Robert Daniel Dewbre appeals from the district court’s order affirming the magistrate’s denial of Dewbre’s motion to suppress evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURE
Just after midnight on June 1, 1996, an Idaho State police officer was traveling on Highway 57 in Bonner County, when he began following Dewbre’s vehicle. Highway 57 is a two-lane road with an occasional passing area where the single one-directional lane splits into two, creating a temporary passing lane. Dewbre entered one of these passing areas. A sign was located near the beginning of the passing area directing traffic to stay to the right except to pass. Two traffic signs and painted arrows on the roadway near the end of the passing area advised traffic that the passing lane was ending and that traffic should merge left. Upon entering this passing area, Dewbre moved his vehicle into the right lane. After driving beyond the last dashed line at the end of the passing area, Dewbre moved his vehicle from the right lane into the remaining single lane. Because Dewbre failed to signal while making these maneuvers, the officer stopped Dewbre for violating I.C. § 49-808.
Based on evidence obtained during the traffic stop, Dewbre was charged with being a minor driving under the influence. Dewbre moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop. Following an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate denied *665Dewbre’s motion to suppress. Dewbre moved for reconsideration, and the magistrate denied the motion. Dewbre entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. Dewbre appealed to the district court, which affirmed the magistrate’s denial of Dewbre’s motion to suppress. Dewbre again appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On review of a decision of the district court, rendered in its appellate capacity, we examine the record of the trial court independently of, but with due regard for, the district court’s intermediate appellate decision. State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584, 585 n. 1, 798 P.2d 43, 44 n. 1 (1990); State v. Bowman, 124 Idaho 936, 939, 866 P.2d 193, 196 (Ct. App.1993). The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact which were supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996).
III.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Dewbre argues that the traffic stop of his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures and that the district court, therefore, erred in affirming the magistrate’s denial of Dewbre’s motion to suppress evidence. A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667 (1979); Atkinson, 128 Idaho at 561, 916 P.2d at 1286. Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there is an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 628 (1981); State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992); State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct.App.1998). The reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. State v. Naccarato, 126 Idaho 10, 12, 878 P.2d 184, 186 (Ct.App.1994). The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause but more than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer. Id.
In the instant ease, Dewbre contends that the officer lacked the requisite suspicion to stop his vehicle because I.C. § 49-808 does not require the use of signals when entering or exiting a passing area. The relevant portion of I.C. § 49-808 provides that no person “shall turn a vehicle or move right or left upon a highway unless and until the movement can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate signal.” Dewbre contends that I.C. § 49-808 requires the use of turn signals only when a vehicle turns or makes a lane change. Dewbre contends that he did not turn or change lanes, that he continued in the same lane while entering and exiting the passing area, and that he, therefore, was not required to use his signal. Dewbre also argues that I.C. § 49-808 requires the use of signals only when appropriate and that no turn signal is the “appropriate signal” when the vehicle movement can be made with reasonably safety.
This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of statutes. State v. Schumacher, 131 Idaho 484, 485, 959 P.2d 465, 466 (Ct.App.1998). Generally, “[w]ords and phrases are construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language.” I.C. § 73-113. A statute must be construed so that effect is given to every word and clause of a statute. State v. Baer, 132 Idaho 416, 417-18, 973 P.2d 768, 769-70 (Ct.App.1999). The task of the court “in interpreting the meaning of language contained in a statute is to give effect to the legislature’s intent and purpose.” State v. Coleman, 128 Idaho 466, 469, 915 P.2d 28, 31 (Ct.App.1996). There is no occasion for construction where the language *666of a statute is plain and unambiguous. State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d 578, 581 (1996). “The plain, obvious and rational meaning is always preferred to any hidden, narrow or irrational meaning.” State v. Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33, 40, 966 P.2d 33, 40 (Ct.App.1998).
The language of I.C. § 49-808 is plain and unambiguous and must be given effect. The following holding from the district court’s order affirming the magistrate’s denial of Dewbre’s suppression motion correctly analyzes the statute’s application:
When Dewbre approached the portion of the highway containing a passing lane, the sign required him to “keep right accept to pass.” As such, Dewbre moved his vehicle to the right to comply with this requirement. When Dewbre reached the end of the portion of the highway that contained a passing lane, the record clearly establishes that there was a sign requiring Dewbre to merge back into the left lane. This required a turning movement to the left. It is undisputed the [sic ] Dewbre made these movements, and it is also undisputed that he did not signal when he made either turn. By failing to signal when he made these turns, Dewbre violated I.C. § 49-808.
It is true that at the point Dewbre made these turning maneuvers, the dashed line did not separate the left and right northbound lanes. However, the statute does not strictly limit its application to the lane changes. Instead, the statute requires a signal whenever an individual makes a “move right or left upon a highway.” Had the legislature intended only to regulate turns and lane changes, it could have stated so specifically. By moving first right, and then left, Dewbre came within the ambit of the statute, and was required to make to [sic ] signal.
(Emphasis added.).
I am constrained to agree. Upon entering the passing area, Dewbre moved his vehicle to the right in order to comply with the highway signage. Upon exiting the passing area, Dewbre moved his vehicle to the left, complying once again with the highway signage. There are no exceptions in I.C. § 49-808 to the signal requirement. State v. Pressley, 131 Idaho 277, 279, 954 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Ct.App.1998). Whenever a movement is made to the left or right on a highway, regardless of whether the movement is made necessary to comply with highway signage, an appropriate signal is required pursuant to I.C. § 49-808.
I do not attempt by this holding to define the boundaries of what constitutes a “movement to the right or left upon a highway.” I conclude only that Dewbre’s movements placed him -within the ambit of the statute. Until further clarification is provided by the Idaho legislature, I am constrained to hold that whenever a vehicle moves to the right or to the left because one lane splits into two lanes, or two lanes merge into one lane, an appropriate signal is required pursuant to I.C. § 49-808. Therefore, I.C. § 49-808 required Dewbre to use an appropriate signal when he moved to the right while entering the passing area and then to the left while exiting the passing area.
Dewbre further argues that no signal is the appropriate signal when the vehicle movement can be made with reasonably safety. The plain language of I.C. § 49-808 provides that an individual may “move right or left upon a highway” if two requirements are met: (1) if “the movement can be made with reasonable safety” and (2) if “an appropriate signal” is given. Even if a vehicle can be moved with reasonable safety, I.C. § 49-808 still requires the use of turn signals when making the movement to the right or left. Furthermore, the Idaho legislature specifically amended the turn signal law deleting the exception Dewbre argues. Prior to the amendment, the statute provided that an appropriate signal was only required “m the event any other traffic may be affected by such movement.” 1953 Idaho Sess. Law 507. This exception was removed in 1977 by the Idaho legislature. 1977 Idaho Sess. Law 370. Consequently, the legislature intended that turn signals be used when moving right or left on a highway regardless of whether other traffic may be affected or a vehicle is moving with reasonable safety. I agree with the district court that an appropriate signal requires “such a signal as would put others *667on notice of the driver’s intention to make a turning movement, and that it was not the intent of the legislature to negate the requirement of signaling when making a turning movement.”
Lastly, Dewbre argues that I.C. § 49-808 is unconstitutionally vague. This argument, however, was not raised below. Generally, issues not raised below may not be considered for the first time on appeal. State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). Therefore, I decline to address this issue.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Dewbre violated I.C. § 49-808 by failing to use his turn signal when he moved his vehicle to the right and to the left on the highway. The officer, therefore, was justified in stopping Dewbre’s vehicle. Accordingly, the district court’s order, affirming the magistrate’s denial of Dewbre’s motion to suppress evidence, is affirmed.