The sole issue presented here is whether defendant city has authority to adopt and enforce within the city a requirement for building construction which is more stringent than that provided in the state building code.
The state, acting through its Department of Commerce, brought suit to enjoin defendants from enforcing a city ordinance specifically requiring "double wall” construction of all buildings within the city. Under the state code "single wall” construction is allowed. After a trial the circuit court held that the challenged ordinance conflicted with the "Structural Specialty Code” (Oregon Administrative Rules, ch 814, § 26-005) of the state building code, ORS 456.730 through 456.885, and enjoined defendants from enforcing the ordinance. The trial court concluded that the subject matter was of general state concern; that statewide uniformity was necessary; and that the state code therefore must be held to have preempted the field.
Defendants appeal contending that the court erred because (1) the ordinance is not in conflict with the state building code; and (2) ORS 456.730 to 456.910 as applied to defendants deprive the people of Troutdale of the right of local self-government as guaranteed by the home rule provisions of the Oregon Constitution (Art IV, § 1 and Art XI, § 2).
Defendant city is a municipal corporation. It adopted its home rule charter in 1942 and by virtue thereof may exercise all municipal powers that can be exercised by any Oregon city. Pursuant to this charter defendant city on July 9, 1974, enacted its Ordinance No. 202, which requires that all homes constructed in defendant city be built with a double wall exterior covering. The state structural code was adopted pursuant to an enactment of the 1973 legislature. It became effective on July 1, 1974.
*96ORS 456.775 (1) of the state building code provides:
"The state building code shall be applicable and uniform throughout this state and in all municipalities therein, and no municipalities shall enact or enforce any ordinance, rule or regulation in conflict therewith.”
The above declaration of legislative intent is not binding on the courts with respect to constitutional questions. State ex rel Heinig v. Milwaukie et al, 231 Or 473, 373 P2d 680 (1962).
Testimony on behalf of plaintiff dealt with the importance of statewide uniformity and the detrimental effects of allowing each municipality to make changes in the uniform code, particularly with respect to factory-produced homes.
The defendants’ evidence tended to stress the need for providing better protection for Troutdale home buyers than that provided by the state code.
First, we must determine if there is a conflict between the city’s ordinance and the state building code. We cannot agree with defendants’ contention that the city’s ordinance does not conflict with the state building code. The state code permits single wall construction of sufficient strength; the city ordinance requires double wall construction without regard to strength. Here there is clearly a conflict as to method of construction. We are not here dealing with certain other parts of the state code which provide for local variations.
The more difficult question is whether the subject matter is one of predominantly local concern or statewide concern. Both the state and the city have important interests in the subject matter.
In the leading case of State ex rel Heinig v. Milwaukie et al, supra at 479, our Supreme Court said:
"An enactment is not of state-wide interest simply because the legislature decides that each of the cities in the state should be governed by the same law. In the appropriate case the need for uniformity in the operation *97of the law may be a sufficient basis for legislative pre-emption. * * *”
We believe that this is such a case. Accord: Warren Park Estates v. Tp. Comm. E. Windsor, 136 NJ Super 180, 345 A2d 346 (1975); City of Minnetonka v. Mark Z. Jones Assn., 306 Minn 217, 236 NW2d 163 (1975). Applying the balancing test set forth in Heinig, we conclude that the state’s interest in the subject of adequate housing and uniform building standards is paramount. Local concerns must yield to the more compelling concern of statewide uniformity in the area involved here. A variety of local municipal building regulations would defeat the declared state policy of a uniform building code. As the trial judge observed in his letter opinion:
"* * * Uniformity is particularly important as the [housing] industry is embarking on the era of the mass or factory constructed home. * * *”
We cannot accept defendants’ contention that the state code requirement for single wall construction merely provides for a minimum requirement, and that any city is free to adopt more stringent requirements. Not only is this contrary to ORS 456.775(1) and 456.755 (1), it would destroy uniformity and in effect be permitting the city to do indirectly that which it cannot do directly. See, City of LaGrande v. PERB, 28 Or App 9, 558 P2d 1236 (1977).
Likewise we cannot accept defendants’ further contention that ORS 456.785 and the state structural code delegate to local jurisdictions general authority to initiate amendments or modify standards for exterior wall construction to meet local conditions. To the contrary this authority is carefully circumscribed by the statutes and the code itself. It is not a grant of unfettered discretion to local jurisdiction as defendants argue. Baum Electric Co. v. City of Huntington Beach, 33 Cal App3d 573, 109 Cal Rptr 260 (1973), relied upon by defendants, is inapposite since there the state law specifically authorized cities to modify the state electrical code. State ex rel Heinig v. Milwaukie et *98al, supra; Beaverton v. I. A. Fire Fighters, 20 Or App 293, 531 P2d 730, Sup Ct review denied (1975); and City of Hermiston v. ERB, 27 Or App 755, 557 P2d 681 (1976), do not compel a different result in the case at bar. Each of these cases involved attempted state regulation in an area of paramount local concern. In none of those cases, unlike the case at bar, was there shown to be a compelling necessity for statewide uniformity with respect to the subject matter. Their reasoning therefore does not apply here.
Summarizing, we conclude as follows: (1) the state building code has preempted the field with respect to the subject matter involved here; (2) ORS 456.730 to 456.910 and the state building code do not violate the home rule provisions of the Oregon Constitution; (3) Ordinance No. 202 is null and void; and (4) defendants should be and are enjoined from enforcing it. See, Dent v. Oregon City, 106 Or 122, 211 P 909 (1923).
Affirmed.