dissenting.
Although the majority purports to apply Allen Kane’s Major Dodge v. Barnes, 243 Ga. 776 (257 SE2d 186) (1979), it actually departs from that precedent. Indeed, the majority erroneously manipulates the analytical framework laid out therein by giving no weight to testimony which, as Allen Kane’s itself specifically recognizes, must be considered during the final step of the analysis, constitutes direct evidence that the employee was acting within the scope of employment, and is therefore sufficient to require that the case go to a jury. I respectfully dissent because, in my opinion, this Court should wholly reaffirm the burden-shifting paradigm of Allen Kane’s and thereby conclude that the evidence of Mark Heard Fuel Company’s employment of Jessica Heard, its ownership of the vehicle, and the additional testimony of her “on call” status at the time of the collision was sufficient to withstand the motion for summary judgment filed by the Company.
The general rule of respondeat superior follows: When a servant causes an injury to another, the test to determine if the master is liable is whether or not the servant was at the time of the injury acting within the scope of his employment and on the business of the master. [Cits.] “Where a vehicle is involved in a collision, and it is shown that the automobile is owned by a person, and that the operator of the vehicle is in the employment of that person, a presumption arises that the *877employee was in the scope of his employment at the time of the collision, and the burden is then on the defendant employer to show otherwise.” [Cits.]
Allen Kane’s Major Dodge v. Barnes, supra at 777. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the Company met this burden through Ms. Heard’s deposition testimony, as well as Samuel Heard’s testimony that she “was not performing any work for the Company on the day of the [collision] and . . . that she had not worked for the Company at all that month because of her school schedule.” Hicks v. Heard, 297 Ga. App. 689, 691 (1) (678 SE2d 145) (2009).
When the uncontradicted testimony of the defendant and/or the employee shows that the employee was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident, the plaintiff must show, in addition to the facts which give rise to the presumption that he was in the course of his employment, some other fact which indicates the employee was acting within the scope of his employment. If this “other fact” is direct evidence, that is sufficient for the case to go to a jury. However, when the “other fact” is circumstantial evidence, it must be evidence sufficient to support a verdict in order to withstand the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (Emphasis in original.)
Allen Kane’s Major Dodge v. Barnes, supra at 780. The “other fact” upon which Ms. Hicks relies is found in sworn testimony by Ms. Heard herself that she was “on call” at the time of the collision and that she used the vehicle on “[a]n on-call as needed basis if [she] needed to go get office supplies, pick up equipment or something.”
In cases from other jurisdictions dealing with vicarious liability for an “on call” employee,
the underlying principle is that the mere fact that an employee is “on call” does not automatically give rise to employer liability. [Cits.] Rather, an employee’s “on call” status gives rise to a question of fact as to whether the employee was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. [Cits.]
Thurmon v. Sellers, 62 SW3d 145, 153-154 (Tenn. App. 2001). See also 1 Modern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation § 7:7 (2d ed.). Moreover, when the initial presumption in this case has been overcome, the facts which gave rise to that presumption remain, and any “other fact” shown by Ms. Hicks is to be considered “in addition *878to” the facts that the Company employed Ms. Heard and owned the vehicle at issue. Allen Kane’s Major Dodge v. Barnes, supra. In conjunction with those initial facts, Ms. Heard’s on-call status was “a sufficient fact to get the case to a jury,” as it constituted “direct evidence indicating that the employee was, in fact, in the scope of [her] employment at the time [she] had an accident with [her] employer’s [vehicle].” Allen Kane’s Major Dodge v. Barnes, supra at 783 (where the other fact to which this quote referred “was that the employee was ‘subject to call at any time’ ”). See also Clements v. Long, 167 Ga. App. 11, 15 (2) (305 SE2d 830) (1983) (physical precedent).
Contrary to the majority, an employee’s on-call status cannot logically be considered part of the evidence raising the initial rebuttable presumption that she was acting in the scope of her employment, because the only evidence necessary to raise that presumption is that the vehicle “ ‘is owned by a person, and that the operator of the vehicle is in the employment of that person.’ ” Allen Kane’s Major Dodge v. Barnes, supra at 777. Indeed, Allen Kane’s approved of the analysis in Massey v. Henderson, 138 Ga. App. 565, 566 (1) (226 SE2d 750) (1976) of Pest Masters v. Callaway, 133 Ga. App. 123 (210 SE2d 243) (1974) for this very reason. Although Pest Masters incorrectly held that the initial presumption alone was sufficient to preclude summary judgment in favor of the employer, it also mistakenly included the employee’s on-call status as part of the evidence raising that presumption. Massey correctly recognized that such status was instead some “other evidence” which was still available to rebut the employer’s evidence that the employee was not acting within the scope of employment. On this basis, Pest Masters, despite its erroneous analysis, “was correctly decided.” Allen Kane’s Major Dodge v. Barnes, supra at 783. Likewise, testimony regarding Ms. Heard’s on-call status constitutes some “other evidence” that she was acting in the scope of her employment. Furthermore, Allen Kane’s was correct in observing that such testimony is direct evidence, as it “immediately points to the question at issue.” OCGA § 24-1-1 (3). See also International Business Machines v. Bozardt, 156 Ga. App. 794, 796-797 (275 SE2d 376) (1980) (“ ‘direct, as opposed to circumstantial, evidence’ consisted of testimony that, at the time employee allegedly caused a collision, he was in town for a series of conferences for his employer’s benefit, although the meetings had ended for the day and he was going out to dinner”).
Accordingly, to the extent that Court of Appeals’ opinions have held that an employee’s on-call status, in conjunction with her employer’s ownership of the vehicle, is not sufficient “to get the case to the jury,” they should be overruled. Those opinions include the following: Hankerson v. Hammett, 285 Ga. App. 610, 612-613 (1) (647 *879SE2d 319) (2007); Upshaw v. Roberts Timber Co., 266 Ga. App. 135, 137 (1) (596 SE2d 679) (2004); Healthdyne v. Odom, 173 Ga. App. 184, 185 (1) (325 SE2d 847) (1984); Evans v. Dixie Fasteners, 162 Ga. App. 74, 75 (1) (290 SE2d 172) (1982).
Although an employee’s on-call status is direct evidence that she was acting in the scope of her employment while driving her employer’s vehicle, it is not conclusive evidence. The majority contends that Thurmon v. Sellers, supra, “actually . . . admonishes against the outcome espoused by the dissent.” (Majority Opinion, p. 874) That would be true only if this dissent was arguing that an employee’s on-call status demands application of respondeat superior as a matter of law. Instead, I recognize that “[pjublic policy would be ill-served by a rule establishing 24-hour employer liability for on-call employees, regardless of the nature of the employee’s activities at the time of [a collision].” Le Elder v. Rice, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 749, 753 (IV) (Cal. App. 1994). See also Thurmon v. Sellers, supra at 154. Likewise, I acknowledge the concerns of the Court of Appeals that the doctrine of respondeat superior requires that, at the time of the collision, the employee was serving the employer, acting in furtherance of his business, and not engaging in a purely personal mission. Hankerson v. Hammett, supra at 612 (1), n. 2; Healthdyne v. Odom, supra.
In light of these concerns, and after reviewing the relevant case law from other jurisdictions, I believe that this Court should adopt the following non-exhaustive list of factors, as set forth by the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, to provide guidance in determining whether an on-call employee was acting within the scope of her employment while driving her employer’s vehicle at the time of a collision:
1. Whether, at the time of the accident, the employee’s use of the vehicle benefitted the employer; 2. Whether the employee was subject to the employer’s control at the time of the accident; 3. Whether the employee’s . . . activities were restricted while on call; 4. Whether the use of the vehicle at the time of the accident was authorized by the employer; and 5. What the employee’s primary reason for using the vehicle was at the time of the injury-producing accident.
Thurmon v. Sellers, supra at 155. See also Medina v. Fuller, 971 P2d 851, 855 (C) (2), (3) (N.M. App. 1998); Le Elder v. Rice, supra.
Summary judgment may be authorized in some cases like the one currently before us if evidence regarding such factors has been fully presented and carefully considered. However, the Company failed to point out, and both the trial court and the Court of Appeals *880failed to consider, any such evidence. Instead, the Company argued, and now three courts have essentially ruled, that evidence on summary judgment of an employee’s on-call status while using her employer’s vehicle never constitutes sufficient rebuttal of evidence which has overcome the initial presumption that the employee was acting within the scope of her employment. Because this ruling was erroneous, the Court of Appeals’ judgment affirming the trial court’s order granting summary judgment should be reversed.
Decided March 29, 2010. Steven K. Leibel, for appellant. Andersen, Tate & Carr, Render C. Freeman, Michael J. Blakely, Jr., Schur, McDuffie & Morgan, Jeffrey P. Yashinsky, for appellees.I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Hunstein and Justice Benham join in this dissent.