposes.” KRS 411.190(1). Moreover, the act of going upon and marking a boundary with brightly-colored engineering flags and “No Trespassing” signs, as well as the act of evicting trespassers therefrom, is not “recreational” activity, nor is timbering. See KRS 411.190(l)(c).
That aside, the majority asserts that KRS 411.190(8), effective July 15, 2002— five years after the adverse possession statute ran in this case — may apply retroactively to Appellees’ November 1, 2002 complaint for reasons that “statutory amendments that do not affect substantive rights, amendments often referred to as ‘remedial,’ ‘do not come within the rule prohibiting retroactive application.’ ” Op. at 80-81 (citing Commonwealth Department of Agriculture v. Vinson, 30 S.W.3d 162, 169 (Ky.2000)). To this assertion, I must disagree.
Such a holding is simply hard to understand in view of this Court’s recent holding in Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.3d 740, 751 (Ky.2009), where this Court reiterated:
Substantive amendments are those “which change and redefine the out-of-court rights, obligations and duties of persons in their transactions with others.” Commonwealth of Kentucky Department of Agriculture v. Vinson, 30 S.W.3d 162, 168 (Ky.2000). By contrast, procedural amendments — “[tjhose amendments which apply to the in-court procedures and remedies which are used in handling pending litigation” id. at 168-69 — are to be retroactively applied (assuming no separation-of-powers concerns) so that the proceedings “shall conform, so far as practicable, to the laws in force at the time of such proceedings.” ... This is consistent with our approach to substantive, procedural, and remedial civil statutes under KRS 446.080. That statute provides in part that “[tjhere shall be no difference in the construction of civil, penal and criminal statutes” and that “[n]o statute shall be construed to be retroactive, unless expressly so declared.” Pursuant to these provisions, we have held, substantive civil statutes are not to be applied retroactively unless the General Assembly expressly declares otherwise, while procedural and remedial statutes are to be so applied. Commonwealth of Kentucky Department of Agriculture [v. Vinson], supra; Peabody Coal Co. v. Gossett, 819 S.W.2d 33 (Ky.1991).
Moreover, in Rodgers, we also cited to University of Louisville v. O’Bannon, 770 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Ky.1989) for the proposition that, “[wjhether a particular circumstance constitutes a cause of action [or conversely a defense] ... is a matter of substantive law.” Rodgers, 285 S.W.3d at 751.
Thus, given this Court’s recent position on these matters, I cannot accept that the taking away of a right of action to quiet one’s title is “procedural” or “remedial” *94and thus I must also dissent as to this issue.
III. Conclusion
Therefore, for the reasons stated, I dissent.
VENTERS, J., joins this dissent.
. Although Appellees’ proof substantiated title by adverse possession to a larger boundary (out to "the green line’’), Appellees requested their title be quieted only to that portion of the "disputed property” to which the Appellants’ asserted title under two quitclaim deeds from the Kentucky Bank and Trust Company and the Ruby Construction Company (purporting to recognize that Walter Ruby, Appellants’ grantor, had adversely possessed it), plus a smaller adjacent portion to the north. These quitclaim deeds from Kentucky Bank and Ruby Construction were prepared by Appellants’ counsel.
This lesser claim was consistent with Appel-lees’ Affidavit of Adverse Possession filed of record in the Hopkins County Court Clerk’s office on June 11, 2002, and at trial, which affidavit contained, as an attachment, an engineering map plotting tracts I-V as acquired by Appellants under the aforementioned quitclaim deeds and also including a small tract, *84VI, encompassed by extending the eastern line of tract V northerly to an intersection point with the northern line of tract IV.
The Kentucky Bank quitclaim deed to Appellants, noted above, was executed in January 2001 for "no consideration, but in order to acknowledge that Grantor [, Kentucky Bank,] does not repudiate any of the claim of Grantees [, Appellants,] that title to the hereinafter described property ripened in Walter J. Ruby prior to his death on February 1, 2000, by virtue of his adverse possession of said property, the Grantor by this instrument does hereby grant, alien and convey by way of quitclaim unto the Grantees-" (Emphasis added). The Kentucky Bank deed was filed of record in the Hopkins County Court Clerk's office on January 29, 2001.
The Ruby Construction quitclaim deed to Appellants, noted above, was executed in April 2001 and also filed of record in the Hopkins County Court Clerk's office on May 2, 2001. It contained the same language: that it was for "no consideration, but in order to acknowledge that Grantor does not repudiate the claim of Grantees [, Appellants,] that title to the hereinafter described property ripened in Walter J. Ruby prior to his death on February 1, 2000 by virtue of his adverse possession of said property, the Grantor by this instrument does hereby grant, alien and convey, by way of quitclaim unto the Grantees....” (Emphasis added).
Appellees’ plat of the quitclaim tracts, along with the small tract VI, Appellees’ Exhibit 3, was prepared by Ronald Johnson & Associates, P.S.C., consulting engineers, and land surveyors on April 2, 2002. Each of the five tracts (tracts I-V) granted by quitclaim from Kentucky Bank and Ruby Construction are described in the deed by survey descriptions, including the northern line of tract IV, which when squared to a point of intersection with the eastern line of tract V, establishes the complete northern and eastern boundaries of tract VI, since each of these side lines are straight lines coming from tracts IV and V. To the extent the lesser boundary that Appellants sought at trial falls within the greater boundary they proved they had actually claimed ("open and notoriously”) on the disputed tract, as shown by the evidence. Its location may be established with certainty based upon the survey description of the tracts contained in these deeds.
Moreover, to the extent any of the lines of the "lesser claimed boundary” on the eastern side fell outside the boundaries of the larger "disputed area”, such portions would be outside of any area claimed by the Appellees in their complaint and would be limited by the eastern line (the "green line”), and thus could not be owned or later pursued by Appellees, pursuant to the doctrine of "splitting causes of action”. See Capital Holding Corp. v. Bailey, 873 S.W.2d 187, 193 (Ky.1994) ("The rule against splitting causes of action ... is an equitable rule, limiting causes of action arising out on a single 'transaction' to a single procedure”).
As noted, Appellees' Affidavit of Adverse Possession with the attached plot of tracts I-VI (Exhibits) was filed of record in the Hopkins County Court Clerk's office on June 11, 2002. Suit followed November 1, 2002. Appellants initially purchased the “Walter Ruby farm” from Walter J. Ruby, Jr. by deed dated October 21, 1999 and lodged of record in the Hopkins County Court Clerk’s office on October 21, 1999 in Deed Book 583 at page 516. Their quitclaim deeds to the disputed property — recognizing title by adverse possession in their Grantor (Ruby) — were dated January and April 2001.
. The jury found for the Appellees under the following instructions:
Instruction I. You will find for petitioners if you are satisfied from the evidence that Petitioners, either personally or through their agent, Roy Stills, held adverse possession of the real estate in question at the time of the end of peaceable possession. Otherwise, you will find of the Respondents.
Instruction II. The term "adverse possession” as used in Instruction I above means that the Petitioners continuously for a period of fifteen years or more pri- or to November 1999 or April 2000, whichever date the jury may believe that peaceable possession ended, had been in actual, open, notorious and adverse possession of the land in controversy, claiming the land to a well-defined or well-marked boundary sufficient to put the true owners of the land, assuming each of them to be an owner of ordinary prudence and diligence in looking after his estate, upon notice that the Petitioners were claiming the land as a matter of right and as their own. If the Petitioners!]] possession is under a mistaken belief that one's deed includes land, it is adverse if the possessor (Petitioners) does not concede that there may be a mistake *85and if they show an intention to hold the land in all events.
. A "marked tree” is a tree which has been marked in some way, generally by a slash or mark made by an axe or a hatchet. Once made, the mark remains and grows with the tree even though its fresh color will disappear with time.
. Roy Stills testified that the first controversy with Appellants — and thus, the end of peaceful possession — was in April 2000, six months after the timber was cut. Appellants, on the other hand, allege that the first controversy was a discussion between Roy Still and one of Appellants in November 1999 after timber was cut on the disputed tract. Appellants acquired their initial interest in the "Ruby Farm” in 1999.
. In fact, the judgment tendered by Appellees prior to the JNOV included a full metes and bounds description of this area.