specially concurring.
I concur in the opinion of the court affirming the dismissal of appellant. I concur also in the reversal of the district court order denying appellant five months’ pay awarded by the personnel review board because of the precedent established by Pritchard v. State, Div. of Vocational Rehabilitation, Dep’t of Health and Social Serv., 540 P.2d 523 (Wyo.1975). I must, however, express my opinion that there is no logical or sound reason for denying the State of Wyoming a right of appeal. The present state of law makes final a board decision against the State no matter how absurd or wrong it may be. It is possible that in the future the State may be the victim of an unwarranted multimillion dollar award and powerless to do other than pay. When that case comes before us, we will be hard pressed to continue the rule of *207Pritchard. Perhaps the legislature will look at this state of the law before the hard case comes along. At a minimum, I would hold that when the “person” aggrieved by the board’s decision initiates an appeal, the State is then in court and may respond to the appeal by cross-claim or otherwise.
URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, dissenting, with whom GOLDEN, Justice, joins.
INTRODUCTION
This is a public employee termination case. Regina Mekss was discharged from her employment with the Wyoming Girls’ School (a juvenile confinement facility) because she went outside the School’s chain of command by a telephone call to the Executive Secretary of the Board of Charities and Reform to challenge the sufficiency of the Board’s investigation into reports of management problems at the institution. Violating the chain of command was characterized as insubordination and justification for her dismissal by the School..
This court holds that her dismissal does not violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution because the School’s “interest in maintaining discipline and esprit de corps ” outweighs her right to freedom of speech. Because her efforts and the telephone call addressed a matter of public concern and did not adversely affect the operation of either the School or the Board, I dissent.
By demonstrating that it is again the messenger who is at risk, this whistleblower case does not suit my sense of either justice or justification to approve Mekss’ termination from public employment. As Justice Thurgood Marshall observed in dissent, denial of, or discharge from, public employment is “a serious blow to any citizen * * * [wjhen something as valuable as the opportunity to work is at stake, the government may not reward some citizens and not others without demonstrating that its actions are fair and equitable.” Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 589, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2715, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972).
Although whistleblowers are recognized as a “vital element of our democratic process” serving as “an early-warning system against fraud and deception within the government,” reprisals against whistle-blowers are often “swift and harsh.” E. Slavin and T. Devine, The Government’s Secret War on Whistleblowers, 18 ABA Barrister 12, 15, 36 (Spring 1991). Public employees who speak out should now fear that they will lose their jobs, forfeit salary increases, or be denied promotions. When faced with such consequences, self-imposed censorship is often the most prudent choice. This self-imposed censorship is of profound consequence not only to the millions 1 who work for the government, but also to the public who may have an interest in hearing their unexpressed views. See Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S.Cal.L.Rev. 3 (1987). Professor Chafee has observed:
“The number of federal, state, and municipal employees is a substantial part of the working population. Add workmen in factories with government contracts and professors teaching in universities with a R.O.T.C. or a government grant for scientific research or an assigned unit from the Army or the Navy, and hardly anybody is left out. If millions of Americans lose freedom of speech and assembly by the mere act of earning a living, the First Amendment becomes a mockery.”
Massaro, supra, 61 S.Cal.L.Rev. at 6 n. 15 (quoting Z. Chafee, The Blessings of Liberty 94 (2d ed. 1956)).
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH
For more than twenty years, the law has been firmly established that a governmental entity cannot condition employment on any limitation that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1687, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) and Schalk v. Galle*208more, 906 F.2d 491 (10th Cir.1990). The School impermissibly violated Mekss’ constitutional right to speak on matters of public concern when it fired her for expressing her views and opinions to the Board and its Executive Secretary. Schalk, 906 F.2d 491.
THE SEQUENTIAL TEST
This majority correctly adopts a sequential test to determine whether the School’s action of dismissal impermissibly infringed upon Mekss’ constitutionally protected right of free speech, as recently summarized in Schalk. In its analysis and application of the sequential test, the majority distinguishes two separate instances of communication initiated by Mekss: the first being the anonymous letter written to the Governor and the other members of the Board, and the second being a telephone call to the Executive Secretary of the Board regarding the investigation.2 For purposes of applying the test, the majority assumes, without deciding, that each instance of communication addressed a matter of public concern.
THE ANONYMOUS LETTER
The majority accepts Mekss’ contention that the anonymous letter constituted whistleblowing speech and that it should be given the highest level of constitutional protection. It further agrees with Mekss that her interest in making the statement outweighed the interest of the School in stifling the speech. However, the majority then concludes that she failed to meet her burden of proving that the letter was a substantial or motivating factor in her dismissal. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977).
Although I disagree with the majority and suspect that the anonymous letter was a substantial or motivating factor in Mekss’ dismissal, the record shows that the supervisor at the School testified that he did not dismiss Mekss for writing the anonymous letter, but for “circumventing established lines of authority” by making the one telephone call to the Executive Secretary of the Board. The majority modified the Personnel Review Board’s Conclusion No. 1 to state that “Ms. Mekss was insubordinate in circumventing established lines of authority”, thereby accepting the supervisor's testimony that Mekss was not dismissed for writing the anonymous letter but rather for making the telephone call. I will apply the sequential test to the telephone call to demonstrate that the School impermissibly infringed upon Mekss’ right to free speech by dismissing her for making that telephone call. Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will County, Illinois, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). See also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972), which held that a college professor’s public criticism of the Board of Regent’s opposition to a proposal that the college be elevated to four-year status was constitutionally protected speech about a matter of public concern. Therefore, I find it unnecessary to further address the matter of the anonymous letter.
PUBLIC CONCERN ANALYSIS
The United States Supreme Court in Connick, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684 held that a public employee’s work-related speech is not covered by the First Amendment unless it addresses a matter of public *209concern and will not disrupt the workplace. Thus, the threshold inquiry in determining whether a governmental employer’s employment decision violates the First Amendment rights of an adversely affected employee is whether the speech at issue “may be ‘fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern.’ ” Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 2897, 97 L.Ed.2d 315, reh’g denied 483 U.S. 1056, 108 S.Ct. 31, 97 L.Ed.2d 819 (1987) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 103 S.Ct. at 1690). Speech on a matter of public concern is generally defined as speech “fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community * * Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 103 S.Ct. at 1690, in contrast to speech “as an employee upon matters only of personal interest * * *.” Id. at 147, 103 S.Ct. at 1690. Thus, the purpose of the inquiry is to weed out a narrow range of employee speech which addresses purely personal disputes and is not entitled to First Amendment protection. Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 998 (4th Cir.1985), cert. denied 476 U.S. 1159, 106 S.Ct. 2278, 90 L.Ed.2d 720 (1986).
“Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48, 103 S.Ct. at 1690. This inquiry focuses on “the extent to which the content of the employee speech was calculated to disclose wrongdoing or inefficiency or other malfeasance on the part of governmental officials in the conduct of their official duties.” Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436, 1445 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 488 U.S. 909, 109 S.Ct. 262, 102 L.Ed.2d 250 (1988). “ ‘The focus is on the role the employee has in advancing the particular expressions: that of a concerned public citizen, informing the public that the state institution is not properly discharging its duties * * *; or merely as an employee, concerned only with internal policies or practices which are of relevance only to the employees of that institution.’ ” Id. at 1445 (quoting Cox v. Dardanelle Public School Disk, 790 F.2d 668, 672 (8th Cir. 1986)). See also Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 857 (10th Cir.1989) and Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 796-97 (10th Cir.1988).
This record justifies my conclusion that the telephone call was made as a public employee speaking as a citizen and did indeed address a matter of public concern. Rankin, 483 U.S. 378, 107 S.Ct. 2891; Connick, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684. It was addressed directly to the sufficiency of the investigation which was a function and duty of the Board. Mekss had nothing personal to gain by airing her concerns. Her motive was to improve the education and treatment of the institutional clientele and to improve the working conditions of the employees. From her perspective, Mekss had sufficient reasons to view the investigation as superficial and inadequate because what she had reported and what she believed others had reported had not been sufficiently documented or considered in the official report.
The content of her statements, if true, suggest that the Board (or the School) was not properly discharging its duties. This falls into the category of “[sjpeech that seeks to expose improper operation of the government or questions the integrity of governmental officials” which “clearly concerns vital public interests.” Conaway, 853 F.2d at 797.
The majority erroneously concludes that because her telephone call addressed issues that had been discussed in the anonymous letter and the subsequent investigation, any further discussion on her part was in the nature of a personal grievance or complaint. Connick, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684. The majority fails to recognize that her speech at this juncture did not address the operation of the School per se, but rather the Board and the manner in which they conducted their investigation into matters concerning the School. To substantiate Mekss' view that the investigation was inadequate necessarily required that she reiterate specific statements she had made to the investigators, which of course reflected her concerns about the operation of the institution. Her concerns and resulting *210statements cannot be fairly or accurately characterized as merely personal complaints concerning internal policies and practices of relevance only to Mekss as an employee. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148, 103 S.Ct. at 1690; Cox, 790 F.2d at 673.
For the sake of argument, assuming that the telephone call was purely critical of the School and not critical of the Board’s investigation, it would still touch on a matter of public concern for essentially the same reasons the majority concludes that the anonymous letter touched on a matter of public concern.3 Conaway, 853 F.2d 789; Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1085, 107 S.Ct. 1287, 94 L.Ed.2d 145 (1987).
As the majority points out, the record does not support the veracity of Mekss’ concerns as she was not permitted to present evidence concerning inaccuracies in the investigation to the Personnel Review Board. Whether her concerns were well founded is not significant since the strong interest in protecting this type of speech determines that the whistleblower need not be absolutely accurate to be protected by the courts. This court, in Board of Trustees, Laramie County School Disk No. 1 v. Spiegel, 549 P.2d 1161 (Wyo.1976), held that the school district erred in discharging its tenured teacher for making and publishing statements critical of the school’s administrator and of schools generally. This court concluded that absent proof that the employee knowingly or recklessly made false statements, his criticism could not furnish a lawful basis for dismissal. Id. at 1176. See also Pickering, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731.
The majority also determines that the speech did not touch on a matter of public concern in part because Mekss did not have sufficient personal knowledge about the investigation. It is true she did not know how the results were tabulated. However, it is not necessary that she have intimate knowledge of how the investigation was conducted before her speech is protected by the courts. The courts have provided protection even though the speaker had no firsthand knowledge of the reported incidents. Hughes v. Whitmer, 714 F.2d 1407, 1423 (8th Cir.1983), cert, denied 465 U.S. 1023, 104 S.Ct. 1275, 79 L.Ed.2d 680 (1984).
The next inquiry is whether the communication disrupted the workplace. The United States Supreme Court in Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Disk, 439 U.S. 410, 99 S.Ct. 693, 58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979) held that a teacher’s series of private communications to her supervisor regarding racial discrimination at the school was protected speech. The court noted that when an employee expresses a grievance in a private meeting, courts can consider the time, place, and manner of the confrontation in evaluating whether it impeded institutional efficiency. Id. at 415 n. 4, 99 S.Ct. at 696 n. 4. It would follow that speech *211that occurs away from the workplace, such as Mekss’ telephone call to the Executive Secretary, poses an even less significant threat to the authority and efficiency of the institution than a private personal confrontation with a supervisor. Likewise, the majority concedes that there is insufficient evidence in the record to support a disruption in the workplace.
THE PICKERING BALANCING TEST
The function of the Pickering test is to “balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. at 1734-35. Balancing the competing interests of the employee and the employer requires consideration of “ ‘whether the statement impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among coworkers, has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the performance of the speaker’s duties or interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise.’ ” Wulf, 883 F.2d at 861 (quoting Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388, 107 S.Ct. at 2899). See also Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570-73, 88 S.Ct. at 1735-37.
In determining that the scales of justice tip in favor of the public institution for this case, the majority relied upon the educational, vocational and rehabilitative nature of the services provided to the troubled adolescent girls combined with its “valid and important interest in maintaining discipline and esprit de corps.” The majority concludes the chain of command rule was adopted to protect this interest and that by violating the chain of command, the School had just cause to dismiss Mekss from employment on grounds of insubordination. However, “[pjhrases like ‘esprit de corps’ or ‘insubordination’ should not lull judges into uncritical deference to public employers’ decisions.” Massaro, supra, 61 S.Cal.L.Rev. at 68.
The majority analogizes the School to a police force and stressed the importance of discipline, harmony, and loyalty in a law enforcement organization and holds that Mekss’ telephone calls to the Executive Secretary of the Board “directly impaired Geisler’s authority and ability to discipline the staff” and had a “direct and detrimental impact on Geisler’s confidence in Mekss’ loyalty to the School and to him.” However, it then modifies the Personnel Review Board’s conclusions by eliminating the conclusion that Mekss created disharmony in the function of the school by stating, “we are not persuaded that substantial evidence in the record supports the actual creation of disharmony by Mekss.”
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addresses the issue of disruption of the working environment in Conaway, 853 F.2d at 797-98:
Disruptions in the working relationship between Conaway and his supervisors, and general disharmony in the office, are foreseeable consequences when an employee reports improper activities of coworkers or supervisors. We recognize, as did Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Rankin, “that a public employer must have authority to maintain the efficiency as well as the integrity of his office.” Rankin, 107 S.Ct. at 2899 n. *. We also recognize, however, the vital interest the public has in the integrity of those who administrate their government. Brockell v. Norton, 732 F.2d [664] at 668. [ (8th Cir.1984) ] It would be anomalous to hold that because the employee’s whistle blowing might jeopardize the harmony of the office or tarnish the integrity of the department, the law will not allow him to speak out on his perception of potential improprieties or department corruption. See Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 773 (5th Cir.1979).
Another consideration under Pickering is whether Mekss’ speech interfered with the performance of her daily job responsibilities. Conaway, 853 F.2d at 798. It is uncontested that Mekss was a valued employee up to the time of her discharge and her job performance was consistently eval*212uated as good to excellent. Furthermore, under Pickering, the danger to an agency’s successful function due to an employee’s speech is minimal where the employee serves no confidential, policy making or public contact role. Rankin, 483 U.S. 378, 107 S.Ct. 2891. Mekss worked as a fiscal control officer and served in no confidential, policy making or public contact role and therefore posed a minimal threat to the smooth function of the School. Her remarks did not interfere with the performance of her duties nor the ability of her co-workers to perform their duties.
Mekss was dismissed for the content of her speech. “Vigilance is necessary to ensure that public employers do not use authority over employees to silence discourse, not because it hampers public functions but simply because superiors disagree with the content of employees’ speech.” Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384, 107 S.Ct. at 2897 (emphasis added). She would not have been dismissed for circumventing the lines of authority had she contacted the Board with praise for their investigation or to commend the School’s operation.
The majority has determined that the manner of Mekss’ communication violated the School’s chain of command. The majority, in upholding Mekss’ dismissal, places undue emphasis on this issue. Once again, the majority fails to recognize that her speech at this juncture did not address the operation of the School per se, but rather the Board and the manner in which they conducted their investigation into matters concerning the School. Therefore, it would have been wholly inappropriate for Mekss or any citizen to address concerns about the investigation through the established lines of authority at the School. She had a criticism of the Board and went directly to that Board. Further, she went directly to the Executive Secretary upon the recommendation of the Secretary of State, Kathy Karpan.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in upholding the right of a police department dispatcher to anonymously report, outside the department's chain-of-command, the perceived misconduct of a police officer, held that “[t]he enforcement of [a chain-of-command] rule against an employee seeking to criticize the very superior empowered to review [the employees’ complaints] would impermissibly chill first amendment rights. Atcherson v. Siebenmann, 605 F.2d 1058, 1063 n. 5 (8th Cir.1979).” Brockell v. Norton, 732 F.2d 664, 668 (8th Cir.1984). See also Knapp v. Whitaker, 757 F.2d 827 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 474 U.S. 803, 106 S.Ct. 36, 88 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985) and Anderson v. Central Point School Disk No. 6, 746 F.2d 505 (9th Cir.1984), upholding the lower court’s injunction barring enforcement of any policy which prohibits direct communication by teachers on matters of public concern with members of the school board.
In a case where an employee was disciplined for violation of a government department’s “chain-of-command” policy by speaking at a public meeting of the county’s government board about deficiencies in the department, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals said in Czurlanis v. Albanese, 721 F.2d 98, 106 (3d Cir.1983):
A policy which would compel public employees to route complaints about poor departmental practices to the very officials responsible for those practices would impermissibly chill such speech. * * * It would deter “whistle blowing” by public employees on matters of public concern. It would deprive the public in general and its elected officials in particular of important information about the functioning of government departments. We do not read the “efficiency of public services” factor referred to in Pickering to extend to a chain-of-command policy as interpreted and applied by the defendants.
See also the post-Connick case of Jurgensen v. Fairfax County, Va., 745 F.2d 868 (4th Cir.1984), Butzner, J., dissenting.
Finally, Mekss has the burden of showing that her speech was a substantial or motivating factor in her dismissal by the School to establish a prima facie case. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 287, 97 S.Ct. at 576; Conaway, 853 F.2d at 795. Once her pri-ma facie case is established, the burden *213then shifts to the School to show it was not a motivating factor in the dismissal, that it would have terminated her employment anyway. Wulf, 883 F.2d at 857; Koch, 847 F.2d at 1440 n. 11. Because both the School and the Personnel Review Board cite the employee’s protected conduct as one of the specific acts of insubordination causing her dismissal, it is not necessary to analyze whether either party carried their burden of proof.
Perhaps another motivating factor in Mekss’ dismissal was the affect her “insubordination” had on Geisler’s ego as illustrated by the incident involving the “letter of apology.” In order to resolve their dispute and as an attempt to impose discipline, Geisler presented Mekss with three options: resignation, dismissal, or writing a letter of apology. Responsively, she opted to draft the letter of apology. However, Geisler promptly deemed it unacceptable because, although she apologized, she did not recant her earlier criticisms.-
Mekss spoke on a matter of public concern. Her First Amendment interests, as a citizen, outweighed any slight impairment in the efficient and harmonious operation of the School. Pickering, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731. A public employee should have the right to speak on matters of public concern without fear of being discharged. Connick, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684; Schalk, 906 F.2d 491. She was a good employee and the state has an interest in retaining such employees. Competent management should have been able to address her concerns and control any insubordinate behavior without (almost summarily) dismissing her. Under the circumstances of this case, termination was neither fair nor the least restrictive alternative available to the School. The government’s violent reaction to employee dissent is clearly not justified in this case.
There is an even more oppressive message of danger for the public employee who is concerned about the services which are being provided by his or her public agency. The concurrence in part and dissent in part in Leonard v. Converse County School Disk No. 2, 788 P.2d 1119 (Wyo.1990) was emphatically motivated by the same concern for employment if management has an unprincipled right to attack non-conforming performance, Wulf, 883 F.2d 842, as “insubordination” or “disloyalty.” History leaves no doubt that a singular cause of the destruction of empires and national governments has followed the “three blind mice” syndrome with disregard of the message and execution of the messenger. Equally apparent from this decision, we retell state government employees: “Ignore agency problems or management misconduct since the only one to be fired will probably be you.” Compare, however, the current Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Considine v. Board of County Com’rs of County of Adams, State of Colo., 910 F.2d 695 (10th Cir.1990).
Attacking whistleblowers where a sincere purpose to improve government is the goal by the subterfuge of claimed disharmony or insubordination will inevitably result in bad government and irresponsible management. Like Leonard, 788 P.2d 1119 and Doidge v. State, Bd. of Charities and Reform, 789 P.2d 880 (Wyo.1990), Ur-bigkit, J., dissenting, we separate state employees from due process and their constitutional rights, Schalk, 906 F.2d 491, since, in the exercise of those rights, we then justify employment termination.
This case again demonstrates the use of the dual foot soldiers of disharmony and non-conformity who then become prison wardens to guard against bothersome conduct or troubling criticism by denying the employee his or her constitutional right to speak out about government and its operation.
Accordingly, I dissent.
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
This case came on before the court upon the Petition for Rehearing and Brief in Support of Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing filed herein on June 27, 1991 on behalf of Appellant, and the court, having reviewed the file, the record, the opinion of the court, the Petition for Rehearing and *214the Brief in Support of Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing, and having carefully considered the matters presented therein, finds that the Petition for Rehearing should be denied, and it, therefore, is
ORDERED that the Petition for Rehearing be, and the same hereby is, denied.
URBIGKIT, C.J., and GOLDEN, J., would grant the Petition for Rehearing.
. See, for statistics, D. Westman, Whistleblow-ing: The Law of Retaliatory Discharge 45 (1991).
. The record clearly shows that the telephone call by Mekss to K. Gary Sherman, Executive Secretary of the Board, was the result of a suggestion from Ms. Kathy Karpan, Secretary of State, who was a member of the Board by whom Sherman was employed. Mekss followed that suggestion and was then terminated. The factual superficiality and obviousness of this case is hardly subject to question. Notes of the facility director, Superintendent Jack Geis-ler, reveal an apparent warning by Sherman to Mekss that "she should get on [the] right side or get out.”
Subsequent to the occurrence of these events, the superintendent of the facility retired and, at a later date, the institution itself was transferred from the Board (confinement) to the Department of Family Services (social welfare and family support). No one will ever know how much contribution to public benefit this one strong-willed employee may have actually made.
. The judiciary, in requirement to confine female juveniles, has a high interest in the performance of this institution with no other facility except the women’s prison in Lusk, Wyoming available when something must be done with the individual. This controversy consequently involved the one available state institution for judicial commitment of the uncontrolled or criminally inclined juvenile females. Wulf, 883 F.2d 842. Nothing in this record shows that the judiciary was asked about agency performance when the Personnel Review Board rendered the decision adverse to the employee. The issue of institutional performance within its assigned mission of unquestionable importance to the state got lost in managerial ego and the "I am right, shut up” syndrome. The record realistically provides no compelling evidence to demonstrate that this employee was either right or wrong about the substance of employee concerns for the facility’s basic operation.
Directly presented in the first sequence of these events was contention of mismanagement. The second sequence invoked the question of whitewash of that mismanagement. Nothing provided in this record permits or justifies determination whether either or both were the result of an unjustified, unprincipled, factually untrue malicious activity of the employee, or just a cover-up where the whistleblower is terminated so that problems will not be uncovered or publicly considered.
Attachments to Mekss' brief, which consisted of contemporary news stories from a statewide newspaper, were attacked by a motion to strike by the Attorney General’s office. The motion was sustained by order of this court determining that "various news articles from the Casper Star-Tribune be stricken and shall be disregarded by the court.”