concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority’s decision that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the exception under 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(3) does not exempt Appellants from criminal liability. I also agree that the district court did not engage in impermissible judicial fact finding to arrive at Mabry’s sentence. I disagree, however, with the majority’s determination that in order for the “settlement exception,” 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(2), to apply, the parties must have initiated a structured dispute resolution process.
The crux of the matter is whether 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(2) provides an exception to the general prohibition against payments between employers and union officials in the context of settlements outside of a formal dispute resolution process. The text of the (c)(2) exception exempts:
[T]he payment or delivery of any money or other thing of value in satisfaction of a judgment of any court or a decision or award of an arbitrator or impartial chairman or in compromise, adjustment, settlement, or release of any claim, complaint, grievance, or dispute in the absence of fraud or duress....
This settlement exception clearly includes payments between employers and union officials in response to court- or arbitrator-ordered awards, but it is the ambit of the last phrase “in compromise, adjustment, settlement, or release of any claim, complaint, grievance, or dispute in the absence of fraud or duress” to which I now turn.
The first step in interpreting any statute is to determine whether “the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning.” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 450, 122 S.Ct. 941, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil, 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997)); see also Fullenkamp v. Veneman, 383 F.3d 478 (6th Cir.2004). If the “statutory language is unambiguous and ‘the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent,’ ” then “[o]ur inquiry must cease.” Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340, 117 S.Ct. 843 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989)). Here, the plain meaning of the words “in compromise, adjustment, settlement, or release of any claim, complaint, grievance, or dispute” does not require that the settlement of such disputes occur in the context of formal litigation or arbitration. In particular, the words “compromise,” “adjustment,” “settlement,” and “dispute” do not necessarily relate to litigation or arbitration. These words refer to the settlement or conclusion of a disagreement, with no express reference to formal proceedings. Moreover, the definitions of “claim” in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986) are “an authoritative or challenging request,” “a demand of a right or supposed right,” and “a calling on another for something due or supposed to be due.”1 All three definitions place Defendant Mabry’s dispute as to the amount owed squarely within the plain meaning of “claim.” Given the broad *451language used to describe the types of settlements exempted within § 186(c)(2), a plain reading of the statute allows an exemption to § 186 for the settlement of informal disputes made in the absence of fraud or duress.
The majority, however, relies upon ejus-dem generis, an interpretive aid in statutory construction, to find that part one of § 186(c)(2), allowing for an exception where payment is given upon “satisfaction of a judgment of any court or a decision or award of an arbitrator or impartial chairman,” modifies part two, which exempts payment “in compromise, adjustment, settlement, or release of any claim, complaint, grievance, or dispute in the absence of fraud or duress.” However, ejusdem generis “cannot be employed to render general words meaningless.” United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680, 682, 70 S.Ct. 352, 94 L.Ed. 457 (1950); accord Owen of Georgia, Inc. v. Shelby County, 648 F.2d 1084, 1097 n. 3 (6th Cir.1981). The principle of ejusdem generis is particularly inapplicable here where Congress, in setting forth the statutory language, went to great lengths to provide a broader scope for the settlement exception, using the words “compromise,” “adjustment,” “settlement,” “dispute,” and “claim” — none of which necessitate the initiation of a formal dispute resolution process.
In the majority’s view, however, “some level of structure or formality in resolving a dispute to evidence the legitimacy of the ensuing payment” is required, and “[a]l-though [they] express no opinion as to what degree of structure must be present to trigger the protection of § 186(c)(2), [they] are certain that it is lacking here.” Even though the majority’s interpretation of § 186(c)(2) does not explicitly require litigation or arbitration to validate a settlement, it renders the import of its decision unclear and will likely lead to further confusion. The majority’s imprecise reading of the statute, coupled with its explicit refusal to decide what actions are necessary to trigger the settlement exception, seem to suggest that even bona fide settlements of real disputes are subject to criminal sanction simply because the parties did not sue each other or initiate arbitration. I believe that a better construction of the statute would allow parties with bona fide disputes to settle their claims, without resorting to litigation or arbitration, so long as that settlement is “in the absence of fraud or duress.” Such a reading would avoid the problems inherent in the majority’s interpretation, which effectively reads out key language in § 186(c)(2).
Moreover, this interpretation would harmonize the plain language of § 186(c)(2), which includes informal settlements, with the overall purpose of § 186. As the majority correctly states, the legislative purpose of § 186 was to combat corruption within the collective bargaining process by imposing criminal sanctions on union officials who receive payments from employers. See e.g., Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 424-25, 79 S.Ct. 864, 3 L.Ed.2d 915 (1959). The legislature’s remedial purpose, however, should be harmonized with an exception whose plain meaning allows the receipt of things of value to settle informal disputes. Indeed, allowing parties to amicably settle their disputes would not, in effect, swallow the entire statute because the parameters of that exception are written into § 186(c)(2) itself — “in the absence of fraud or duress.” That limiting language provides an end point for § 186(c)(2) and affords a precise fit between the contours of the corrupt activity prohibited by § 186 and the exception given to the settlement of bona fide disputes in § 186(c)(2).
Furthermore, despite Congress’s explicit displeasure with corruption within the col*452lective bargaining process, it is not at all clear that Congress meant to criminalize such a broad swathe of potentially legitimate activity. “[I]f Congress had intended to [criminalize such conduct], and to subject [offenders of the prohibition] to lengthy prison terms, it would have spoken more clearly to that effect.” Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 620, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994). In other words, if Congress had intended to require union officials to initiate formal proceedings for the settlement exception to apply, Congress would have said so. The absence of the words “formal litigation” or “arbitration” and the insertion of the words “claim” and “dispute” into the second section of § 186(c)(2) suggests that Congress did not actually intend to require union officials and employers to engage in formal adjudicative processes to avoid criminal liability. The requirement was only that the claim and its settlement be bona fide, i.e., “in the absence of fraud or duress.” Thus, the plain language of the statute together with the discernable congressional intent of § 186 suggest that § 186(c)(2), the settlement exception, should be read to allow the settlement of bona fide disputes between an employer and a union official as long as both the dispute and settlement are in the absence of fraud or duress.
Moreover, to the extent that there exists any ambiguity in the meaning of § 186(c)(2), the rule of lenity should operate as a tie-breaker in favor of the defendant. The rule of lenity is a longstanding principle of statutory construction directing that “when choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.” Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000) (quoting United States v. C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22, 73 S.Ct. 227, 97 L.Ed. 260 (1952)); see also Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 409, 123 S.Ct. 1057, 154 L.Ed.2d 991 (2003); United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 18 U.S. 76, 95, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820); 3 N. Singer, Sutherland Stat. Const. (6th ed.2007) (stating that lenity is “an ancient rule of statutory construction that penal statutes should be strictly construed against the government ... and in favor of the persons on whom such penalties are sought to be imposed.”).
The purpose of lenity is, first, to allow a “sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.” N. Am. Van Lines v. United States, 243 F.2d 693, 697 (1957). See also United States v. Boucha, 236 F.3d 768, 774 (6th Cir.2001). Second, lenity operates to assuage “the instinctive distaste against men languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has clearly said they should.” Boucha, 236 F.3d at 774 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971)). Thus, “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.” Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25, 121 S.Ct. 365, 148 L.Ed.2d 221 (2000) (quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 28 L.Ed.2d 493 (1971)).
Here, to the extent that the majority’s interpretation also represents a plausible reading of § 186(c)(2), the language and intent of the settlement exception is not sufficiently clear to warrant such a narrow interpretation of the exception under § 186(c)(2). I am loath to inflict criminal punishment on those who engage in the amicable settlement of bona fide disputes where the plain language of § 186(c)(2) exempts from liability informal settlements *453of disputes between employers and union officials.
Thus, based on the plain language, discernible congressional intent, and rule of lenity, I believe that the appropriate interpretation of § 186(c)(2) is that informal settlements of informal disputes are excepted from the general prohibition of § 186 so long as such settlements are made in the absence of fraud or duress. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
. The definition of "claim” in Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed.2004), though including the concept of formal litigation, also encompasses informal disputes that do not necessarily involve litigation or arbitration. The definitions are: "1. The aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right enforceable by a court ... 2. The assertion of an existing right; any right to payment or to an equitable remedy, even if contingent or provisional ... 3. A demand for money, property, or a legal remedy to which one asserts a right ...”