Dissenting:
The majority relies on cases in which the party seeking an injunction was attempting to enjoin speech, claiming the result here necessarily follows from cases (1) reviewing a decision forcing a union to cease expressing its views through bannering, Overstreet v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local Union No. 1506, 409 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir.2005), (2) seeking to compel a newspaper to publish content from a political candidate, Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 243, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974), or (3) reviewing an order requiring a newspaper to resume publishing a weekly column to which it objected, Passaic Daily News v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1543, 1548 (D.C.Cir.1984). In other words, the majority finds the grounds for its conclusion in cases seeking to enjoin or compel speech or its content.
This is not such a case. The injunction here only seeks reinstatement for terminated employees. Period. It does not enjoin speech. Rather, the injunction addresses troublesome, retaliatory terminations and disciplinary actions the News-Press took only after union organizing began. The injunction addresses terms and conditions of employment, and it leaves the News-Press’s right to publish its desired content entirely intact.1 Under *967the injunction, the News-Press was and is perfectly free to insist on total editorial control in labor negotiations, leaving it able to lockout employees who do not agree to such terms.
The News-Press sees this case as one in which it may have to withstand economic pressure from its employees who are unhappy with the paper’s management. Exerting such pressure is the very essence of union activity. “[T]he reason for labor organizations ... [is] to give laborers opportunity to deal on an equality with their employer.” NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893 (1937). Where, as here, an injunction does not implicate First Amendment concerns, this core purpose of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) is properly protected through a section 10(j) injunction when organizing employees are fired because of their union activities.
Three facts are critical here. First, this case is not about the six editors and reporters who resigned citing editorial differences with the News-Press. It is about the eight newsroom employees who responded to what they saw as arbitrary management by seeking union protection, and were then fired for their union activities. Second, only after the fired employees engaged in the protected union activity did the News-Press bring any issue regarding their alleged “bias” or “disloyalty” to the employees’ attention or note such issues in their personnel files. Third, examining these facts in a thoughtful, 75-page opinion, following a 17-day trial, the ALJ concluded the News-Press committed numerous unfair labor practices, and the employees’ union activities prompted the News-Press’s challenged actions. The ALJ thus recommended relief, including reinstatement of the eight discharged employees.
A. Deference to the Board
The majority’s opinion turns in part on finding Overstreet controlling. Maj. Op. 958, 962, 966. However, beyond the magic words of “the National Labor Relations Act” and “the First Amendment,” the facts of Overstreet, a secondary boycott case, are fundamentally different.2
In Overstreet, the outcome turned in part on whether the union’s bannering activities constituted “threatenfing], coerc[ing], or restraining] any person engaged in commerce” under Section 8(b)(4)(H) of the NLRA. The opinion characterized those words as “vague” and their application as “far from self-evident.” Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1212. Given this ambiguity, the court inquired into whether the Board’s “proposed construction of the Act ‘would give rise to serious constitutional questions’ ” and therefore require construing ambiguous statutory language to avoid such questions. Id. at 1209 (quoting NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 *968U.S. 490, 501, 99 S.Ct. 1313, 59 L.Ed.2d 533 (1979)). Overstreet held “serious constitutional questions” are implicated where an injunction would present “a significant risk that the First Amendment will be infringed” even without deciding whether the proposed injunction would actually violate the First Amendment. Id. (quoting Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. at 502, 99 S.Ct. 1313). Because one permissible interpretation of Section 8(b)(4)(H) avoided those questions and the risk of infringing the First Amendment, the court applied the uninfringing interpretation. See id at 1209-10.
Unlike Overstreet, here, the NLRA’s protections of employees’ rights to “assist labor organizations” and “to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection” clearly apply to media employees, because the Supreme Court has held an agency of the press has no “special immunity” from application of the NLRA or any general law. Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33, 57 S.Ct. 650, 81 L.Ed. 953 (1937); see 29 U.S.C. § 157 (NLRA Section 7).
Section 8’s declaration of an unfair labor practice when employers “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise” of Section 7 rights “by discrimination in regard to hir[ing] or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization,” as the ALJ found the News-Press did here, unambiguously applies. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a). Therefore, the Overstreet standard should not guide the present outcome, and “the Board’s determination on the merits will be given considerable deference.” Miller ex rel. NLRB v. Cal. Pac. Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 449, 460 (9th Cir.1994).
Finding the Overstreet standard inapplicable is further buttressed by comparing its facts to this case. In Overstreet, the Board sought an injunction prohibiting union bannering of retail stores selling products from firms with which the union had a labor dispute, pending NLRB resolution of the complaint. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1203. The injunction thus had direct bearing on the union’s ability to continue its speech. That secondary-boycott situation bears no resemblance to the facts in this case, an organizing ease in which pretextually terminated employees are seeking reinstatement. Indeed, the News-Press conceded at argument that the terms of the injunction do not require the paper to change its editorial policy, nor give employees the power to direct the editorial policy. Overstreet thus has no application to an injunction which simply does not implicate the First Amendment risk the News-Press alleges.
B. First Amendment Concerns
The News-Press argues the NLRA should yield to First Amendment protections accorded the press in this case because of a publisher’s total discretion to determine the contents of its newspaper. The majority follows suit, noting “the employee-initiated union campaign aspired in large part to compel the publisher of the News-Press to relinquish” editorial control over its free “reporting of the news.” Maj. Op. 961. The News-Press contends that unlike Associated Press, where the AP sought a blanket entitlement to discharge the employee, this case directly concerns the full freedom and liberty of a newspaper to publish the news as it desires and to control the editing and rewriting of news for publication. Put another way, the News-Press, and the majority, find distinguishing between an injunction reinstating employees, and an order dictating what a newspaper must publish, a distinction without a difference. I disagree.
*969The ALJ found all eight employees were fired because of their union activities and the News-Press’s allegations of biased reporting pretextual.3 As in Associated Press, therefore, this case does not present the question of whether Congress has the power to interdict an employee’s discharge if a newspaper “believed its policy of impartiality was likely to be subverted by [an employee’s] continued service.” 301 U.S. at 132, 57 S.Ct. 650. Unlike the order requiring a newspaper to reinstate a columnist and resume publication of his weekly column at issue in Passaic, 736 F.2d at 1558-59, the injunction the Regional Director sought here would only have required the News-Press to rehire reporters, leaving intact all of its policies and procedures related to article publication and editorial approval process. On remand after Passaic, an order requiring the newspaper to restore the columnist to his position and “decide whether to publish his submissions based upon any factors other than his union or protected activity” went unchallenged. Herald News, 276 NLRB 605, 606 (1985).
Indeed, as the district court acknowledged, the injunctions at issue in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 243, 94 S.Ct. 2831, and Passaic “sought in some fashion to force publication of specific content by the newspapers at issue, thus actually directing the publishers’ exercise of their editorial discretion,” whereas the injunction sought in this case “seeks to prevent Respondent only from disciplining its employees who engaged in activities aimed to pressure it into limiting its exercise of its editorial discretion.” McDermott ex rel. NLRB v. Ampersand Publ’g LLC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94596, at *28 (C.D.Cal. May 21, 2008). The district court nevertheless concluded that because “these demands were not mere requests but were instead backed by public concerted activity placing economic pressure on [the News-Press] to acquiesce,” “the sought after injunction amounts to state action limiting Respondent’s ability to combat pressure placed on it to limit its exercise of editorial discretion.” Id. at *28-29.
The News-Press argues along similar lines, claiming it has a First Amendment right to discharge its employees notwithstanding any provision of the NLRA because of their collective advocacy of a boycott directed, in part, toward forcing the News-Press to reestablish certain journalistic standards. Citing Newspaper Guild, Local 10 v. NLRB, 636 F.2d 550 (D.C.Cir.1980), the district court accepted this argument, noting the D.C. Circuit required the Board to strike a balance “between an employer’s freedom to manage his business in areas involving the basic direction of the enterprise and the right of employees to bargain on subjects which affect the terms and conditions of their employment.” Ampersand, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94596, at *31 (quoting Newspaper Guild, 636 F.2d at 562). Citing the inapposite Tomillo opinion, the majority similarly concludes the injunction here would “remov[e] an otherwise available weapon to resist employees’ attempts to seize control over the newspaper’s content.” Maj. Op. 961.
Contrary to these assertions, the Director has not sought to force the News-Press to capitulate to its employees’ demands. In fact, unlike in Newspaper Guild, the Director has not even ordered the News-Press to bargain over these demands in good faith. Cf. Newspaper Guild, 636 F.2d at 557. The proposed injunction would allow the News-Press to *970continue to operate without a “firewall” between the editorial and news departments if it so chose. It would also leave the News-Press with complete editorial control, including what kind of opinion pieces, if any, to publish in relation to its disputes with its employees. The News-Press and the majority are essentially arguing for a newspaper’s First Amendment right to be free from its employees’ public criticism of its practices because their criticism (and call for a boycott) is “coercive.”4 The News-Press argues it must be free to respond to this “economic coercion” with discharge or other economic weapons of its own or else it will have no choice but to capitulate.
In concluding “[t]he injunction the Regional Director seeks here would prevent the News-Press from taking action against employees,” Maj. Op. 961, the majority proves too much. A “company always has the legal right to discipline an employee in a nondiscriminatory fashion for improper conduct. Further, any company subject to a § 10(j) injunction is theoretically subjected to the risk of which [the News-Press] complains.” NLRB v. Electro-Voice, Inc., 83 F.3d 1559, 1573 (7th Cir.1996).
In addition, employees generally may advocate “a boycott of the employer’s product, as long as the boycott is tied to a labor dispute and does not disparage the employer’s product.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 238 NLRB 1323, 1324 (1978), enforced, 651 F.2d 1172 (6th Cir.1980). Consumer boycotts pressure, but do not compel, targeted employers to capitulate to employees’ demands, whether those demands relate to traditional compensation matters or to other “terms of employment.” There is no more reason to expect the News-Press would be forced to agree to reestablish a firewall than to expect it to be forced to capitulate to employees’ other contract demands. Employees who desire to bargain over policies related to journalistic integrity should not thereby be stripped of their Section 7 rights. Even if, as in Newspaper Guild, a balancing “between an employer’s freedom to manage his business ... and the right of employees to bargain” were required, 636 F.2d at 562, an employer’s desire to be free from public criticism of its practices is not equivalent to its First Amendment right to choose what to publish on its pages. It thus does not outweigh employees’ NLRA rights to protest or bargain over the conditions of their employment.
Given the limited scope of the injunction and the employees’ clear right to organize, there is no significant risk of a First Amendment infringement due to the requested relief, and, therefore, the criteria for considering the injunction should have *971been applied with the typical deference to the Board. See Miller, 19 F.3d at 460-61.
C. Balancing of Equitable Criteria
By necessity, the granting of injunctive relief requires adjustment of the parties’ rights without full adjudication of the facts. Yet here we benefit from the ALJ having created a substantial factual record to overlay against “the requirements of equity practice.” Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329, 64 S.Ct. 587, 88 L.Ed. 754 (1944). When “determining whether interim relief under 10(j) is ‘just and proper,’ district courts should consider traditional equitable criteria ... through the prism of the underlying purpose of § 10(j), which is to protect the integrity of the collective bargaining process and to preserve the Board’s remedial power while it processes the charge.” Miller, 19 F.3d at 459-60.
In Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court clarified the traditional equitable criteria, explaining a party seeking a preliminary injunction “must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” — U.S. -, -, 129 S.Ct. 365, 374, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008).5
Rejecting Overstreet’s applicability in this case, I would find the district court abused its discretion in denying the injunction. Though the district court was conscientious in its analysis, finding the Director unlikely to prevail on the merits was grounded in the erroneous legal premise that employees’ attempts to negotiate aspects of the editorial process strip them of the NLRA’s protection. With the proper protection and deference to the Board in place, the ALJ’s findings show a clear likelihood of success on the merits, and the other equitable factors are met as well.
When concluding Overstreet’s standard of review does not apply, courts view the Director’s probability of prevailing “in light of the fact that ultimately, the Board’s determination on the merits will be given considerable deference.” Miller, 19 F.3d at 460. Here, the ALJ’s extensive factual findings detail a variety of unfair labor practices orchestrated by the News-Press and include reasonable findings that key testimony offered on the News-Press’s behalf was not credible and the justifications advanced for its actions were in large part pretextual.
Under the facts here there are multiple irreparable injuries due to the terminations and subsequent rejection of the injunction. “To permit illegal employer conduct to go unaddressed while the Board’s corrective machinery grinds toward resolution would subvert the underlying purposes of section 10(j) and allow those who commit unfair labor practices to reap the benefits of that conduct.” Scott ex rel. NLRB v. Stephen Dunn & Assocs., 241 F.3d 652, 660 (9th Cir.2001). Thus, unlawful, unremedied discharges create adverse impacts on employees’ interests in union organizing, and the union’s ability to bargain irreparably deteriorates as this situation is allowed to continue. See Pye ex rel. NLRB v. Excel Case Ready, 238 *972F.3d 69, 74-75 (1st Cir.2001) (“[T]he discharge of active and open union supporters ... risks a serious adverse impact on employee interest in unionization and can create irreparable harm to the collective bargaining process.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Electro-Voice, Inc., 83 F.3d at 1573 (“As time passes the likelihood of union formation diminishes, and the likelihood that the employees will be irreparably deprived of union representation increases.”).
An unlawful discharge also causes the irreparable harm of removing union supporters from the workplace at the time when the union is in most need of support. See Electro-Voice, Inc., 83 F.3d at 1573. Here, the longer the complaint sits with the Board without action, the weaker the union appears to remaining employees and the less energy exists in support of unionization, injuries that are immeasurable and irreparable.
The balance of hardships and the public interest also tip in favor of “ensuring] that an unfair labor practice will not succeed” because “declining to issue the injunction will permit the allegedly unfair labor practice to reach fruition and thereby render meaningless the Board’s remedial authority.” Miller, 19 F.3d at 460.
The majority puts significant emphasis on the Board’s delay in filing an injunction, citing the passage of time as the only factor supporting its conclusion that denial of the injunction resulted in no irreparable harm. Maj. Op. 964-65. Yet the majority’s entire discussion of the Board’s delay (and thus its entire discussion of irreparable harm) cites only one case, and in that case this court actually rejected the argument the majority recycles regarding the importance of the Board’s delay in filing the injunction.
In Aguayo ex rel. NLRB v. Tomco Carburetor Co., 853 F,2d 744, 750 (9th Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Miller, 19 F.3d at 455-56, we dismissed an argument made pursuant to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., which, like the majority, found Board delay critical to denying an injunction, see 515 F.2d 1185, 1193 (5th Cir.1975). We noted the delay argument was “not persuasive,” stating “[d]elay by itself is not a determinative factor in whether the grant of interim relief is just and proper.” Aguayo, 853 F.2d at 750. Yet the majority references Aguayo and then proceeds to reason from the premise Aguayo rejected, claiming the Board’s delay is so important here that it constitutes the entire irreparable harm analysis.
Perhaps the majority cites no cases for this proposition because we have specifically rejected the reasoning underlying an approach attaching such importance to Board delay. We have previously noted that the view Boire and the majority advance “actually hinders rather than protects the collective bargaining process” because “ ‘the underlying purposes of section 10(j) are to protect the integrity of the collective bargaining process and to preserve the [Board]’s remedial power while the Board resolves the unfair labor practice charge.’ ” Scott, 241 F.3d at 660 (quoting Miller, 19 F.3d at 452).
Other circuits, though recognizing the troublesome consequences of the Board’s delay in filing an injunction, have agreed, distinguishing Boire and declining to attach dispositive weight to Board delay. See, e.g., Muffley v. Spartan Mining Co., 570 F.3d 534, 544-45 (4th Cir.2009) (noting the troubling nature of the Board’s 18-month delay in seeking an injunction, but finding the balance of harms, the likelihood of success on the merits, and the “strong public policy” favoring injunctive relief, supported an injunction); see also Levine v. C & W Mining Co., 610 F.2d 432, 437 *973(6th Cir.1979) (noting approaches contrary to Boire are “more in accord with the purposes of the Act”).6
Though these cases show no excuse necessary, two related facts serve to justify the Board’s delay in this case. Generally, the Board argues it was waiting for the ALJ to develop the administrative record to prevent the district court and the ALJ from simultaneous review. This efficiency justification could in some instances be sufficient to justify delay. See Hirsch v. Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 147 F.3d 243, 248-49 (3d Cir.1998). In addition, the Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in a case to resolve whether adjudicative decisions made by only two of the NLRB’s five members are valid. See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir.2009), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 130 5. Ct. 488, — L.Ed.2d - (2009). Though the question in New Process Steel does not implicate the Board’s authority here in its prosecutorial role, see Muffley, 570 F.3d at 540, the uncertain legal status of the NLRB, as the Supreme Court has recognized, provides further, reasonable justification for delays in decision making. This justification is particularly salient because, here, the delay in filing the section 10(j) injunction, after the ALJ’s decision, occurred precisely when the cases questioning the Board’s ability to act without a quorum were moving through the NLRB and subsequently the courts of appeal. See, e.g., Laurel Baye Healthcare, LLC, 352 NLRB 179, 2008 WL 593779 (2008) (decided one week before injunction was filed in present case).
Despite the passage of time, the union’s negotiations for its initial collective bargaining agreement with the News-Press are ongoing and the union’s position has been weakened by the absence of the key union-supporting employees who were discharged and by the remaining employees’ fears stemming from those discharges. Continued delay may cause the discharged employees to find other work, denying the union of the benefits of their active support and accumulated experience, and the passage of time thus does not obviate the need for injunctive relief. Nor does this subversion of the NLRA benefit the public interest.
The majority also glosses over a significant district court error, conceding they “are not entirely confident that the district court gave appropriate weight to the rights of the discharged employees.” Maj. Op. at 965. I agree. The district court erred in its acceptance of the News Press’s alleged harm relating to the replacement workers it has hired because “the predominant focus under section 10(j) is the harm to the bargaining process,” and the “rights of the employees who were discriminatorily discharged are superior to the rights of those whom the employer hired to take their places.” Aguayo, 853 F.2d at 750.
In emphasizing the Board’s delay in seeking the injunction, rehashing its First Amendment arguments, and explaining away the district court’s misunderstanding *974of important precedent, Maj. Op. 964-66, the majority neglects discussion of the irreparable harms that exist regardless of any delay: rights of wrongfully discharged employees, id. at 750, the firings’ damage to the organizing drive, Scott, 241 F.3d at 660, and potential weakening of the Board’s remedial authority, id., all of which are also relevant to the balance of the equities and the public interest.
Finally, in evaluating the fired employees’ petition, the district court assumed the correctness of the ALJ’s thorough findings, reasoning that it “laek[ed] a basis to conclude” that “animus toward the Union and its demands was not the motive for the [News-Press’s] actions.” The majority also finds no basis, because one does not exist, for questioning these serious determinations that employees seeking to form a union were fired only after union organizing began.
In short, the majority applied the incorrect legal standard, leading it to the incorrect result. “Instead of offering a credible explanation for its actions, the [News-Press] relied on a pretextual justification and contended that the First Amendment served as a shield that prevented the Board from challenging the decision and inquiring into its motives.” Passaic, 736 F.2d at 1553. Because the majority begins by accepting the notion that who a newspaper employs necessarily determines its content, it finds the News-Press exempt from the labor laws other employers must follow. Instead, I would recognize the scope of the injunction is limited to reinstatement only, and under the injunction the News-Press would still be able to publish its paper as it sees fit. In failing to make this distinction, the district court applied the incorrect standard and analysis, abusing its discretion.
I would reverse and direct the district court to issue and enforce the injunction sought by the NLRB.
. The proposed injunction reads as follows: [The News-Press shall] Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging employees for engaging in Union or other protected concerted activities;
(b) Informing employees that they will be suspended for engaging in Union or other protected concerted activities;
(c) Retaliating against employees for engaging in Union or other protected concerted activities by inter alia giving them poor work evaluations;
(d) Threatening employees with discipline and discharge if they engage in peaceful employee conduct, such as employee delegations;
(e) Prohibiting employees from wearing buttons with protected messages, such as "McCaw, Obey the Law”;
(f) Prohibiting employees from displaying signs with protected messages, such as "McCaw, Obey the Law”;
(g) Coercively interrogating employees, verbally or in writing, concerning their Union or other protected activities;
Take the following affirmative action:
(a) Within five days of the issuance of this Order, offer interim reinstatement to [the eight fired employees] to their former job positions and working conditions, or if those job positions no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions without prej*967udice to their seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, displacing, if necessary, any newly hired or reassigned workers;
(b) Within five days of the issuance of this Order, rescind and remove from the personnel files of [the eight fired employees] any reference to their discharges, pending the final decision of the Board;
(c) Within five days of the issuance of this Order, rescind and remove from all personnel files any reference to warnings or notices of suspensions given to any employee for participating in the employee delegation. ...
. I agree with the majority's statement that there is "no reason" the analysis from Over-street should not survive the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008), but this does not alter my conclusion that the majority is incorrect to apply the Overstreet analysis here.
. These fact-intensive determinations are generally entitled to deference. See, e.g., Silver-man v. J.R.L. Food Corp., 196 F.3d 334, 337-38 (2d Cir.1999).
. As support for this claim, the majority cites the statements of Melinda Burns (“Burns”), who was wrongfully fired for her union activities, suggesting her view that "a newsroom has to have independence from the editorial side of the paper” demonstrates the First Amendment issues at stake in this case. Maj. Op. 961. But, despite the majority’s assertion that my "approach closes its eyes to what the underlying labor dispute here is about,” Maj. Op. 962, clearly I do not presume to suggest Burns can dictate to the News-Press what editorial standards it must employ. The First Amendment unquestionably protects that determination. Nor do I doubt that the editorial concern was a subject of the employees’ bargaining. The NLRA cannot grant employees the power to insist upon conditions on a newspaper’s content. The statute can, however, provide Burns, and similarly situated employees, the ability to at least discuss those standards in collective bargaining, free from the Damocles’ sword of retaliatory termination. The News-Press, of course, also remains free to reject such requests, insisting on its rights to publish its paper as it sees fit. Contrary to the majority's assertions, Maj. Op. 962-64, that right, protected for the News-Press by the First Amendment, is not implicated on the facts of this case.
. In doing so it rejected our previous standard allowing injunctive relief on a showing of a "possibility” of irreparable injury. E.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658, 677 (9th Cir.2008). I follow the majority in assuming without deciding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter alters our previous statements in Miller of the showing a party must make to obtain injunctive relief under section 10(j). I also see no reason why Winter disturbs our other statements in Miller instructing courts to consider the traditional equitable criteria against the backdrop of section 10(j)’s purpose.
. Significant delay in the 10(j) process is not unique to this case and is, in fact, a common criticism leveled at the Board. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems With its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 Duke L.J. 2013, 2028 (2009) (“One criticism frequently leveled at the NLRA is that the relative mildness of the remedies (reinstatement plus back pay) and the slowness of the administrative process (it can take years from the filing of a complaint by an aggrieved employee to the issuance of an enforceable order) creates a huge incentive for employers to deliberately violate the statute knowing that they will reap the benefit of illegal conduct for a long time, if not permanently in the case of a successful defeat of an organizing campaign.”).