I concur in the decision and judgment in this case.
While this court may not review issues, the final determination of which has been conferred by Congress exclusively upon the Secretary of the Treasury or the Tariff Commission, the validity of the action of the Secretary or other administrative official is subject to review. Kleberg & Co. (Inc.) v. United States, 71 F.2d 332, 21 CCPA 110, T.D. 46446; Waterman Steamship Corp. v. United States, 30 CCPA 119, C.A.D.223, and cases cited.
*312In the instant case, it is apparent that the Tariff Commission’s construction of the term “industry” in the statute affects the validity of its action. Its determination that an industry in the United States was being, or was likely to be, injured related to a domestic industry consisting of the producers of cast-iron soil pipe in California. However, if the term “industry” in the 'statute means all the producers of a given article in the United States, the Commission’s interpretation is wrong and its finding invalid.
The de-termination of the meaning of a word in a statute is a matter of law within the province of the courts. H. J. Heinz Company v. United States, 43 CC PA 128, 133, C.A.D. 619. The court is not bound by an incorrect interpretation of a law by an executive officer. United States v. American Bitumuls & Asphalt Co. et al., 246 F.2d 270, 44 CCPA 199, 207, C.A.D. 661, certiorari denied 355 U.S. 883, 78 S.Ct. 150, 2 L.Ed.2d 113.
In Kleberg & Co. (Inc.) v. United States, supra, the court stated that it could not investigate the facts to determine whether they justified the issuance of an antidumping order, but held that it could answer the question, “Did the Secretary exceed his authority when he construed the meaning of the words ‘fair value’ to be as defined in said regulation?”
Likewise, in the instant case, the court may determine whether the Tariff Commission exceeded its authority by construing the term “industry” to mean the producers in California.
I am in accord that it did not do so. It is to be noted that the statute uses the words “an industry in the United States,” not the industry producing comparable merchandise, or the American industry, or the industry of the United States. The language used does not indicate a congressional intent to limit the term “industry” to the entire American industry in all cases, but rather the contrary. This is borne out by the subsequent legislative history set forth in the majority opinion.
Where merchandise is bulky or heavy and is produced in various sections of the-United States, the country may well be divided into marketing areas, with producers selling primarily or exclusively to customers in their own locality. That was evidently the case in connection with cast-iron soil pipe. Under such circumstances, the producers in a particular mai-keting area may constitute an industry in the United States, within the meaning of the Antidumping Act. Therefore, injury or threat of injury to them is sufficient to sustain a determination that an industry in the United States was being, or was likely to be, injured by the importation of merchandise at less than fair value.
Furthermore, if a recognized segment of the domestic cast-iron soil pipe industry is being, or is likely to be, injured, there is certainly some injury to the whole industry, since the whole is the sum of its parts. If part is injured, the whole is to some extent injured, unless there is an offsetting benefit, which is not the ease here.
Appellant claims that the notice issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, pursuant to section 201(a) of the Antidump-ing Act, did not meet the requirements of the statute and that, therefore, his finding was void. Said section provides that the Secretary of the Treasury shall make public a notice of his determination and the determination of the Tariff Commission. In the instant case, the Commission’s determination was that “a domestic industry in the United States is being, or is likely to be, injured” [italic supplied] by the importation of cast-iron soil pipe from the United Kingdom at less than its fair value. The Commission’s letter to the Secretary also stated:
“The domestic industry to which the Commission’s determination of injury relates was held to consist of the producers of cast iron soil pipe in the State of California * * [Italics supplied.]
The notice, T.D. 53934, which the Secretary caused to be published stated that the Tariff Commission had notified him *313■“of its determination that the industry manufacturing cast iron soil pipe in the United States is being, or is likely to be injured.” [Italics supplied.]
Evidently the Secretary construed the Commission’s finding to mean that injury to the cast-iron soil pipe industry in California constituted an injury to the domestic industry. Thus, the notice given was not in the language used by the Tariff Commission. In view of our construction of the term “industry” in the statute, the notice is adequate. Furthermore, there is no showing that the appellant herein or anyone else was misled or prejudiced by the notice. The notice was not one given in connection with proposed rule making where the parties might not have been fully advised of the issues, but one given after a hearing at which the question of the meaning of the term “industry” had been discussed. The facts presented are not sufficient to invalidate the Secretary’s finding.