concurring in part and dissenting in part.
J.S. was suspended from school for speech that took place outside the schoolhouse gates, during non-school hours, and that indisputably caused no substantial disruption in school. Because I believe that file School District’s actions violated J.S.’s First Amendment free speech rights, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion to the contrary.14 Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever allowed schools to punish students for off-campus speech that is not school-sponsored and that caused no substantial disruption at school. I would follow the logic and letter of these cases and reverse the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the School District and denial of J.S.’s motion for summary judgment on her free speech claim. The majority’s opposite holding significantly broadens school districts’ authority over student speech; I believe that this holding vests school officials with dangerously overbroad censorship discretion.
In reaching this conclusion, I recognize the comprehensive authority of schools and school officials to prescribe and regulate conduct within schools. Nonetheless, people of all ages are entitled to the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment and such freedoms must be respected. I further recognize that speech such as that employed in this case—even made in jest—could damage the careers of teachers and school administrators. Aggrieved schools and school officials may well seek redress through civil lawsuits and perhaps even by pressing criminal charges. I conclude only that the punitive action taken by the School District in this case violated the First Amendment rights of J.S. I do not pass upon the viability of other measures the appellees could have pursued.
I.
J.S., an Honor Roll eighth grade student, was punished for creating a fake *309profile of her middle school principal, James McGonigle, which she and her friend, K.L., posted on MySpace, a social networking website. J.S. and K.L. created the profile on Sunday, March 18, 2007, from J. S.’s house, using a computer belonging to J.S.’s parents. The profile did not identify McGonigle by name, school, or location, though it did contain his official photograph from the School District’s website. J.S. testified that she intended the profile to be a joke between herself and her friends. Appendix (“App.”) 190.
The profile contained crude content and vulgar language, ranging from nonsense and juvenile humor to profanity and personal attacks aimed at the principal and his family. Particularly disturbing were the profile’s references to pedophilia. However, the record indicates that the profile was so outrageous that no one took its content seriously. In fact, McGonigle himself acknowledged that he believed the students “weren’t accusing me. They were pretending they were me.” App. 327. Moreover, McGonigle showed the profile to Superintendent Joyce Romberger, who was required to report any suspected misconduct by the school principal to the Board of School Directors. As the majority acknowledges, however, Romberger took no such action “because she believed [the profile] consisted of ‘lies’ and ‘malicious comments’ made by students angry at McGonigle.” Majority Op. 292.
Initially, the profile could be viewed in full by anyone who knew the URL or who otherwise found the profile by searching MySpace for a term it contained. The following day, however, J.S. made the profile “private” after several students approached her at school, generally to say that they thought the profile was funny. App. 194. By making the profile “private,” J.S. limited access to the profile to people whom she and K.L. invited to be a MySpace “friend.” J.S. and K.L. granted “friend” status to about twenty-two Blue Mountain School District students.
Notably, the School District’s computers block access to MySpace, so no Blue Mountain student was ever able to view the profile from school. Moreover, as the majority acknowledges, the only printout of the profile that was ever brought to school was one brought at McGonigle’s specific request. Majority Op. 292. McGonigle then used the URL on the printout to view the profile from his office computer, which did not block access to MySpace.
After meeting with J.S., K.L., and then-parents, and informing them that the children would receive a ten-day out-of school suspension for creating the profile, McGonigle also contacted the police and asked about the possibility of pressing criminal charges against the students. The local police referred McGonigle to the state police, who informed him that he could press harassment charges, but that the charges would likely be dropped. McGonigle chose not to press charges, and instead completed a formal report and asked the police to speak to the students to let them know how serious the situation was.
In an attempt to justify punishment, the School District asserts that the profile disrupted school. As the majority concedes, the School District only points to three instances of alleged “disruptions”:
(1) two teachers, Randall Nunemacher and Angela Werner, had to quiet then-classes while students talked about the profile; (2) one guidance counselor had to proctor a test so another administrator could sit in on the meetings between McGonigle, J.S., and K.L.; and (3) two students decorated J.S. and KL.’s lockers to welcome them back upon their return to school following the suspen*310sion, and students congregated in the hallway at that time.
Majority Op. 293-94. Notably, Nunemacher acknowledged that the talking in class was not a unique occurrence, and admitted that he had to tell his students to stop talking about various topics approximately once a week. Similarly, Werner stated that the incident she was involved in did not disrupt class because the students spoke to her during the portion of the class when students were permitted to work independently. The substitution of a guidance counselor to proctor a test also did not cause any major inconveniences in school because the meetings only lasted about twenty-five to thirty minutes, and the student counseling appointments that had to be cancelled during that time were all rescheduled.
The majority also notes that McGonigle testified that when J.S. and K.L. returned from suspension, some students decorated the girls’ lockers to welcome them back to school, which created “a buzz and a stir” in the hallway. McGonigle punished the two students who decorated the lockers. The majority also emphasizes McGonigle’s testimony that he “noticed a severe deterioration in discipline in the Middle School ... following the creation of the profile, his corresponding discipline of J.S. and K.L., and ... this lawsuit,” and that “he had stress-related health problems as a result of the profile and this litigation.” Majority Op. 294. I believe that this testimony is irrelevant to the issues before this Court because these disruptions did not arise out of the creation of the profile itself, but rather, were the direct result of the School District’s response to the profile and the ensuing litigation. This testimony, therefore, is not relevant to determining the level of disruption that the profile caused in the school.
After analyzing the above facts, the District Court granted the School District’s summary judgment motion on all claims, though specifically acknowledging that Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969), does not govern this case because no “substantial and material disruption” occurred. App. 10-12 (refusing to rely on Tinker); App. 17 (concluding that “a substantial disruption so as to fall under Tinker did not occur”). Instead, the District Court drew a distinction between political speech at issue in Tinker, and “vulgar and offensive” speech at issue in a subsequent school speech case, Bethel School District v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986). App. 11-12. The District Court also noted the Supreme Court’s most recent school speech decision, Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 127 S.Ct. 2618, 168 L.Ed.2d 290 (2007), where the Court allowed a school district to prohibit a banner promoting illegal drug use at a school-sponsored event.
Applying a variation of the Fraser and Morse standard, the District Court held that “as vulgar, lewd, and potentially illegal speech that had an effect on campus, we find that the school did not violate the plaintiffs rights in punishing her for it even though it arguably did not cause a substantial disruption of the school.” App. 15-16. The Court asserted that the facts of this case established a connection between off-campus action and on-campus effect, and thus justified punishment, because: (1) the website was about the school’s principal; (2) the intended audience was the student body; (3) a paper copy was brought into the school and the website was discussed in school; (4) the picture on the profile was appropriated from the School District’s website; (5) J.S. created the profile out of anger at the principal for disciplining her for dress code *311violations in the past; (6) J.S. lied in school to the principal about creating the profile; (7) “although a substantial disruption so as to fall under Tinker did not occur ... there was in fact some disruption during school hours”; and (8) the profile was viewed at least by the principal at school. App. 17 (emphasis added).
The District Court then rejected several other district court decisions where the courts did not allow school punishment of speech that occurred off campus, including the decision in Layshock v. Hermitage School District, 496 F.Supp.2d 587 (W.D.Pa.2007), aff'd, Nos. 07-4465, 07-4555, 2010 WL 376184 (3d Cir. Feb. 4, 2010), a case substantially similar to the one before us today. See App. 17-20. In distinguishing these cases, the District Court made several qualitative judgments about the speech involved in each of the cases. See, e.g., App. 18 (asserting that the statements in Flaherty v. Keystone Oaks School District, 247 F.Supp.2d 698 (W.D.Pa.2003), were “rather innocuous compared to the offensive and vulgar statements made by J.S. in the present case”); App. 19 (contending that “[t]he speech in the instant case ... is distinguishable” from the speech in Killion v. Franklin Regional School District, 136 F.Supp.2d 446 (W.D.Pa.2001), because of, inter alia, “the level of vulgarity that was present” in the instant case); App. 20 (claiming that as compared to Layshock, “the facts of our case include a much more vulgar and offensive profile”).
Ultimately, the District Court held that although J.S.’s profile did not cause a “substantial and material” disruption under Tinker, the School District’s punishment was constitutionally permissible because the profile was “vulgar and offensive” under Fraser and J.S.’s off-campus conduct had an “effect” at the school. In a footnote, the District Court also noted that “the protections provided under Tinker do not apply to speech that invades the rights of others.” App. 16 n. 5 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513, 89 S.Ct. 733).
II.
Although the precise issue before this Court is one of first impression, the Supreme Court and this Court have analyzed the extent to which school officials can regulate student speech in several thorough opinions, all of which compel the conclusion that the School District violated J.S.’s First Amendment free speech rights when it suspended her for speech that took place outside the school, during non-school hours, and that caused no substantial disruption in school.
Unquestionably, the First Amendment protects the free speech rights of students in school. Morse, 551 U.S. at 396, 127 S.Ct. 2618 (“Our cases make clear that students do not ‘shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.’ ” (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506, 89 S.Ct. 733)). The exercise of First Amendment rights in school, however, has to be “applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment,” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, and thus the constitutional rights of students in public schools “are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,” Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682, 106 S.Ct. 3159. Since Tinker, courts have struggled to strike a balance between safeguarding students’ First Amendment rights and protecting the authority of school administrators to maintain an appropriate learning environment.
The Supreme Court established a basic framework for student free speech claims in Tinker, holding that “to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion,” school officials must demonstrate that “the *312forbidden conduct would materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 89 S.Ct. 733 (quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added). This burden cannot be met if school officials are driven by “a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.” Id. Moreover, “Tinker requires a specific and significant fear of disruption, not just some remote apprehension of disturbance.” Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 211 (3d Cir.2001). Although Tinker dealt with political speech, the opinion has never been confined to such speech. Cf. Id. at 215-17 (holding that the school’s anti-harassment policy was overbroad because it “appears to cover substantially more speech than could be prohibited under Tinker1 s substantial disruption test”). See also Killion, 136 F.Supp.2d at 455-58 (holding that the school overstepped its constitutional bounds under Tinker when it suspended a student for making “lewd” comments about the school’s athletic director in an email the student wrote at home and circulated to the non-school e-mail accounts of several classmates).
As this Court emphasized, with then-judge Alito writing for the majority, Tinker sets the general rule for regulating school speech, and that rule is subject to several narrow exceptions. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 212 (“Since Tinker, the Supreme Court has carved out a number of narrow categories of speech 'that a school may restrict even without the threat of substantial disruption.”). The first exception is set out in Fraser, which we interpreted as prohibiting “ ‘lewd,’ ‘vulgar,’ ‘indecent,’ and ‘plainly offensive’ speech in school. ” Id. at 213 (emphasis added); see also Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 253 (3d Cir.2002) (quoting Saxe’s narrow interpretation of the Fraser exception). The second exception to Tinker is articulated in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, which allows school officials to “regulate school-sponsored speech (that is, speech that a reasonable observer would view as the school’s own speech) on the basis of any legitimate pedagogical concern.” Saxe, 240 F.3d at 214 (citing Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988)).
The Supreme Court recently articulated a third exception to Tinker’s general rule in Morse. Although, prior to the instant case, we have not had an opportunity to analyze the scope of the Morse exception, the Supreme Court itself emphasized the narrow reach of its decision. In Morse, a school punished a student for unfurling, at a school-sponsored event, a large banner containing a message that could reasonably be interpreted as promoting illegal drug use. 551 U.S. at 396, 127 S.Ct. 2618. The Court emphasized that Morse was a school speech case, noting that “[t]he event occurred during normal school hours,” was sanctioned by the school “as an approved social event or school trip,” was supervised by teachers and administrators from the school, and involved performances by the school band and cheerleaders. Id. at 400-01, 127 S.Ct. 2618 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court then held that “[t]he ‘special characteristics of the school environment,’ Tinker, 393 U.S.[ ] at 506[], and the governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse ... allow schools to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use.” Id. at 408, 127 S.Ct. 2618.
Notably, Justice Alito’s concurrence in Morse further emphasizes the narrowness of the Court’s holding, stressing that Morse “stand[s] at the far reaches of what the First Amendment permits.” 551 U.S. at 425, 127 S.Ct. 2618 (Alito, J., concur*313ring). In fact, Justice Alito only joined the Court’s opinion “on the understanding that the opinion does not hold that the special characteristics of the public schools necessarily justify any other speech restrictions,” or restrictions outside of those recognized by the Court in Tinker, Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse. Id. at 423, 127 S.Ct. 2618. Justice Alito also noted that the Morse decision “does not endorse the broad argument ... that the First Amendment permits public school officials to censor any student speech that interferes with a school’s ‘educational mission.’ This argument can easily be manipulated in dangerous ways, and I would reject it before such abuse occurs.” Id. at 423, 127 S.Ct. 2618 (citations omitted). Moreover, Justice Alito engaged in a detailed discussion distinguishing the role of school authorities from the role of parents, and the school context from the “[ojutside of school” context. Id. at 424-25, 127 S.Ct. 2618.
Here, the majority declines to decide whether the School District could have punished J.S.’s speech under the Fraser standard, Majority Op. 298, but concludes that the School District did not violate J.S.’s First Amendment rights because “school authorities could reasonably have forecasted a substantial disruption of or material interference with the school as a result of the MySpace profile, as defined by Tinker,” Id. 290. Because I do not believe that either Tinker or Fraser justifies the School District’s actions in this case, I dissent.
A.
I believe that the District Court correctly concluded that the School District’s suspension of J.S. was unlawful under Tinker. There is no dispute that J.S.’s speech did not cause a substantial disruption in the school. The School District’s counsel conceded this point at oral argument, the District Court explicitly found that “a substantial disruption so as to fall under Tinker did not occur,” App. at 17, and the majority has “no trouble concluding ... that [the specific examples of actual disruption that the School District points to] did not amount to a substantial disruption of the Middle School sufficient to discipline the students for their speech,” Majority Op. 299. Yet, the majority attempts to overcome this considerable hurdle by adopting the standard put forth by several of our sister courts of appeals, which allows schools to meet the Tinker test by showing that a substantial disruption was “reasonably foreseeable.” Id. 299 (citing Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 51 (2d Cir.2008) (holding that Tinker does not require “actual disruption to justify a restraint on student speech”)); Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 591-92, 596 (6th Cir.2007) (“Tinker does not require school officials to wait until the horse has left the barn before closing the door.... [It] does not require certainty, only that the forecast of substantial disruption be reasonable.”); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir.2001) (“Tinker does not require school officials to wait until disruption actually occurs before they may act.”).
I assume, without expressing an opinion, that the “foreseeability” standard is consistent with Tinker;15 nevertheless, I believe *314that to justify the School District’s punishment of J.S. under this test is contrary to Tinker itself. I also believe that the eases on which the majority relies are distinguishable from the instant case. Ultimately, I submit that the facts here do not support the conclusion that a forecast of substantial disruption was reasonable, and I respectfully disagree with my colleagues’ conclusion to the contrary.
In Tinker, the Supreme Court held that “our independent examination of the record fails to yield evidence that the school authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing of the armbands [to protest the Vietnam War] would substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students.” 393 U.S. at 509, 89 S.Ct. 733. Given this holding, it is important to consider the record before the Supreme Court in Tinker and compare it to the facts of this case. The relevant events in Tinker took place in December 1965, the year that over 200,000 U.S. troops were deployed to Vietnam as part of Operation Rolling Thunder. Justice Black dissented in Tinker noting that “members of this Court, like all other citizens, know, without being told, that the disputes over the wisdom of the Vietnam war have disrupted and divided this country as few other issues ever have.” Id. at 524, 89 S.Ct. 733 (Black, J., dissenting). In fact, the Tinker majority itself noted the school authorities’ concern about the effect of the protest on friends of a student who was killed in Vietnam. See id. at 509 n. 3, 89 S.Ct. 733. Justice Black also emphasized the following portions of the record:
the [ ] armbands caused comments, warnings by other students, the poking of fun at them, and a warning by an older football player that other, nonprotesting students had better let them alone. There is also evidence that a teacher of mathematics had his lesson period practically ‘wrecked’ chiefly by disputes with [a protesting student] who wore her armband for her ‘demonstration.’
Id. at 517-18, 89 S.Ct. 733 (Black, J., dissenting). Based on these facts, Justice Black disagreed with the Tinker majority’s holding that the armbands did not cause a *315substantial disruption in school: “I think the record overwhelmingly shows that the armbands did exactly what the elected school officials and principals foresaw they would, that is, took the students’ minds off their classwork and diverted them to thoughts about the highly emotional subject of the Vietnam war.” Id. at 518, 89 S.Ct. 733; see also id. at 524, 89 S.Ct. 733 (“Of course students, like other people, cannot concentrate on lesser issues when black armbands are being ostentatiously displayed in their presence to call attention to the wounded and dead of the war, some of the wounded and the dead being their friends and neighbors.”).
This was the record in Tinker, and yet the majority in that case held that “the record does not demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities,” and thus that the school violated the students’ First Amendment rights. Id. at 514, 89 S.Ct. 733 (emphasis added). Now I turn to our record. J.S. created the profile as a joke, and she took steps to make it “private” so that access was limited to her and her friends. Although the profile contained McGonigle’s picture from the school’s website, the profile did not identify him by name, school, or location. Moreover, the profile, though indisputably vulgar, was so juvenile and nonsensical that no reasonable person could take its content seriously,16 and the record clearly demonstrates that no one did. See, e.g., App. 327 (demonstrating that McGonigle recognized that the students “weren’t accusing me”); Majority Op. 292 (acknowledging that Romberger had a duty to report suspected misconduct, but that she believed the profile was full of “lies and malicious comments” (quotation marks omitted)). Also, the School District’s computers block access to MySpace, so no Blue Mountain student was ever able to view the profile from school. And, the only printout of the profile that was ever brought to school was one that was brought at McGonigle’s express request. Thus, beyond general rumblings, a few minutes of talking in class, and some officials rearranging their schedules to assist McGonigle in dealing with the profile, no disruptions occurred.17
My colleagues acknowledge that the “actual disruption[s]” that the School District points to are no more than “minor inconveniences.” Majority Op. 299. They also concede that it is “difficult to separate the effects that the profile itself had on the school from the effects attributable to McGonigle’s investigation of the profile and subsequent punishment of J.S. and K.L.” Id. 299-300. Yet the majority concludes that a substantial disruption was reasonably foreseeable, given the content *316of J.S.’s speech. I disagree. In comparing our record to the record in Tinker, I do not believe that this Court can apply Tinker’s holding to justify the School District’s actions in this case. As my colleagues acknowledge, an “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 89 S.Ct. 733. If Tinker’s black armbands—an ostentatious reminder of the highly emotional and controversial subject of the Vietnam war—could not “reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities,” id. at 514, 89 S.Ct. 733, neither can J.S.’s profile, despite the unfortunate humiliation it caused for McGonigle.
Moreover, I believe that a comparison of our record to that of Tinker demonstrates that to apply the foreseeability standard adopted by our sister courts of appeals in a principled manner, courts need to define “foreseeability” in a way that is harmonious with Tinker. That is, courts must determine when an “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance” transforms into a reasonable forecast that a substantial disruption or material interference will occur. The majority cites several cases where courts held that a forecast of substantial and material disruption was reasonably foreseeable. See, e.g., Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50-51 (holding that punishment was justified, under Tinker, where a student’s derogatory blog about the school was “purposely designed by [the student] to come onto the campus,” to “encourage others to contact the administration,” and where the blog contained “at best misleading and at worst false information” that the school “need[ed] to correct” (quotation marks and alteration omitted)); Lowery, 497 F.3d at 596 (holding that punishment was justified, under Tinker, where students circulated a petition to fellow football players calling for the ouster of their football coach, causing the school to have to call a team meeting to ensure “team unity,” and where not doing so “would have been a grave disservice to the other players on the team”); LaVine, 257 F.3d at 984, 989-90 (holding that the school district did not violate a student’s First Amendment rights when it expelled him on an emergency basis “to prevent [ ] potential violence on campus” after he showed a poem entitled “Last Words” to his English teacher, which was “filled with imagery of violent death and suicide” and could “be interpreted as a portent of future violence, of the shooting of [] fellow students”).
The majority likens this case to the above cases by contending that the profile was accusatory and capable of “arous[ing] suspicions among the school community about [McGonigle’s] character” because of the “profile’s blatant allusions to McGonigle engaging in sexual misconduct.” Majority Op. 300, 302. As explained above, however, this contention is simply not supported by the record. The profile was so outrageous that no one could have taken it seriously, and no one did. Thus, it was clearly not reasonably foreseeable that J.S.’s speech would create a substantial disruption or material interference in school, and this case is therefore distinguishable from the student speech at issue in Doninger, Lowery, and LaVine.
Moreover, unlike the students in Doninger, Lowery, and LdVine, J.S. did not even intend for the speech to reach the school—in fact, she took specific steps to make the profile “private” so that only her friends could access it. The fact that her friends happen to be Blue Mountain Middle School students is not surprising, and does not mean that J.S.’s speech targeted the school. Finally, the majority’s suggestion that “absent McGonigle’s quick corrective actions to curb [the profile’s] ef*317feet,” a substantial disruption would occur, Majority Op. 24, is directly undermined by the record. If anything, McGonigle’s response to the profile exacerbated rather than contained the disruption in the school. See id. (admitting that it is “difficult to separate the effects that the profile itself had on the school from the effects attributable to McGonigle’s investigation of the profile and subsequent punishment of J.S. and K.L.”).
Finally, I am particularly troubled by the majority’s “hold[ing] that the potential impact of the profile’s language alone is enough to satisfy the Tinker substantial disruption test.” Majority Op. 302. This statement is disconcerting because it sounds like an application of the Fraser standard rather than the Tinker standard. Specifically, the majority appears to be more concerned with the level of vulgarity of J.S.’s speech, than its potential impact. See id. (“We simply cannot agree that a principal may not regulate student speech rising to this level of vulgarity .... ” (emphasis added)).18 In light of the facts of this case—and, specifically, the fact that the profile was so outrageous that no one could have taken it seriously—to focus on the vulgarity of the language is to allow the Fraser exception to swallow the Tinker rule.
The facts simply do not support the conclusion that the School District could have reasonably forecasted a substantial disruption of or material interference with the school as a result of J.S.’s profile. Under Tinker, therefore, the School District violated J.S.’s First Amendment free speech rights when it suspended her for creating the profile.
B.
Because Tinker does not justify the School District’s suspension of J.S., the only way for the punishment to pass constitutional muster is if we accept the School District’s argument—and the District Court’s holding—that J.S.’s speech can be prohibited under the Fraser exception to Tinker.19 The majority notes that the exceptions to Tinker are “narrow,” and yet it “decline[s][ ] to decide whether a school official may discipline a student for her lewd, vulgar, or offensive off-campus speech that has an effect on-campus” under Fraser. Majority Op. 298. I submit that this question has already been decided by the Supreme Court—-Fraser does not apply to off-campus speech. Specifically in Morse, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, emphasized that “[h]ad Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum outside the school context, it would have been protected.” 551 U.S. at 405, 127 S.Ct. 2618 (citing Cohen).20 The *318Court’s citation to the Cohen decision is noteworthy. The Supreme Court in Cohen held that a state may not make a “single four-letter expletive a criminal offense.” 403 U.S. at 26, 91 S.Ct. 1780. Accordingly, Chief Justice Roberts’s reliance on the Cohen decision reaffirms that a student’s free speech rights outside the school context are coextensive with the rights of an adult, such as Cohen.
Thus, under the Supreme Court’s precedent, the Fraser exception to Tinker does not apply here. In other words, Fraser’s “lewdness” standard cannot be extended to justify a school’s punishment of J.S. for use of profane language outside the school, during non-school hours.21
The fact that McGonigle caused a copy of the profile to be brought to school does not transform J.S.’s off-campus speech into school speech. The flaws of a contrary rule can be illustrated by extrapolating from the facts of Fraser itself. As discussed above, the Supreme Court emphasized that Fraser’s speech would have been protected had he delivered it outside the school. Presumably, this protection would not be lifted if a school official or Fraser’s fellow classmate overheard the off-campus speech, recorded it, and played it to the school principal.22 Similarly here, the fact that another student printed J.S.’s profile at the express request of McGonigle does not turn J.S.’s off-campus speech into on-campus speech.
Under these circumstances, to apply the Fraser standard to justify the School District’s punishment of J.S.’s speech is to adopt a rule that allows school officials to punish any speech by a student that takes place anywhere, at any time, as long as it is about the school or a school official, is brought to the attention of a school official, and is deemed “offensive” by the prevailing authority. Under this standard, two students can be punished for using a vulgar remark to speak about their teacher at a private party, if another student overhears the remark, reports it to the school authorities, and the school authorities find the remark “offensive.” There is no principled way to distinguish this hypothetical from the facts of the instant case.
Accordingly, I conclude that the Fraser decision did not give the School District the authority to punish J.S. for her offcampus speech.23
*319III.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the District Court’s judgment and grant summary judgment to J.S. on her First Amendment free-speech claim.
. I agree with my colleagues' conclusion that the School District’s policies were not overbroad or void-for-vagueness, and that the District Court correctly determined that the School District did not violate the Snyders’ Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights. As discussed infra note 11, however, I disagree with my colleagues that 24 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 5-510 did not bar the School District from punishing J.S. for her off-campus speech.
. The question of whether Tinker's “substantial disruption” standard applies to off-campus speech in the first place is not settled. I submit that the majority of the courts answered this question in the affirmative, often citing the following passage in Tinker: "conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason—whether it stems from time, place or type of behavior—materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guaran*314tee of freedom of speech.” 393 U.S. at 513, 89 S.Ct. 733 (emphasis added). I note, however, that the phrase "in class or out of it” does not necessarily indicate the Supreme Court’s approval of the application of Tinker to restrict speech that takes place off-campus and that is not sponsored by the school. Instead, it appears that Tinker was referring to on-campus student speech that occurs outside of the actual classroom, like Fraser's speech at a student assembly. See id. at 514, 89 S.Ct. 733 (concluding that "the record does not demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities, and no disturbance or disorders on the school premises in fact occurred,” even though the students "caused discussion outside of the classrooms ” (emphasis added)).
Interestingly, the majority appears to concede that Tinker’s reference to "out of class” speech only encompasses speech that occurs when a student is "still under school control.” Majority Op. 298. Here, conversely, J.S. was not under “school control” when she created the profile on her parents’ computer on a Sunday. Moreover, in Saxe, this Court emphasized the importance of "geographical and contextual limitations” in confining school districts’ authority over student speech. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 216 & n. 11 (concluding that the school’s anti-harassment policy was constitutionally overbroad because, inter alia, "the Policy does not contain any geographical or contextual limitations” and could "even be read to cover conduct occurring outside the school premises .... [which] would raise additional constitutional questions”). I do not believe we have to answer the difficult question of whether J.S.'s speech constitutes school speech to hold that the School District violated her First Amendment rights in this case.
. I reject the majority’s assertion that “students and parents inevitably would have begun to question McGonigle's demeanor and conduct at school, the scope and nature of his personal interests, and his character and fitness to occupy a position of trust with adolescent children, on account of the profile’s contents.” Majority Op. 301 (emphasis added). This contention is simply not supported by the record.
. My colleagues also emphasize that McGonigle "noticed a severe deterioration in discipline in the Middle School ... following the publication of the profile and the punishment of J.S. and K.L.” Majority Op. 300. The facts that McGonigle cites to support this proposition, see supra, p. 290, demonstrate that these disruptions were not ones that arose out of the creation of the profile itself, but rather, were the direct result of the School District’s response to the profile and the ensuing litigation. As set forth earlier, I do not believe that the deterioration in discipline that followed McGonigle’s punishment of J.S. and K.L. is relevant to determining the level of disruption that the profile caused, or could reasonably have been expected to cause, in the school.
. To draw distinctions based on "levels of vulgarity” is generally antithetical to the First Amendment. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971) (noting "one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric. Indeed, we think it is largely because governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style largely to the individual.”); see also Morse, 551 U.S. at 409, 127 S.Ct. 2618 (declining to extend Fraser to cover all speech deemed "offensive” and noting that “much political and religious speech might be perceived as offensive to some.”).
. Indisputably, neither Kuhlmeier nor Morse governs this case.
. Notably, in Morse, Chief Justice Roberts also cited Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Fraser, which noted, ”[i]f respondent had given the same speech outside of the school environment, he could not have been penalized simply because government officials considered his language to be inappropriate.” Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688, 106 S.Ct. 3159 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Cohen).
. The School District notes that the courts in Doninger and Bethlehem Area School District suggested that Fraser applies to vulgar off-campus speech. See Doninger, 527 F.3d at 49 ("It is not clear ... [whether] Fraser applies to off-campus speech.”); Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d at 867 (“[W]e are not convinced that reliance solely on Tinker is appropriate.”). These cases are not only not binding on this Court, but also both Doninger and Bethlehem Area School District ultimately relied on Tinker, not Fraser, in upholding school censorship. Thus, the courts’ suggestion that the Fraser standard may apply to off-campus speech is dicta. Most importantly, that dicta is undermined directly by Chief Justice Roberts’s statement in Morse: “Had Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum outside the school context, it would have been protected.” 551 U.S. at 405, 127 S.Ct. 2618 (citing Cohen, 403 U.S. at 15, 91 S.Ct. 1780). The most logical reading of Chief Justice Roberts’s statement prevents the application of Fraser to speech that takes place off-campus, during non-school hours, and that is in no way sponsored by the school.
. Note that the question of whether a school has the authority to punish a student who brings vulgar speech into school is separate from whether the school can punish the source of that speech.
. I disagree with the majority's holding that 24 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 5-510 did not bar the School District from punishing J.S. for her off-campus speech. Section 5-510 limited the authority of the School District to:
adopt and enforce such reasonable rules and regulations ... regarding the conduct and deportment of all pupils attending the *319public schools in the district, during such time as they are under the supervision of the board of school directors and teachers, including the time necessary spent in coming to and returning from school.
Id. (emphasis added). The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has interpreted this provision to prohibit a school district from punishing students for conduct occurring outside of school hours—even if such conduct occurs on school property. See D.O.F. v. Lewisburg Area Sch. Dist. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 868 A.2d 28 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004).
All of the integral events in this case occurred outside the school, during non-school hours. Accordingly, I believe that § 5-510 barred the School District from punishing J.S.