concurring in the judgment:
I agree with the “two considerations” or test set forth by the majority for determining whether a guardian’s or custodian’s presence at an interrogation satisfied the requirements of section 19-2-511(1), 6 C.R.S. (1998): First, “whether [the adult] in fact fit[s] within one of the specified categories of adults authorized by the statute to advise and counsel”; and Second, if within one of the categories, “whether [the adult’s] interests were sufficiently aligned with” and not objectively hostile to the juvenile’s. Maj. op. at 695. I further agree that if the questioned adult meets both tests, then, the parent, guardian, or custodian has the legal ability to perform in a manner contemplated by the purposes of the Children’s Code and, hence, statements of the juvenile may be admitted notwithstanding the prohibitions in section 19-2-511.
I write separately, however, to make clear two things. First, that under the first prong of that test, I would conclude that Bonnie Jennings, Courtney Legler’s grandmother, fits within the definition of “physical custodian” and should not lose that status because the juvenile, Courtney Legler, ran away from their home. Second, the “objectively hostile” standard of the majority’s second consideration, see maj. op. at 695, fulfills the purpose of the statute as elucidated in section 19 — 1— 102(d), 6 C.R.S. (1998) and section 19-2-102, 6 C.R.S (1998).
I.
A.
It is well settled that courts should give effect to the intent of the General Assembly and should not impute their own meaning to otherwise clear statutory language. See People v. White, 870 P.2d 424, 445 (Colo.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 841, 115 S.Ct. 127, 130 L.Ed.2d 71 (1994); People v. Schuett, 833 P.2d 44, 47 (Colo.1992). To discern legislative intent, a court should look first to the statutory language, see People v. Warner, 801 P.2d 1187, 1190 (Colo.1990), and give statutory words and phrases their full effect according to their plain and ordinary meaning. See People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo.1986).
It has been firmly established by this court that when interpreting statutes to meet the intent of the General Assembly, we must give meaningful effect to the whole of the statute. See Colorado State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Saddoris, 825 P.2d 39, 42 (Colo.1992) (statutes must be construed as a whole to give consistent, harmonious and sensible effect to all their parts); City of Lakewood v. Mavromatis, 817 P.2d 90, 96 (Colo.1991) (primary goal in determining meaning of statute is to ascertain and give effect to intent of legislature); Charlton v. Kimata, 815 P.2d 946, 949 (Colo.1991) (if possible, supreme court must give effect to every word of statute). Thus, when interpreting the rights of juveniles before our courts under comprehensive legislation such as the Children’s Code, we are obliged to give meaning to all provisions of that code in an effort to further the public policy represented by the legislative scheme. See A.B. Hirschfeld Press, Inc. v. *698Denver, 806 P.2d 917, 920 (Colo.1991). If statutes elsewhere in our laws touch upon the same subject but are potentially conflicting, courts should reconcile the statutes, if possible, to ensure a consistent and sensible application of the law. See In re Estate of David v. Snelson, 776 P.2d 813, 818 (Colo.1989).
By giving deferential effect to comprehensive statutes adopted by our General Assembly, courts recognize that legislators, not judges, are uniquely authorized to choose between alternatives of general application and, as a consequence, determine matters of public policy. This is true with regard to rights and procedures as to the use of statements of juveniles in proceedings before our courts. Hence, we should recognize a holistic approach, beyond criminal law or solely penal considerations, for the admission of statements of juveniles in order to effect the legislative purpose of assuring the development of our children, including their discipline as well as their care and protection.
In setting forth its legislative intent under the Children’s Code at sections 19-1-102 and 19-2-102, 6 C.R.S. (1998), the General Assembly evinced its desire regarding the treatment of children:
Legislative declaration. (1) The general assembly declares that the purposes of this title are:
(a) To secure for each child subject to these provisions such care and guidance, preferably in his own home, as will best serve his welfare and the interests of society;
(b) To preserve and strengthen family ties whenever possible, including improvement of home environment;
(c) To remove a child from the custody of his parents only when his welfare and safety or the protection of the public would otherwise be endangered and, in either instance, for the courts to proceed with all possible speed to a legal determination that will serve the best interests of the child; and
(d) to secure for any child removed from the custody of his parents the necessary care, guidance, and discipline to assist him in becoming a responsible and productive member of society.
§ 19-1-102, 6 C.R.S. (1998).
Legislative declaration. The general assembly hereby finds that the intent of this article is to protect and improve the public safety by creating a system of juvenile justice that will appropriately sanction juveniles who violate the law. The general assembly further finds that, while holding paramount the public safety, the juvenile justice system shall take into consideration the best interests of the juvenile in providing appropriate treatment to reduce the rate of recidivism in the juvenile justice system and to assist the juvenile in becoming a productive member of society.
§ 19-2-102, 6 C.R.S. (1998).
B.
Section 19-1-103(84), 6 C.R.S. (1998) states that “physical custodian,” as used in section 19-2-511, “means a guardian, whether or not appointed by court order, with whom the juvenile has resided.”
It is undisputed that Legler lived with Jennings for fourteen months prior to the questioned interrogation and was to have continued living there but for her departure from the home of her custodian as a runaway only weeks before the police interrogation. Thus, based on the plain language defining “physical custodian,” I would conclude that Jennings satisfies the statutory definition.
Like the majority, I view the language as plain, straightforward and not ambiguous. See maj. op. at 695. Unlike the majority, however, in my view the statute’s language “with whom the juvenile has resided” indicates that a physical custodian is not “limited to the adult or adults with whom the child resided immediately prior to the arrest and custodial interrogation.” Id. (emphasis added). In defining “physical custodian” in that manner, the majority reads into the plain language of the statute additional words and therefore alters the intent of the General Assembly. In enacting section 19-1-103(84), the General Assembly was free to define “physical custodian” as the majority does today by using the limiting language it has *699imported into the definition, or perhaps more clearly, by stating that a physical custodian is one “with whom the juvenile resides.” The General Assembly, however, did not so define “physical custodian,” but instead chose the broader language “with whom the juvenile has resided,” which, by its grammatical tense, indicates a person with the lawful ability to exercise custody and control over the child and a person with whom the child has ever resided.
The majority, on the other hand, interprets the definition narrowly as to what is, or may be, contrary' to a child’s penal interests without taking into account all of the interests and objects represented by our Children’s Code. See § 19-1-102, 6 C.R.S. (1998). I read the statute more broadly so as to effect the General Assembly’s attempt to ensure that the juvenile has the benefit of physical custodians pursuant to section 19-2-511, including an adult whose home the child may have run away from recently. In effect, if taken to its natural result, the majority would exclude adults based on the fact that the child ran away from home — a person no longer described as one “with whom the juvenile resides.”
However, the majority opinion should not be read as suggesting in all cases that an adult is not a “physical custodian” where the child is not living at the home of the adult at the time of the interrogation. See maj. op. at 695 (“It would contradict the legislative purpose of this statute to interpret it so broadly as to grant a continual physical custodianship to any adult with whom a child has ever resided.”). Section 19-1-103(35), 6 C.R.S. (1998) defines “custodian” as a “person who has been providing shelter, food, clothing, and other care for a child in the same fashion as a parent would.” (Emphasis added.) The underscored language indicates that a custodian is responsible for much more than the mere housing and feeding of a child, as this definition reaches an entire range of indefinable care rendered by parents in the course of raising a child.
Recently, we construed the term “physical custody” appearing elsewhere in our Children’s Code to mean “not limited to having actual, physical control of the child ... [and cited] Henderson v. Henderson, 174 Mont. 1, 568 P.2d 177 (Mont.1977) (finding the term ‘physical custody’ is not limited to having actual, physical possession of the child, but relates to the custodial rights involved in the care and control of the child).” See In re Custody of C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d 246, 252-53 (Colo.1995). There, we held that “since the [adults] had physical possession and control” they had standing to petition for custody. Id. at 253. While I agree that our holding in C.C.R.S. addressed issues concerning the adoption of a juvenile, I find the majority’s view, in this case, that a “physical custodian” set forth in section 19-2-511(1) is only a person with whom a child has resided “at the time of the interrogation,” maj. op. at 695, in conflict with both the plain language and our precedent.
Accordingly, while I adopt the test announced by the majority today, in my view its application here is not consistent with the plain language of the statute and, as a consequence, does not follow the express legislative intent of our General Assembly.
II.
' However, I agree with the second consideration of the majority’s test, that is, whether the interests of the custodian are objectively hostile to those of the juvenile, and join in its application here.
The General Assembly declared that one of the purposes of the Children’s Code is “to secure for any child removed from the custody of his parents the necessary care, guidance, and discipline to assist him in becoming a responsible and productive member of society.” § 19-l-102(d), 6 C.R.S. (1998). Contrary to this purpose, Jennings’ reasoning for waiving Legler’s constitutional rights was not based on “care, guidance, and discipline”; instead Jennings stated that she acted without sympathy for her granddaughter, that she did not love her granddaughter, and that she wanted “Legler put away so [Jennings] can raise [Legler’s baby].” This intentional conduct or motive I find wholly inconsistent with the legislative intent behind the Children’s Code.
*700Therefore, I conclude that there is evidence in the record which supports the trial court’s finding that Jennings was incompetent to assist Legler, as contemplated by the Children’s Code, and thus, Legler did not waive her rights under section 19-2-511(1). Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the majority.